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I.  THE  MULTINATIONAL  ENTERPRISE  A.tiEAD  OF  ITS ~ 
1. Stating the  problem 
We  are living in a  world where  our  thougths  and  a.ctions 
will be determined to an  ever increasing extent internationally. 
It therefore sound  paradoxical to have  to observe that it is 
precisely the multinational enterprise that is becoming  the object 
or increasing criticism. 
For  a  proper understanding of this paradoxical situation, 
a  distinction needs  to be  made  between  two  fields of tension. 
The  first of them  is located between enterprise and  society. 
For  the multinational enterprise there is a  second field of tension 
stemming  from  the fact that the multinational enterprise has  an 
international standpoint. Owing  to its international position,  the 
zmfltinational enterprise is confronted with the interests of the 
national communities  in which it is active. Before  going further 
into this situation, a  definition is-given below  of what  we  under-
stand by  the term multinational enterprise. 
2.  Definition of multinational enterprises. 
The  multinational enterprise is an  enterprise which  carries 
out business activities on  a  permanent basis in several countries 
and  attunes  these activities to each  other. 
This  definition has  deliberately been  kept wide,  so as  to 
link up  as  well as  possible with linguistic usage.  Thousands  of 
enterprises which  are involved in the  national economy  in various 
countries  through their more  or less permanent  local activities, 
come  under  the heading of multinational enterprises. - 2  -
A characteristic of the multinational enterprise is  the  coordi-
nation of activities in the various  countries.  The  activities be-
longing to the group  are attuned to each other within the  framework 
of common  objectives  and  a  common  strategy. 
Nothing is said in this definition about  the  degree of multina-
tionality.  Indeed,  this  may  be highly divergent.  At  the  foot  of the 
ladder are  the enterprises which  are active in only a  few  countries 
and  where  the activities and  business  management  are  dominated  by 
the  country in which  the  head  office is established.  At  the  top of 
the  ladder are the enterprises whose  activities are  open  to in-
fluences  from  many  countries  and  the  management  of ,.rhich  endeavours 
to give  a  direction,  from  a  worldwide  standpoint,  to activities  that 
are spread throughout the world. 
The  degree  of multinationality wilJ  also be  reflected in the 
financial structure of the enterprise.  If assets  and  shareholders 
are spread over several countries,  then the multinational character 
is reinforced. 
The  degree  to which  an enterprise unites severa1 nationalities 
in the  management  is also determinant for the nature of the  manage-
ment  structure.  The  enterprise in which  the best man  is appointed 
regardless  of nationality has  more  right to be  cal1.ed  mu_l tinationo.J 
Gha~ the  group in which  national preferences  prevail. 
For the way  in which  a  multinational enterprise adopts  its 
sta11dpoint, it is further of importance  to make  a  distinction between 
multinational enterprises  that have  a  centralised or a  decentralised 
method  of O.ecision-mak1ng.  In general,  the  principiA  of decentrali.sa-
tion is gaining ground.  L~ a  large international concern,  flexibili-
ty can  only be preserved by  a  great measure  of independence  and  own 
responsability on  the  part of the local managers.  The  central control 
exists  on  the basis  of plans  covering several years,  budgets  and 
management  information systems  and  criteria.  These  instru~ents offer 
the possibility of coordinating group activities in the  fields  of 
research,  production and  sales.  The  most  important investment deci-
sions,  the  financing  and  the  appointment policy for  top officials 
ge~erally remain  a  central matter. - 3-
According  as  the multinational enterprise appl.ies  a  decentra-
lised policy, it will prove easier for it to adopt a  pluriform 
standpoint in the different countries in which it is active.  An  effi-
cient policy formation,  however,  depends  to a  large extent on  the 
type  and  function of the individual enterprise. 
3.  Typology  and  functions  of multinational enterprises 
1)  Extractive firms 
Far back in history,  enterprises already sought for sources  of 
minerals  and oils overseas  in order to supply local requirements. 
In this  case,  the  purpose  of the foreign investments  was  to safeguard 
the supply of raw  materials for  processing and  consumption by the 
firm itself. Obvious  examples  of this are  mining  companies,  oil com-
panies  and  food  firms with plantations in tropical regions.  The  signi-
ficance  of this category of enterprises is of a  twofold  nature. 
First of all, in most  cases  long years  of experience and  know-how 
are present on  the production side, which  are further promoted  by 
research.  The  strength of these  enterprises also lies in an inter-
national distribution system that is built up.  Moreover,  the latter 
point does  not hold true for natural products which  are sold on  the 
world market in that form. 
2)  The  life-cycle enterprises 
Many  American  enterprises started to give an  international 
slent to their activities after a  certain saturation point had  been 
reached on  the advanced  national market.  In  developing new  markets 
abroad, it vas possible to benefit from  the  know-how  and  experience 
already acquired on  their own  market.  We  thus  see that the major 
selling waves  for washing  machines,  refrigerators and  television 
sets in Europe  followed,  with some  time  lag,  the initial sales peaks 
in the  United States.  In the last phase  of the life-cycle of the 
product,  the advance  has  disappeared,  competition increases  and 
the yield will decline.  The  group,  which  has  meanwhile  started 
operating internationally, will convert itself into the  type men-
tioned under 3  and 4. - 4-
J)  The  synergic enterprises 
A number  of enterprises have  opted from  the very outset for a 
multinational standpoint.  Especially in Europe,  several enterprises 
were  obliged, because of the limited nature of their own  domestic 
market,  to adjust their activities beforehand to sales on various 
markets.  Firms  which  were  willing or able to make  this move  were  in 
general in a  position to  offer something specific.  They  had  an  ad-
vance  over possible competitors,either of a  technical or of a  commer-
cial nature.  Many  multinational enterprises  now  see their strength 
reside in a  policy that is aimed  at renewal,  by means  of research 
activity permanently geared to this.  If it is desired to organise 
these research activities in an  optimum  way,  then the  cost must  be 
spread over a  maximum  sales area.  In many  cases,  this  means  a  decent 
share  on  the  most  important world  markets.  Conversely,  this interna-
tional spread of activities is expected to lead to a  synergy,  a  fa-
vourable mutual  influence and  support for  these activities. 
Various  factors  further play a  role in the decisions  as  to 
whether  exports will be  made  to foreign markets  or whether goods 
will be  produced locally, either in the firm's  own  establishments  or 
under licence.  Factors  that may  be  mentioned  here are  customs  barriers, 
continuity,  service to customers,  scope  of the market,  local esta-
blishment factors,  etc. 
4)  The  internally specialised group 
A new  category,  which  came  to the  fore especially in the 1960s, 
is the multinational enterprise which  proceeds  to increasing speciali-
sation within the  group.  We  see that the motor  industry and  the 
electro-technical industry already had  establishments in many  countries 
with local production for the local market.  Gradually,  shifts occur 
here,  and  this means  that the different subsidiaries specialise in 
the  manufacture of certain components,  which  are made  for the world 
market.  The  assembly  then occurs  at a  central point or,  where  this 
proves  better,  regionally or locally. -s-
As  appears  from  the  foregoing,  the multinational enterprises 
are in a  position to make  use  of the relative cost advantages  offered 
by each  countr.y.  On  the other hand,  international specialisation and 
trade are promoted  to an  accelerated degree by this development. 
5)  The  financially oriented enterprises  (conglomeratea) 
Many  entrepreneurs have  seen the multinational enterprise as 
a  means  of risk-spreading.  These  risks may  be of various  types. 
Cyclical fluctuations  do  not occur simultaneously all over  the world, 
so that an appropriate geographical spread of ac-tivities is to  the 
benefit of a  stable development  of the multinational enterprise. 
The  risk of nationalisation is also reduced by  the multinational 
enterprise. 
It is mainly  the multinational enterprises  coming  under  types 
41  3  and 2  in which  there is the greatest need,  from  the point of 
view of business efficiency,  for a  coordination of the group acti-
vities.  In the  ease  of.conglomerates,the policy can be  carried out 
in a  more  decentralised way,  except for the financial aspects. 
In the concrete multinational enterprise,  we  find  in most 
cases  a  combination of a  number  of typical features.  The  objectives 
of the multinational enterprise may  however  be  highly divergent. 
Nevertheless,  they all have  one  point in common  :  the  constant 
s~eking after an  overall - in the sense of worldwide - optimum  in 
production,  research and  distribution. 
Within the  framework  of its own  objectives,  the multinational 
enterprise fulfils a  nomber  of social functions.  Stated in general 
terms,  the multinational enterprise plays  a  central role in the 
internationalisation of industrial developments  and  other business 
activities.  In this way,  it contributes to the geographical spread 
of welfare.  In addition,  a  nomber  of specific functions  may  be 
distinguished. 
First of all, the multinational enterprise_has at its disposal 
an international pool consisting of capital, management  and  technical - 6-
experience,  research,  production capacities  and  access  to  the world 
~~~ets. The  multinational enterprise can  always  fall back on  this 
pool  and  employthe  best know-how  and  manpower.  The  pool available 
to the multinational enterprise is, more  particularly,  of great 
value for  the  developing countries.  With  respect to  ind~trial 
countries,  the multinational enterprise acts  rather as  a  clearing-
house  in the  transmission of knowledge  and  experience  and  the 
transfer of capital and  experts. 
A second function performed by the multinational enterprise 
is  that of arbitrage.  The  multinational enterprise will take  account 
of international differences in costs  and  prices  in its  policy consi-
derations.  Labour-intensive  production will be  startP.d up  in low-wage 
countries, if the total procluction and  distribution costs  prove  to 
be  lower.  Sales will preferably be  concentrated on  the markets  with 
the highestyields.  In this way,  the multinational enterprise  contri-
butes  to a  certain levelling-off,  internationally speaking,  in the 
remun8ration  of the  production factors  capital and  labour,  as  well 
as in the  price  of the  final product. 
i1.  thi.rd function that mey  be  attributed to  the  m1;l tinational 
enterrrise is that of catalyst of new  international structures  in 
trade  and  industry.  In the  case  of the multinational enterprise, 
new  ideas  and  techniques  are rapidly passed  on  by means  of the 
international radius  of action.  Penetration on  new  markets  leads  to 
keener  competitive relationships  and  the break-up of existing patterns. 
It is not only through the enterprise's  own  growth that an  endeavour 
is made  to achieve  the  most  favourable  possible structure from  the 
overall point of view.  In the 1960s,  especially,  an  extremely large 
number  of mergers  and  take-overs  occurred  among  the big concerns. 
Structural adjustments  in businesses  and  branches  of activity were 
carried out at an  accelerated pace.  In cases where  multinational 
enterprises were  lacking,  or were  insufficient in nomber,  we  see that 
these structural changes  either failed to materialise in certain 
branches  of activity,  or else were  carried out to an  inadequate 
extent. - 7-
I  am  thinking,  for instance,  of the textile industry, where  a 
European  or international regrouping  could have  brought about a 
considerable strengthening and  concentration of forces. 
4·  Scope  and  develogment  of multinational enterprises 
Statistical data about the  scope  and  growth  of multinational 
enterprises are scarce and  incomplete.  We  do  indeed find reliable data 
with respect to the investments  of US  enterprises  abroad,  which  would 
make  up  about 60 %  of all foreign investments. 
Annex  I  gives  a  survey of  'US  Direct Investments  Abroad  by 
Major  Area'.  The  total direct investments  of US  enterprises  abroad 
show  an  increase from  $ 40.7 bilJion in 1963  to  ~ 78.1 billion in 1970, 
which  means  that they almost doubled  in seven years'  time.  Investments 
in industrial countries  show  a  definitely greater increase than those 
in developing  countries.  The  most  marked  growth  occurs  in the  E"SC, 
where  American  investments  rose in the  period under  review from  ~~  4. 5 
billion to$ 11.7 billion, i.e., by 160  ~. 
On  an overall basis,  the  spread of  US  direct investments  abroad 
is now  :  1/3 in developing  countries  and  2/3  in industrial countries. 
About  1/3 is invested in Europe  and  slightly less  than 1/3 in Canada. 
The  small amount  of investments  in Japan is striking :  $ 1.5 billion 
in 1970. 
From  Annex  II  'US  Direct  Investments by Major  Industries' it m~ 
be deduced  that the  investments  in 'Manufacturing'  and  'Other Industries' 
rose  more  quickly in 1963-1970  to a  total of $  50  billion than in the 
categories  'Mining  and  Smelting'  and  'Petroleum'. 
Annex  III lists  ''11le  Value  of Foreign Direct Investments  in the 
US  by Major  Industry and  ·country - End  of 1970'.  Of  the  total amount 
of~ 13.2 billion of investments in the  US  in 1970,  $  9.5 billion  ca~e 
from  Europe.  Investments  from  Europe  have  increased by about  50  ~j  since 
1967.  Traditional investors  in the  US  are Great Britain,  the  Netherlands 
and  Switzerland,  which  account for  80  %  of the  investments  originating 
from  Europe. - 8  -
As  regards  the total df direct foreign investments  in the world, 
originating from  free  countries,  only estimates are  known.  Jack 
Behrma~ in his  book  'National  Interests  and  the  MUltinational 
Enterprise'  estimates  the  total at $ 140  billion in 1969.  Mr.  Judd 
Polk of the  US  Council  of the  International  Chamb9r  of Commerce  co~es 
to  the  conclusion,  on  the basis  of rough  calculations,  that  ~ 1  of 
direct foreign investment yields  about  .$  2  turnover per annum.  If we 
were  to place  the direct foreign investments  at about  ~ 150  billion 
for 1970,  then the  turnover of foreign subsidiaries amounts  to  :~  300 
billion,  equal  to the  gross  national product of France,  Italy and  the 
Benelux  countries  together,  or 12  %  of the gross  national product of 
the free world. 
It is a striking fact that the annual  growth  of the  US  direct 
foreibn investments  by approx.  10  %  as  well as  of the  European invest-
ments  in the  US  by  just over 14  %,  exceeds  the growth of the gross 
nati:mal product in the  indus trial countries.  This  indicates  that the 
multinational enterprises  are playing an  important  and  growing  role 
in the world  economy. 
The  greatly increased industrialisation in the world is reflected 
in world  trade, 2/J. of which  now  consists of industrial goods.  In the 
period 1963-1970,  world  trade increased  B.IL~ually by  just over 10  %. 
Trade  among  the developed  countries  rose more  markedly,  by over  1.2  % 
per annu.rn. 
Attention .is  drawn  to a  remarkable  phenomenon  :  the  economic 
relations among  the  industrial countries are becoming  ever more 
intensive  and  this applies  to trade as well as  to direct foreign 
investments.  Developments  in both fields  are almost parallel,  although 
one  is  i~clined to assume  that foreign investments  are  increasing 
somewhat  more  rapidly than trade. 
As  an  explanation o.f  the quite spectacular growth  of the inter-
national activities of enterprises,  reference  may  be  made  to three 
factors. - 9  -
In the first place,  a  great many  initiatives were  developed 
after the war  for regulating monetar,y  and  commercial  relations,  in 
which  connection special mention may  be  made  of the arrangements  made 
in the  IMF  and  the  GATT. 
Furtherm?re,  regional integration - more  particularly,  the  EEC  -
has  e~erted a  powerful  impetus  on  the  internationalisation of European 
firms  and  on  the penetration of American  enterprises in Europe. 
Lastly,  technical progress in traffic and  communications  has 
stimulated the  expansion of international  economic  activities. 
The  post-war period has  been  characterised by  an  a.lmost  uninter-
rupted and  steep rise in welfare.  One  cannot escape  the  impression that 
the multinational enterprise,  as  linchpin of an industrialisation at 
the international level, has  obviously made  a  powerful contribution 
to this growth of welfare. 
5.  Enterprise and  society 
The  upsurge  and  penetration of the multinational enterprise in 
economic  life give  rise to  tensions,  as indicated in the statement 
of the problem.  In part,  these  tensions  do  not relate specifically to 
the multinational character, but to the large enterprise and  in general 
to  the  system of corporate production in the Western countries.  The 
enterprise has  contributed to an  unequalled extent to increasing the 
prosperity.  The  growth  of production has  however  been accompanied  by 
disquieting secondary phenomena  with respect to the nature and  quality 
of our existence.  Certainly in the Western industrial countries,  the 
growth of prosperity is no  longer regarded as solely a  blessing. 
The  wellbeing of human  society is obviously being given priority over 
the increase in prosperity. 
The  'Rome  Club'  has  pointed,  not without reason,  to the dangers 
of an  exponential growth  :  exhaustion of the natural reserves  and 
increasing contamination and  destruction of nature. ~  critics go 
so far in their calls for more wellbeing, better protection of the 
environment,  and  less wqrk  effort, that they tend to forget that their 
wishes  can hardly be  fulfilled without economic  growth. - 10  -
Indeed,  few  people will accept a  decline  in prosperity.  Economic  growth 
wiJ.l.,  however  need  to be  directed more  towards  the quality of existence. 
Waste  products  should be  brought back into the  economic  circuit.  The 
price  and  market mechanism  and  the financial yield calculations of 
enterprises,  however,  give  inadequate  expression to the  s~crifices of 
a  general and  social nature which  the  community  makes  for the benefit 
of growth.  The  government will consider it as  part of its task to  take 
supplementary action here. 
In the field of mru1agement  and  personal relations,  too,  new 
conceptions  are  called  for as  regards  a  say in matters,  motivation, 
development  possibilities and  work  relationships.  The  function of the 
enterprise is  ~adc subordinate in these  days  to  the  norms  and  ideas 
existing in the  commm1ity;  in other words,  a  process has  got under way 
that may  be  described  as  an integration of the enterprise in society. 
If the enterprise  comes  to be  open  to social ideas, it will need  to 
give its own  form  and  content to them,  adjusted to  the  function  and 
method  of the  enterprise.  naturally,  this  process  does  not go  ahead 
without a  hitch.  Conflict situations arise mainly from  the  fear that 
large enterprises might  have  the  power  to disregard social  nor~s  a~d 
responsabilities. 
6.  The  multinational enterprise and  the national  community 
Naturally,  this  fear applies  to an  even greater extent to  the 
even more  'intungible'multinational enterpris8s,  with head  offices 
abroad where  decisions  are  taken that affect the national interests. 
In this way,  a  second  field of tension is  created between  the multina-
tional  cna~acter of the  multinational enterprise and  the national 
community. 
The  national  co~~m1ity is  unaccustomed  to the multinational 
enterpr.i.~~e.  The  new  element is  equated with loss  of identity and 
independence.  The  fear  that the local subisidiary of a  multinational 
enterprise may  take insufficient account of the national objectives 
in the social,  economic  and  political fields,  results partly from 
ignorance  of the  purpose  and  method  of the multinational enterprisF - 11  -
It is prompted  partly by the ass,umed  position of strength occupied by 
the multinational enterprise.  Obviously,  the behaviour of each multi-
national enterprise cannot always  be  defended,  but the anxiety all too 
easi~ outstrips the benefits which  the multinational enterprise  confers 
on  the local community,  as  explained in the  foregoing. 
Another  cabse of the field of tension resides in the  changes  in 
society which  the multinational enterprise consciously or unconsciously 
brings  about and  the need  for adjustment they entail.  Penetration by 
the multinational enterprise is accompanied by the introduction of new 
ideas,  techniques  and methods  of business management.  In fact,  the 
enterprise often bears  the brunt of the demands  made  by science and 
technique.  This  technical progress has  in fact constantly called in 
question the social and  economic  structure and  the cultural pattern. 
The  multinational enterprise here acts  as  an  ac~lerator in the adjust-
ment  process.  In contrast to the industrialised western countries,  the 
arrival of the multinational enterprise in developing  countries in-
volves  much  more  thorough  changes  which  influence the entire pattern 
of life. 
The  tensions  referred to above  are triggered off mainly in the 
case of a  dominant  position of the multinational enterprise in the 
host country.  This  is  practi~ally never of a  general nature, but is 
centred on a  specific branch or market.  In the  case of multinational 
enterprises of American  origin,  for  ex~mple, we  may  mention sectors 
such as  computers,  nuclear energy and  space travel.  There  then exists 
in the host countries a  fear of dependence  and  curtailment of their 
own  development opportunities.  The  question remains,  however,  of how 
a  better equilibrium can be achieved.  A policy of aloofness  m~ keep 
the foreign investors out, but it cuts off the  country itself from 
advanced  developments~ MOre  appropriate is an open-door policy,  provided 
that nations+ industry, by cooperation with foreign firms,  gains  access 
to the  newly  acquired knowledge  and  its applications.  The  restoration 
of equilibrium must  then primarily be  sought by acquiring a  prominent 
position in other sectors as  a  point of departure for an  international 
division of work. - 12  -
Tensions  are also  the  consequence  of the internationalisation 
of trade  and  industry  1  with vrhich  international cooperation in the 
political field does  not keep  pace.  Naturally,  the multinational 
enterprise is subject to the legislation and  the executive authority 
of the  country in which it is active.  Each  country,  however,  has  only 
partially jurisdiction over the multinational enterprise,  insofar as 
the activities v.r:ithin  that country are  concerned.  For the group as 
such,  with its overall stre.tegy and  flexibility,  no  international 
legal  fra~evrork exists.  Likewise,  the  argmnent  is often used that at 
the  internr~tional level  the  countervailing powers  for creating a  de 
facto situation of equiJibrivm are  lacking.  This  argument however 
assumes  a  merely rel.s.ti  ve  significance if the naticnal  countervailing 
powers  which  limit the multinational enterprise in its international 
freedom  of movement  are  taken into consideration. 
A number  of intern&.tional agreements  exert an influence  on  the 
activities of the multinational enterprises,  ~ore particularly the 
GATT  and  the  I:t-1F.  The  purpose  of the  GATT  was  to promote  internaticnal 
trade by a  gradual dismantling of tariffs and  trade barriers based on 
the most-favoured  t'lation  principle.  The  Il.W  - to put matters in a 
highly sirr.plified way  - p1ayed  a  complementary role with respect  to 
payments  on  the basis of fixed exchange  rates. 
The  GATT  is  mainly attuned  to trade among  the  industrial countries. 
International economic  relations  have  however  acquired new  characteristics. 
It is no  lonser exclusively a  question of the abolition of trade barriers 
in favour  of a  free  entry on  the  export market.  The  conditions  under 
which  industrial and  business activities  can be  engaged  in on  ·the  spot 
are becoming  of ever ereater importance.  The  social,  economic  and 
political climate exerts  an influence  on  such questions  as  where  invest-
ments  occur,  where  activities are  undertaken  and  what  kind of industrial 
and  economic  structure is  developed.  It is the national  govern1nents  that 
are responsible for this  cliffiate  and  that decide which  national interests 
prevail in this  connection,  although international repercussions  also 
pl~ a  role in the decisions. - .13  -
Furthermor~, the problem  of the developing countries is being 
given increasing attention.  In GATT  and  UNCTAD,  adequate  forms  of 
cooperation bet~en industrial and  developing  countries are being 
sought.  Up  to  the  present,  however,  coordination and  cooperation in 
the field of international economic  relations are  incomplete,  a.nd 
there are consequently obstacles  and.discrepancies in the  competitive 
relationships  in the world. 
The  multinational enterprise  can  perform a  useful function if 
it enables  the local advantages  to come  to fruition in the pattern of 
an international division of labour.  The  artificial differences 
resulting from  the  lack of international coordination in the political 
field will however  exercice  just as  much  influence on  the behaviour 
of the enterprise.  The  multinational enterprise is  then sometimes 
reproached for  the fact that the  intended effect of national policy, 
e.g., in the field of taxation,  monetary movements  or promotion of 
exports, is undermined.  It cannot be  denied that the·national states 
are limited more  than previouslY in their choice with respect to the 
instruments  for the execution of a  national policy, which  means  that 
the  attainment of the national objectives in the social and  economic 
field may  also be  impeded. 
Converse~, the multinational enterprise will experience the 
lack of international cooperation and  rules as  a  constant disregard 
for its mult.inational or global points of departure,  a.s  a  national 
fragmentation and- all too often- a  merely arbitrary limitation of 
its field of action and  as  discriminatory treatment in cases where 
preference is given to a  country's  own  naticnals. 
In this way,  there exists an  oppositicn between  the multinational 
enterprise,  which  aims  at optimum  relationships within the  internation-
ally active group,  and  the  national state,which feels itself to be 
primarily responsible for  the wellbeing of its citizens.  The  same  holds 
true for the  trade union organisation, which will feel obliged in the 
first instance to defend the interests of its members.  The  responsibi-
lity of the multinational enterprise,  on  the other hand,  applies  to 
all those  concerned with its activities, - shareholders  as well as - 14  -
workers  from  different countries.  Its point of departure is  thus 
essentially international. 
To  sum  up, it may  be  stated that the multinational enterprise 
has  to a  marked  degree  outstripped the developments  in the political, 
social and  institutional field.  This  poses  a  dilemma  :  must  the multi-
natior~al enterprise adjust itself to the  demands  made  by the national 
economy  and  society,  or conversely,  should - for example  - governments 
and  workers  adopt an  international approach  ?  We  shall try to give  an 
answer  to this question,  more  especially in chapter II. 
7.  Interplay b§...tli-,8en  government  and  industry 
The  national government  is  confronted with multinational enter-
prises with a  turnover  that is sometimes  higher than the gross  national 
product  and  which  shows  firmer growth  than  the national economy.  The 
sentiments  that are felt about  the  multinational enterprise are mixed. 
On  the  one  hand,  there  is  the  fear that the nation's  own  policy will be 
threatened with  the  danger of being undermined by the strength and 
flexibility of the  multinational enterprise.  On  the other hand,  the 
utility of a  multinational enterprise is recognised.  It can bring 
employment  and  prosperity,  reinforce the industrial pattern and  ensure 
transmissicn of knowledge  and  experience.  The  attitude of a  country 
will differ depending  on  whether it acts  as  country of origin or as 
host country.  The  position differs yet again if the  headquarters  of 
a  relatively large  number  of multinational enterprises are established 
in one  country,  or else if a  developing  country is dependent  on  the 
readiness  of  fore~gn enterprises  to invest. 
Government  and  enterprise are,  from  many  points  of view,  inter-
dependent.  The  enterprise regards  the government  as  a  valvable partner, 
for example,  for  cooperation in the  research field,  government  contracts, 
infrastructural arrangements  for  the benefit of investment  ~rejects, 
and  protection in respect of  trade  policy.  The  f.Overnment  seeks  to 
create an  economic  and  industrial climate  such that the  entrepreneurs' 
activities will be  harmonised with the  objectives  of government  policy. 
The  government  needs  the  enterprise for  the  performance  of its  tasks - 15-
with respect to full employment,  monetary stability, balance of payments 
equilibrium, social  justice,  optimum  growth and  improved living condit-
ions, but above  all as  primary source  of income  and  prosperity. 
An  extensive range of means  are available  t:J  the  government, 
varying  from  general legal provisions  to voluntary consultation and 
cooperation.  The  government  may  expect  the multinational enterprise to 
conduct itself as  a  good  citizen.  In the  case of observance  of legal 
measures,  the multinational enterprise will find this an  obvious  matter. 
An  exception must be made  for conflict situations in which  the multi-
national enterprise is compelled by host country and  country of origin 
to  follow prescriptions that contradict each other for subsidiary and 
parent company  respectively.  In these  cases,  national laws  have  conse-
quences  reaching beyond  the borders.  Examples  are the anti-trust lezis-
lation in the  US  and  the restrictions still existing in that country on 
the supply of strategic goods  to East European  countries. 
Not  so much  from  the point of view of legal measures,  but precise-
ly at the level of voluntary contacts and  interplay,  the government will 
want  to be  ensured of the  complete  cooperation of the multinational 
enterprise.  A careful harmonisation of  tasks  and  activities may  ~ive 
rise to difficulties if the local establishment of a  foreiGn enterprise 
is sensitive  in the first place  to  the indications it receives  from  the 
parent company.  Conversely,  the multinational enterprise wonders  whether 
the host country is prepared to involve  the subsidiary company  in the 
stimulation of development  in certain branches  of industry by  research 
contracts,  supplies or even subsidies.  A great many  questions arise here, 
such~as: who  profits  from  such activities and  do  they in fact prove 
entirely to the benefit of the host country  ? 
The  community  expects  the government  to be  increasingly attentive 
to social objectives  and  to render them  valid in the interplay with 
enterprises.  The  government will want  to acquire certainty on  this point, 
without in eeneral going so far as  to occupy  the entrepreneur's seat 
itself.  Nor  is  the government  in a  position to link the  conduct of the 
entrepreneur in detail to legal provisions.  There  thus  always  remains  a 
great measure  of necessary scope  for the entrepreneur,  on  vrhich  the - 16  -
government,  if it might  prove  necessary, will wish  to exert an influence. 
In the  case  of the enterprises,  a  notion of responsibility towards 
society is  assumed,  which  weighs  heavily in the balance when  policy 
decisions  are  taken.  Certain  goverTh~ents are afraid that a  frank 
exchange  of' views  with subsidiary firms  of foreign  enterpr~ses will 
involve  a  greater risk. 
Bringing the  local subsidiaries under the national sphere  of 
influence also has  its limits.  The  advantages  of a  multinationally 
operating group  of enterprises must be  maintained optimally.  The 
countries  concerned also benefit here. 
8.  What  is the standpoint of the trade  union movement  ? 
In the  same  way  as  the national governments,  the national  trade 
union  ~ovements are also anxious  about  the  multinational enterprise 
which  has  grown  beyond  the bounds  of national  relationshi~s. By 
comparison with  the  local enterprise,  the multinational enterprise has 
more  freedom  in its decisions  about where  know-how  is to be  applied, 
in which  country investments are  to be  maie  or  cheap labour to be 
recruited in developing  countries.  1~ctivities and  results in a  given 
country are regarded  as  a  component  of the  group interest.  Once  again, 
this freedom  should not be  overestimated.  The  multinational enterprise 
has  so many  local links  that the  policy is aimed at growth  and 
continuity of existing establishments  and  in the  interest of the 
workers  concerned.  The  elimination or abolition of activities will, 
in the  case of multinational enterprises,  only occur in greatest 
emergencies  or when  there is a  conviction that the  development of 
certain sub-activities  can obviously be better carried out in another 
group. 
The  greater flexibility of the  multinational enterprise  comes 
to expression mainly in the  case  of net.r  a.ctivities.  The  trade  unions 
nevertheless  experience  this situation as  a  weakening  of· their position. 
In addition,  the  trade  unions  do  not always  have  a  clear picture of 
the position and  policy of the  group.  If the local entrepreneur is the 
negotiatin~ partner of the  trade  unions,  then the  impression may  be - 17 -
given that negotiations do  not occur at the decision-making level in 
the enterprise.  The  reverse is generally the case.  It is precisely the 
national management  that· is acquainted with the local situation and it 
will have  a  decisive voice in negotiations with the national trade 
union. 
More  particularly,  th~ International Federation of Chemical  and 
General Workers'  Unions  (ICF)  and  the  International Metalworkers' 
Federation  (IMF)  want  to create_a counterpart to the multinational 
enterprise by developing  an internationally interlocking trade union 
federation.  Their activities are aimed  at providing the local federations 
with better background  information about  the position of the. multinat-
ional enterprise concerned  and  the branch of industry in wage  negotiat-
ions,  as  vell as  at organising campaigns  supporting each  other inter-
nationally.  The  difficulty remains,  however,  that the international 
trade union federations  are dependent on  the  approval of the national 
organisations, which  consider themselves  to be  responsible for defending 
the interests of their members. 
The  national trade union organisations in general still show 
little interest for the work  of the international trade union federations. 
Social opinions, relationships and  working  conditions are highly 
divergent from  one  country to another.  International interests can 
hardly be brought to a  common  denominator.  International solidarity 
among  the workers  also  h~s 'its limits.  Reality obliges  oneto recognise 
that it will certainly dtill be  a  long  time before the international 
trade union  federations  can  act as  equivalent negotiating partners with 
the multinational enterprises. Within the  limited framework  of the  EEC, 
however,  there are more  prospects  of increasing  cooperation beyond  the 
borders  in the trade  union movement. 
It should give  no·  cauae  for surprise that the national trade 
unions  primarily want  to defend their interests within the limits  of 
the national economy  or the _local  firm.  !t m~  not be deduced  from  this 
automatically that the trade unions  vould be  blind to the international 
consequences  of their national approach.  This  is indeed the  case vhen 
overhigh wage  demands  are made  that may  give rise to protectionist 
measures.  These  in turn affect the  colleagues abroad and  invite - 18  -
retilia~ory measures.  For the multinational enterprise,  the question 
the~,~ises of whether existing or planned activities  can be maintained. 
In some  cases, it may  be possible  to profit from  a  protected market 
position,  although exports will come  to be  jeopardised.  In any  case, 
such  a  protection of the  national  economy  means  an impediment  for  the 
multinational enterprise precisely in the field where it can play an 
important role  :  the  international division of labour ru1d  the intensifi-
cation of economic  relations. 
The  trade unions will want  the  multinational enterprise to 
identify itself with  the  local interests  of the workers;  the multi-
national enterprise will expect the  trade  unions  to be  aware  of the 
international repercussions  of their demands.  Furthermore,  the multinat-
ional enterprise will have  to enable  the interests of all the groups 
involved in the multinational enterprise to be  safeguarded. 
An  understanding for this point is a  condition for  the  development  of 
close relations between  the multinational enterprise and  the  trade 
union. - ;19-
II.  INTIDRATION  OF  ACTIVITIES  OF  MULTINATIONAL  ENTERPRISES  IN  NATIONAL 
OOMMUNITY 
.  ~ 
1. What  solutions qualify 
In what way  can a  contribution be  made  towards  decreasing  the 
tension between the multinational enterprise and  society ?  In the 
previous  chapter,  we  explained that a  hiatus has  been created 
between the multinational enterprise which  is a  forerunner in the 
process  of internationalisation and  the political and  social forces 
which  have  remained  more  national in their orientation.  From  which 
side rnbst  the bridging-over mainly  come  ? 
In various  quarters,  a  code  of fair conduct is thought of as 
a  solution to this problem.  Opinions  are highly divergent about what 
I 
precisely should be  the  content of such a  code.  The  whole  question 
is whether it is· possible to arrive at the  formula.tion  of standards 
which  give some  foothold and  which  do  not lapse into vague  general~ 
ities. Even  apart from  this,  the .significance of a  code  of fair 
conduct may  be  doubted, if it were  to be  drawn  up  from  the employers' 
side.  ~e code  will remain unilateral and  arbitrary in nature  as 
long as  the national governments,  trade unions  and  pther interested 
parties are not· involved in it to an  adequate  exten~. 
Nor  does  a  statute for the multinational enterprise that would, 
for example,  be  made  to depend  on  the United Nations,  offer a  way 
out.  It does  not look as  though  the  me'mber  countries are prepared to 
transfer their .competence  with respect to the  conduct  of the  ~ulti­
national enterprise to an international body.  This  would  mean  that 
the national interests would  be  subordinated,to this global authority. 
Some  day,  perhaps,  th,se hypotheses will become  reality, but not 
immediately. 
What  steps  can  indeed be  considered now  that the  tension 
between multinational enterprises and  the national community  is 
increasing ? - 20  -
An  improvement  to be made  to  the present situation could  be 
the  creation of an international agreement  among  the  countries with 
respect to  the fiscal,  monetary and  establishment demands  to be  made 
on  the multinational enterprises.  This  will, it is true,  somewhat 
limit the'ir freedom  of movement.  On  the other hand, it ~ill consider-
ably diminish the  tension between  the multinational enterprises  and 
the national  community,  especially in cases where  this is based on 
the rear that the multinational enterprises will play off the national 
societies,  ,_.Ji th all their differences,  against each other.  It may 
also reduce  the disadvantage of many  kinds  of national  arrangements 
in the  above-mentioned fields,  which  form  a  considerable obstacle 
to the attainment of a  worldvride  optimum  within the multinational 
enterprise. 
A first requirement  for decreasing  the  tension between multi-
national enterprise  B...'1d  society is, however,  that the enterprise 
should practise great frankness.  It is also in the interest of the 
mu.ltinational enterprise that unfounded  criticism and  suspicion 
should be  removed.  More  information which  is relevant for the local 
community  needs  to be  provided  about the activities  and  long-term 
objectives  o.f  the  group  as  well as  about their significance for  the 
country in question. 
Furthermore,  the mu.ltlnational enterprise must be  prepare·:: 
to engage  in discussions  of this matter with local authorities  and 
bodies. Both  the multinational enterprise and  the  natianal  cornr.1unity 
will benefit from  a  permanent dialoeue with. a  viet-!  to bridging over 
the possible oppositions  by means  of cooperation.  This  p~esu~es a 
positive attitG:de  towards  the integration of the  enterprise in 
society and  the ideas  and  aspirati8ns  existing therein. 
The  best solution is  to link the  interests  of the subsidiary 
enterprise in a  permanent way  with the fate  of the host country. 
This  is attained by means  of the multinational enterprise meeting 
as  much  as  possible  the national wishes  for participation in the 
capital and  mana::;ement.  Conversely,  the  national community  obtains 
hereby a  means  of influencing. policy in the enterprise. 2.  The  open subsidiary a  bridge for industrial countries 
For the formalisation of such a  local cooperation between 
multinational enterprise and  society,  the most  appropriate means  is 
the open subsidiary.  This  term is to be  understood in the sense that, 
in addition to the participation by the multinational enterprise,  the 
share capital in the subsidiary is spread over a  large number  of 
shareholders and  that this enterprise is listed locally on  the stock 
exchange.  Furthermore,  the local element will be  amply  represented in 
the management.  Such  a  set-up leads  to an engagement  of the local 
enterprise vis-a-vis  the national community. 
In this connection,  we  act on  the assumption that the  EEC  may 
be regarded as a  national community.  The  open subsidiary then 
qualifies  primarilY for the major  industrial regions  of the world  : 
the  US,  the  EEC  and  Japan. ~  European  firms  have  already used the 
form  of the open  subsidiar.y for their activities in the US.  Our-views 
amount  to the fact that the multinational enterprise with headqtmrters 
outside Europe,  but which  is active in Europe,  proc~eds to the 
floating of shares of its European subsidiary.  Until such  time  as 
there exists a  European stock exchange,  a  parallel listing on  several 
stock exchanges  in Europe  will promote  the spread of the shareholding 
and  accentuate the European  character of the open subsidiary. 
The  engagement  envisaged finds  expression in 
a)  internal organisation and  decision-making 
The  national element represented by  shareholders  and workers 
involved in the  open  subsidiary must  be  concerned in the decision-
making.  A condition for this is a  decentralisation in the decision-
making  to geographical units.  Furthermore,  th~ open subsidiary 
will have  to be  given_a say at the  central level when  eommon 
interests are at stake with which  local aspects are linked  •.  The 
geographical element in the organisation of the group  could find 
its reflection in, for example,  an international advisory board. 
The  international character of the group will be  reinforced 
thereby. - 22-
Ho:w  far may  this geographical decentralisation go  without 
-·jeopardisin6  the  unity of the  group  ?  It is difficult to give 
a  straightforward reply to this question.  The  independence  of 
the subsidiary within the  group is partly determined by the fact 
of whether there is a  question of a  majority or a  min6rity 
participation.  In  the  case  of multinational enterprises where 
the  emphasis  of the  central strategy and  coordination is on  the 
financial level, it may  be  expected that there will be  more 
readiness  to accept a  modest  participation than in the  case  of 
multinational enterprises with a  more  central coordination at 
the  industrial,  commercial  and  technical level.  The  majority of 
the  types  of multinational enterprises,  however,  derive their 
strength from  the international harmonisation of sub-actitivies 
lli~ong  each other.  Consequently,  they will regard a  participation 
which  also provides  them  with a  possibility of control,  as  a 
condition for  the  carrying-out of an international  manageme~t. 
The  open  subsidiary will have  to  eomp!_y  with stock exchange 
regulations  and  legal publication obligations.  Not  only will the 
open  subsidiary have  to provide  justification by publication of 
the  annual figures,  but it -vlilJ  also have  to supply  &YJ.  additional 
quantity of specific information  about local activities.  There 
are  two  sides  to the  question for  the  multinational enterprise 
here. 
On  the  one  hand, it 1-rill  have  to provide more  information,  split 
accord_ing  to geo2;raphical sub-activities, belonging to  the  field 
of action of the  open subsidiary. 
On  the  other,  the managers'  feeling of responsibility increases 
now  that  they will have  to give  an  account of themselves  not only 
internally but also externally. 
The  latter factor may  mean  an extra incentive  for  acl1ieving 
satisfactory results. 22 
c)  establishment of subsidiarY'S  own  result 
An  important advantage  of the open  subsidiary is that suspicion 
can to a  large extent be  allayed with respect to a  supposed 
"passing-on" of profits,  the  evasion of tax payments  and  manipul-
ation of settlement prices.  The  responsibility towards  minority 
shareholders requires  the result that can be  ascribed to the 
local establishment to be  fixed as  clearly as  possible. 
In this  connection,  the settlement prices  for mutual  supplies  in 
the group will need  to be  calculated on  a  commercial basis.  It is 
obvious  that this will not always  be  a  simple matter.  The  mutual 
settlement of research costs,  technical and  other advice,  exchange 
of know-how  and  experience,  is also difficult to arrange.  It ~ust 
however  be  possible to arrive at the  drawir~-up of certain rules 
of conduct within the  group.  Furthermore, it is also advisable, 
in the  internal field of legal and  commercial  arra11.gements,  to be 
circumspect about an  exaggerated geographical splitting-up of 
activities. 
3.  Nation_?.l  influence  17JaY_ not nullify the advantages_ of the mul tin§!.tional 
enterprise§. 
We  are aware  that the  open stilisidiary is not a  panacea for 
eliminating all problems  between the mu1tinational en-terprise  and 
the national  community. 
In the first place,  we  may  not forget that operating 1-ri th 
several more  or less  independent subsidiaries  imposes  big restrictions 
on  the  freedom  of movement  of the mu1tinational enterprise.  It may 
indeed be  asserted that this is the sacrifice that the multinational 
enterprises  must  make  in order to meet  halfway national feelings  and 
wishes.  But this sacrifice may  in some  cases  be  of such a  nature  that 
under  certain circumstances  the multinational enterprise will prefer 
to abstain from  foreign investments.  The  loss  of freedom  of movement 
is mainly unattractive for the multinational enterprise  whic~1 
especially wishes  to attain the advantages  of working  on  a  internat-
ional group basis  through internal specialisation and  synergism. - 24-
The  possibility of attuning sub-productions  and  research activities 
to an international market  policy must  prevail here.  Geographical 
fragmentation must  be  avoided. 
This  applies  in particular to  Europe,  where  a  fle~ible adjust-
ment  to changing  circumsta~ces must  remain open  for  the multinational 
enterprise.  The  integration process  as  well as  technical progress 
obliee  the  multinational enterprise to carry out further structural 
changes  within Europe.  Sometimes  this means  enlargement  of scale 
or concentration of certain production processes.  In other cases, 
the  policy is directed towards  specialisation and  standardisation. 
It will not  always  be  possible  to allow all activities  to grow  of 
their own  accord  to  optinum relationships.  It may  be  expected that, 
via acquisitions  and  trru1sfers,  many  other shifts of activities from 
one  eroup to the other will prove  necessary,  mainly beyond  the 
borders.  Has  not European  integration precisely the goal of attuninG 
industrial activities  to the  new  dimensions  of the  cor.unon  market  ~ 
4.  Developin:;  cotmtries  and  th9  joint venture 
The  multinational enterprise plays  an  irreplaceable role in 
the  tran~3fer of  knowlede-e  to developing  countries,  includin.:; 
0 
indus trial application and  mar!ceting.  On  the  other ha::1d,  the  develo:r>-
ing  cotmtry,  with an  economy  that is not very far developed and  of 
modest  scope,  is highly sensitive to the  powerful position of certain 
multin3.tional enterprises. 
The  integration of activities in the  national economy,  v1hich 
was  recom~ended in the  foregoinG  for  the  industrial countries,  applies 
to an  even more  marked  extent to developin::;  countries.  Application 
of the principle of the  open  subsidiary is however  a  complex  matter 
in developing countries.  In the majority of the latter,  the  capital 
market  iG  inadequately developed for the  incorporation of an  open 
subsidia~y.  Furthermore,  big risks  are  incurred in the  case of new 
estab~ishments,  so  that interest for participation in capital may 
be slight.  If nevertheless  a  multinational enterprise whishes  to 
involve  others in the  financing,  then recourse will be  made  to -~-
development banks  and  funds  as well as  to partners with substantial 
capital.  In such  circumstances,  we  speak of a  joint venture, i.e., 
there is cooperation with a  local partner who,  apart from  capital, 
will also contribute - if possible - local knowledge  and  experience 
to the management  as  well.  If at the  ti~e of establishment in a 
developing  country,  the local partners  and  sources are  not directly 
present for  the  formation of a  joint venture,  then the latter can 
only be set as  target for _a  subsequent period. 
The  joint venture is in general for a  developing  cotmtr,y  or, 
better still, a  regional group-of developing  countries,  one  of the 
most  suitable  for~ for promoting  the  integratiorl of the activities 
of the subsidiaries in the host countries.  A drawback  m~  be  the 
fact that the capital participation is limited to a  few  individuals. 
Two  paths are open  in order to augment  the local involvement  in the 
joint venture.  Firstly, spreadine of bl~cks of shares,initially 
taken up  by development banks,  among  the public.  Furthermore, it is 
of great importance for local integration that the personnel policy 
be  aimed  at inclusion of local manpower  ani training for higher 
management  functions. 
A serious obstacle to investments  in developing  countries 
resides in the frequently oversmall market of the developing  country 
in question.  Production solely for the domestic market is then not 
interesting.It cannot sufficiently be  emphasised  how  important it 
is for developing  countries  to  join together for  the  creation of 
regional markets  and  to coordinate  the  investment policy.  In this 
way,  the transfer of capital and  technology will be  greatly promoted. 
Furthermore,  the multinational enterprise is afforded the 
possibility of establishing the  joint venture  per region,  with 
better development  chances  and  more  freedom  of movement.  If the 
multinational enterprise has  to limit itself to local sources  and 
possibilities,  then local production is often only possible if it 
can be  regarded as  an integral component  of the group activity. 
AccordinG  as  this situation occurs,  the  multinational enterprise will 
aim,  for  the benefit of an integral management,  at having at its 
disposal a  controlling interest in the  joint venture. - 26  -
The  joint venture  offers  a  good  opportunity of combining  the 
'iriteres  ts of the  mu1 tinat  ional enterprise and  the host countries. 
If, despite this,  internal oppositions  were  to arise between parent 
and  subsidiary,  then the  joint venture  offers  the  advantage  that it 
obliges  the  parties  concerned to take account of each  o·ther' s  stand-
points  so as  to arrive at a  joint approach  to  the  problems.  But 
definite rules will then need  to be  drawn  up.  The  joint venture  may 
not become  the plaything  of political forces  and it needs  to remain 
outside party politics.  The  partners  must  further be  prepared  to 
:1elp  finance  expansion,  to which  the  dividend policy must  also be 
attm1ed. 
The  joint venture  may  be  regarded as  a  preventive mediwn  for 
the  entire or partial expropriation or nationalisation of enterprises. 
Our  attitude towards  natio~1alisations or an obligation to divest 
oneself of interests in developing  countries,  such as  is being 
introduced,  for instance,  in the  Andes  countries,  is definitely one 
of rejection.  Such  a  liquidation of interests is generally an oper-
ation involving  a  loss  for  the  multinational enterprise,  and  certain-
ly when  this  occurs  quite unexpectedly.  The  continuity of the  enter-
prise is  also endangered,  if the multinational enterprise withdraws 
from  the  mana6e~ent.  The  policy of expropriation overlooks  the  fact 
that a  dynamic  firm is subject to a  process  of continuous  renewal. 
The~  amputation of the local activities of the multinational enter-
prise is a  stat  us  quo  solution, \-rhich  leads  to a  stiffening of 
attitudes.  The  split is dia:netrically opposed  to the increasing 
international interconnection of  technique  and  industry,  which 
naturally servt:.?S  neither the  purpose  of the multinational enterprise 
nor of tht")  developing  countries  themselves. -~-
III.  EUROPEAN  UNITY  A CONDITION  FOR  EXISTENCE  OF  MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES 
1. Structure in course of creation 
In  the  foregoing it is argued  that within the  EEC  the 
national  conception is giving way  to  a  European approach  to 
the  question of  the multinational enterprise.  The  adjustment 
to European  conditions  must  come  from  the  multinational 
enterprise but  in particular  from  the  national political and 
social groupings. 
To  regard  the EEC  as  a  unit simila.r  to a  national 
community  is a  fiction,  at least for  the  time  being.  To 
reach  this e.nd,  a  great  many  psychological,  political and 
economic  hurdles  will still have  to be  cleared.  We  therefore 
do  not  wi~h to  overlook  the specific problems  whic~ the 
European  Community  in course  of creation raises with respect 
to  the multinational enterprise. 
While it is true  that the  customs  union is attained and 
the  monetary  and  economic  union is planned  for  1~·So,  the  fact 
remains  that the  economic  and  industrial policy and  in particu-
lar the social policy is still almost  entirely a  national 
matter.  This reality is in sharp contrast  to  the original aims 
of the EEC.  The  intention,  as  indicated in the Spaak report, 
was  above all to create a  framework  for  more  optimal relations 
in industry and  branches  of activity,  attuned  to  the  greater 
dimensions  of  the  common  market. 
A number  of multinational enterprises have  nevertheless 
seized this opportunity and  have  emerged  as  pace-makers  for  a 
European restructuration. This has  occurred despite  the still 
existing obstacles  which arise in the  case  of mergers  and 
acquisitions beyond  the borders.  The  very necessary structural 
adjustments,  however,  have  only partly come  about. - 28  -
The  competition of large internationally operating 
entel'prises,  which  have  established their headquarters  outside 
the  EEC,  mainly  in the  US,  also  provides  an  incentive  for 
reinforcement  of  the industrial structure.  In its memorandum 
on  'The  Industrial Policy of  the  Community',  submitted  to  the 
Council  in  1970,  the European  Commission asserts  that a  higher 
degree  of concentration is necessary  for  an  optimum  development. 
In addition,  the  Commission  warns  against  the restrictions and 
onesidedness  of national  concentrations.  The  regrouping and 
adjustment  of  firms  by  mergers  and  other  forms  of industrial 
cooperation mainly  occur  in a  national  framework. 
The  formation  of a  free  common  market  and  the abolition 
of market  distortions  and  discriminations  have  evidently not 
been adequate.  Thresholds  for  the  existence  of  what  the  Com-
mission  calls European  transnational  enterprises  ~re therefore 
located at the  psychological level,  including linguistic 
problems,  mainly  in  the  field of 
- taxes 
- legislation 
- capital and  money  market. 
2.  Thresholds  for  industrial  cooPeration and  adjustment 
A further  fiscal  harmonisation  could  considerably  improve 
the  cooperation among  enterprises in the European  context. 
Fiscal obstacles  to  mergers  can be  removed  if the  Council  of 
Ministers adopts  the draft directives of  the European  Commis-
sion with respect  to  mergers  as  well  as  to  the  taxation ar-
rangements  for  parent  and  subsidiary companies. 
In fact,  we  should  go  a  step further  in the EEC,  i.e., 
by  the  adoption of  a  common  regulation for  the  avoidance  of 
double  taxation in  the  case  of international  concerns. 
This presumes  the  establishment  of a  system of settlement 
prices  and  passing-on of costs  which  would  be  applied,  for 
example,  by  a  head  office or research laboratory. -~-
Consultation among  the  member  states in case of differences 
of opinion about· settlements applied within a  concern  connects 
up  with  this.  An  EEC  arbitration board  would  promote  a  uniform 
interpretation of  the regulations. 
Although  the standpoint is defended  that a  European 
limited  company  is not  indispensable,  it is at least of 
psychological  importance  when  it is a  question of mergers 
beyond  the borders  or  establishment  of  joint subsidiaries. 
A European limited company  presupposes,  indeed,  that European 
legal conceptions  and  standards ·will  be set up.  In contrast 
to a  national limited  company,  which  determines  the decision-
making  and responsibilities in a  national  way,  the European 
limited  company  requires  consideration of European views  and 
conceptions.  At  the  same  time,  this points  to  the difficulties 
involved.  Indeed,  the European limited  company  can hardly  come 
into existence if there is no  common  opinion  on  matters  such 
as rights of shareholders,  workers,  directors and  management. 
For  the  time being,  each  country  follows  its own 
course.  Thus,  in the Netherlands  a  new  corporate structure 
has  been introduced,  substantially opening  the  way  to  co-
determination within the enterprise.  In contrast to  the 
system existing in the large German  firms  whereby  a  number 
of directors are designated directly by  the  workers,  the 
Netherlands legislation grants  a  right of objection both  to 
the shareholders  and  to  the  workers  in the appointment  of 
directors,  a  board  which  is self-electing. Furthermore,  a 
holding  company,  whose  employees  are  predominantly located 
abroad,  is exempted  from  these  provisions.  The  new  regulations 
are  aimed at ensuring that directors  do  not  promote  sectional 
interests and  that  the unity of management  in the  enterprise 
is not  jeopardised.  We  shall have  to wait  and  see how  this 
system  functions  in practice,  and  one  of  the  questions  may 
certainly be  whether  a  balanced  composition of the board is 
obtained and  whether  the  Board  of Directors will fulfil its 
purpose.  In view of  the different national legal prescriptions - 30-
and  divergent  conceptions,  a  European legal  form  only has  a 
chance  of success in the  case  of  a  regulation that is not  too 
detailed,  but  flexible.  The  draft  now  submitted is not  free 
from  these  objections.  The  gradual  establishment  of  a  European 
money  and  capital market  will  considerably benefit  the  financial 
capacity and  flexibility of European  firms. 
For  the  enterprise operating in several European 
countries, it is of great  importance  to  be  able  to  change 
over  to  a  European  cash  management  system.  This  means  that 
all  the  European subsidiaries belonging to  the  multinational 
enterprise are affiliated to  a  central bank  account,  whereby 
balances  can  be  set off against  each  other and  the  total sup-
ply of liquidities is at  the  disposal  of  the  group  for  invest-
ment  or  reserves.  A necessary  condition  for  this is that 
European  banks  or  combinations  of banks  are  prepared  to 
intertwine their circuits.  Such  a  system  can  only  function 
properly with  mutually  fixed European  exchange  rates,  freedom 
of  transfer  for  cash  and  mutually harmonised  levels  of interest 
rates.  It is obvious  that  a  European  cash  management  system 
cannot  come  about  without  a  commencement  of  monetary  union. 
It may  be  wondered  whether  the  cr0ation of  a  European 
capital market  is indeed  such  an  urgent  requirement,  in  view 
of  the  possibilities of the Eurodollar  market.  The  multinat-
ional  enterprise with  a  sound  financial  structure  can in 
general turn  to  the Eurodollar  market  for  barr  o~ing purposes. 
The  introduction of  these  funds  into national  circulation, 
however,  is subject  to all sorts of licences  and  restrictions. 
This  arsenal is used  to  combat  inflation,  i.e.,by protecting 
the  national  economy  against  import  of  foreign  capital. The 
monetary  upheavals  and  the  emergence  of flight  capital led  in 
1971  to  a  considerable  sharpening of  these  measures  and  further 
compartmentalisation of  the  money  and  capital markets.  With 
the restoration of balanced  monetary relations in  the  world, 
the  recent restrictions in capital movements  will also  need  to 
be  lifted.  International discussions  about  liberalisation of 
capital  movements  will  contribute  to  this. - 31-
, The  establishment of a  European  share  market  is an 
important  matter.  For  the  majority of the  multinational enter-
prises,  the  domestic  market  is  too  small  for  the attraction of 
risk capital.  The  goal  of many  multinational enterprises is to 
find  a  reflection of their multinational  character in a 
widening of the  financial basis.  International spreading of 
share  ownership  is becoming  ever  more  important  now  that it 
has  been  found  that in the  1960s  the  largest European  firms 
made  use  to  an  increasing extent of borrowed  assets  for  the 
financing of their expansion.  In the  case  of  the European 
firms  appearing  on  the  "Fortune" list of  the  200  largest 
industrial enterprises outside  the  US,  the  own  funds/outside 
funds  ratio fell  from  an  aver~ge of 0.81  in 1966  to 0.63 in 
1970.  A further  deterioration of  the  own  funds/outside  funds 
ratio is in general regarded as  unsound.  Account  must  also be 
taken of a  decrease  in corporate  earning capacity,  certainly 
as regards  the activity in a  number  of countries  and  sectors, 
which  limits  the  self-financing possibilities. 
It may  be  assumed  therefore  that  the multinational 
enterprise stands  to benefit even more  than in the  past  from 
smoothly  functioning European share markets.  There is still 
much  to be  done  in this respect.  Until  such  time  as it proves 
possible  to arrive at European stock exchanges,  the  following 
measures  are  recommended  : 
a)  uniform stock exchange  and  publication regulations  for 
listed securities,  as regards,  inter alia,  publications of 
annual  documents  and  the valuation principles  to be  applied 
in this  connection,  as  well as  prospectuses. · 
b)  abolition of fiscal discriminations.  The  European  Commission 
has  already made  proposals along these lines  for  harmonisa-
tion of the  tax levied  on  dividends  and  interest payments. 
In  this connection,  it must  be  pointed  out  that in any  case 
the  creation of new  distortions must  be  avoided.  The  latter 
would  arise if action were  to be  taken  on  the  plans  existing 
in Germany  for  deducting  company  tax  from  the  income  tax - 32-
owed  by  the  shareholder residing in Germany.  Foreign 
shareholders  cannot benefit  from  this arrangement,  or  only 
to  an unequal  extent. Furthermore, it is important  that, 
in  the  framework  of fiscal harmonisation,  the distortions 
existing with  respect  to  this point,  for  example  in France, 
should  be  eliminated. 
c)  abolition of  the restrictions,  affecting mainly institutional 
investors,  with  regard  to  purchase  of  foreign securities. 
3.  From  national  to European industrial polic: 
The  restructuration of European  trade  and  industry will 
be  promoted  by  the  removal  of obstacles  in the  fiscal,  juridical 
and  financial  field.  The  question is whether  this is sufficient. 
The  Commission  has  presented its views  on  this subject  in 
detail in the  Memorandum  on  European  Industrial Policy,  al-
ready  referred  to  above.  It would  take  us  too  far  to  go  here 
into  the  many  points  that affect  the multinational enterprise. 
The  question always  arises,  however,  of whether  the government 
must  proceed  to  an  active structural policy and if so,  to  what 
extent.  Opinions  on  this point are rather divergent. 
For  facility's sake,  we  should like  to  take  the actual 
situation as  point  of departure.  It is observed  that in all 
European  countries  the  government  deals actively with  an 
industrial structure policy.  This  in itself is already 
sufficient reason  for  the European  Commission  to  take  coordinat-
ing action in this respect in  the light of  common  objectives. 
This  coordination is indispensable  because  the  national  frame-
work  is  too  small  to  enable  optimum  conditions in production, 
sales  and  research  to  be  reached.  Furthermore,  major  technolo-
gical projects will  need  to be  tackled collectively.  Lastly, 
a  disjointed national  policy  may  have  upsetting and  discrimin-
atory effects. -~-
Sectorial and  regional policies are  good  examples  of a 
European approach  which  had  been lacking so  far.  The  conditions 
und~r which sectors in difficulties are  given support  by  their 
national authorities are highly divergent in Europe.  Usually, 
demands  are made  with respect to reorganisation and  improve-
ment  of  the survival chances  of the enterprise. Solutions are 
then sought  or prescribed within the national  framework. 
Good  examples  are shipbuilding and  the  textile industry.  It 
is obvious  that in stagnating branches  of activity,  the  govern-
ment  ma~,  by  granting support  to  firms  in difficulty,  easily 
encourage  surplus capacity to  the  detriment  of  foreign  compe-
titors.  A better coordination with a  view  to limiting the 
sectorial aid is urgently needed,  if we  ever  wish  to arrive 
at an overhaul  of a  number  of branches  of activity at the 
European level.  The  sectorial aid will in general  need  to have 
a  degressive  character  and  may  only benefit  the viable  firms. 
In certain EEC  countries,  an active policy is applied 
in order  to prevent difficulties in branches  of activity. 
This  occurs in general  through planning and structural surveys 
by region or by sector. The  follow-up is either aimed at 
through  an overall policy or else  through  a  more  direct inter-
vention via,  for  instance,  investment  banks  and  government 
participations and  enterprises. Here  too,  there is no  mention, 
or hardly any  mention  of a  European approach  and  the search 
for European solutions. The  danger  of distortion of competition 
is far  from  imaginary.  Preferential treatment  of government 
enterprises occurs  without  there being any  opening-up of 
businesses.  In this  way,  artificial structures are again 
maintained,  which  not only operate in .a  discriminating way 
but also  impede  the adjustment  to sounder relationships. 
The  European  Commission  is already active in the  field 
of forecasts  and  sector studies. Further  expansion and  intensif-
ication may  proceed in the  direction of technological  forecast-
ing and  subdivision of the  overall medium-term  projections 
into a  number  of sectors. - 34 -
It:is certainly to  be  recommended  that European  trade  and 
.industry should  be  more  closely involved  in  these studies. 
A difficulty that remains,  however,  is  the  inability 
of  the  Commission  to  apply  in practice  the  opinions  obtained 
and  the results  stemming  from  the studies.  The  Commission  is 
almost  entirely dependent_,  for  the  execution  thereof,  on its 
power  of  conviction with  the  member  states and  with  trade  and 
industry.  This  makes  a  close interaction among  the parties 
concerned  even  more  desirable.  It is certainly also in the 
interest of  the  multinational  enterprise,  which  is precisely 
in  favour  of a  European approach  to  the  proble.s,  to  show  in 
this  connection  the  same  frankness  as  is usual  in relations 
with  the  national  government. 
The  European  Commission  would  in  any  case  need  to arrive 
at  a  bette~ coordination of  the sectorial policy.  It is  perhaps 
worth  considering whether  the  European  Investment  Bank,  in a 
somewhat  modified role,  should  be  afforded  the  opportunity of 
participation in national  investment  banks.  This  need  not  lead 
to  supervision,  but  indeed  to  a  better interaction in the  case 
of financial  support  for  structural adjustments  and  mergers. 
Another  example  of  coordination that  is still inadequate 
is regional  policy.  This has  even degenerated  into  a  competitive 
struggle  among  regional authorities,  who  quarrel  with  each 
other about  the  establishment  of  new  firms  by  means  of attractive 
subsidies  and  facilities.  The  Commission has  rightly proposed 
that  these  subsidies  should  be  limited  to  a  maximum  of  20  % 
and  that  the  policy should  be  harmonised,  which  has  been 
accepted  by  the  Council  in principle.  Rendering subsidies 
transparent is  now  an  initial requirement  in order  to  avoid 
distortion of  competition,  inter alia,  through  a  combination 
of regional  and  sectorial aid.  For  the  multinational  enterprise, 
it is also  of  great  importance  that  the  long-term objectives 
of regional  policy  and  regional  planning should  be  established 
at European level,  so  that  account  can  be  taken  thereof in its 
own  policy. -35-
There is unfortunately little trace of a  European 
approach  in the  stimulation of branches  of activity in the 
field of technological progress.  Each European  country of any 
impOrtance  supports its own  computer  industry by subsidies 
and  mainly by reserving government  contracts  for  the national 
industry.  The  experience acquired with Euratom is perhaps  not 
greatly encouraging  for  new  initiatives in the  field of a 
large-scale technical cooperation in highly promising sectors. 
Fortunately,  however,  there have  been some  initiatives. 
Although  of a  modest  nature,  progress  has  been  made  in sectors 
such as  the aircraft  industry and  the  production of enriched 
uranium  by  the ultra-centrifugal process.  The  difficulties 
are  concentrated mainly  on  the  question of how  each  country 
obtains in return a  reasonable share in the  fruits of the 
common  approach,  preferably in proportion to its own  contribut-
ion. 
This difficulty is more  or less overcomein  the suggestion 
by  the European  Commission  that  technological  development  should 
be  promoted  by  granting subsidies and  loans via a  relatively 
large number  of  community  development  contracts relating to a 
comparatively large number  of minor  projects.  The  condition is 
rightly made  here  that  there  must  be  a  direct orientation 
towards  the  industrial and  commercial application of  the 
invention. The  community  development  contracts deserve  a  rapid 
application in practice. It must  be  doubled  whether  these 
contracts are an adequate  means  of pressure  for  the  formation 
of European  combinations  of firms.  It is quite possible that 
these  contracts  could be allotted to the multinational enter-
prise which  makes  possible a  European approach. 
The  promotion of technical progress at  the European 
level,  which is of great importance  for  the  Community, 
presupposes  further that a  start will be  made  with liberalisat-
ion and  combination of government  purchases at  the European 
level,  mainly  in the sectors of modern  technology.  The  joint 
creation by  the  government  of a  market  for  advanced  products, -~-
to which research and  production can be  oriented by  means  of 
long-term contracts,  is even  more  important  than merely 
financial  and  fiscal support  in the  development  of productso 
One  of the  fields  in which,  in contrast to the  national 
approach  to industrial  problems  referred to above,  a  common 
policy has  indeed already been established,  is that  of 
competition policy.  On  the basis of Arts.  85,  86  et seqq., 
the  Commission directs its policy to  the  implementation of an 
effective competition,  i.e., in particular a  close  watch  is 
kept  on  the  market 'behaviour  of the  competitors.  This  is a 
sub-aspect of the  whole  group of industrial problems,  compris-
ing much  more,  which  - owing  to  the  absence  of a  European 
approach  in other fields  - becomes  isolated rather  than 
integrated.  Thus  one  may  wonder  what  is the  significance of 
effective competition in a  situation in which  enterprises have 
to  carry out structural  changes,  the  equilibrium between 
supply and  demand  on  the  market  is lacking and  the  industrial 
climate is determined nationally.  Ultimately, it is nevertheless 
a  question of an efficient production and  provision of services 
aimed at increasing the well-being and  prosperity. 
4. Social  programme 
European integration in the social field  may  certainly 
not  be  regarded  as  a  mere  appendix  to  a  European industrial 
policy.  On  the  contrar~,  countless  workers  are already 
experiencing at  the present  time  the  consequences  of industrial 
changes at the European level.  The  social and  economic  aspects 
of industrial policy will need  to be  borne  in mind  at the 
same  time.  In the  'blueprint  for  a  common  social  programme', 
the European  Commission  derives  the  value  of the  establish-
ment  of an  economic  and  monetary  union  from  the  contribution 
that it can  make  to  the  implementation of the  principal goals 
of society 
- full  and  optimum employment 
- more  social  justice - 37-
- better living conditions. 
In the blueprint,  a  number  of problems are  indeed 
analysed  and  priorities are indicated  for  a  programme  of 
action,  but  the study has  in general  failed to  go  beyond  that 
point. Few  concrete policy proposals are to be  found  in the 
blueprint. 
The  multinational enterprise will certainly,  in principle, 
not be  inclined to reject  the  timely approach  to a  number  of 
concrete  problems  of social policy in the  Community.  The 
multinational enterprise,  for  example,  has  an interest in 
ensuring that  the mobility of labour is increased,  especially 
as regards senior  executive staff,  experts and specialists. 
To  an increasing extent,  within a  European  group of firms, 
integration is occurring of certain activities and  services, 
such as sales and  research set-up,  administrat~ve and staff 
departments  and  internationally composed  project  teams. 
This  integration encounters difficulties stemming  not  only 
from  differences in income  tax,but also as  a  consequence  of 
the divergent secondary labour  conditions,  social benefits, 
rights and  obligations.  A further harmonisation of social 
insurance and  labour law as well as better housing facilities 
for  foreign  work~rs will contribute to a  considerable extent 
to  the desirable mobility.  Naturally,  other important 
considerations of a  social policy nature  and additional 
burdens also play  a  role in the determination of  the direction 
in which  and  the  gradualness with  which  the harmonisation  can 
be achieved. 
Another social aspect of  the action of the multinational 
enterprise in the  Community  is the relationship to the  worker. 
The  latter will,  as regards his work,  experience an increasing 
feeling of dependence  on  decisions that are  taken  from European 
standpoints on  investments,  mergers  or  closures of firms. 
The  corporate management  has an interest,  especially in the 
case  of decisions  about  closures of fir•s and  dismissals, 
in getting the workers  affected to understand  the situation. - 38-
Fu~tunately, consultation almost  always  takes  place  in such 
~:ircumstances. This  consultation will mainly  be  limited to 
offsetting the  consequences  of  the  outflow of workers,  whereby 
moreover  the  multinational enterprise  with diversified inter-
ests is rather  more  in a  position to  of~er alternative  employ-
ment  than  a  firm specialising solely in one  branch.  In many 
cases,  where  this is not  possible,  the  solutions  for  new 
employment,  retraining,  redeployment,  etc.,  will  have  to  be 
sought  externally. 
As  already  pointed  out,  the European  firms  are  involved 
in a  process  of necessary  adjustment  to  Euro~ean conditions, 
which  may  still be  expected  to result in a  flow  of reorganis-
ations  and  overhauls  whi.ch,  without  an  accelerated  establishment 
of a  common  labour  market  policy,  will  lead  to  unnecessary 
social tensions.  It is obvious  that  the European Social Fund 
as  well  as  the  recently established  Committee  for labour 
Market  Problems  will play  an active role here. 
Attention is also being paid  to  an  improved living 
climate,  in which  the  need  for  protection of  the  environment 
is felt  especially.  The  national  framework  is not  sufficient 
to  solve  the  problems  of air and  water  pollution arising in 
this  connectiono For  social reasons,  but  equally well  for 
competition considerations,  it is desirable  that  common  object-
ives  and  standards  should  be  drawn  up  in the  EEC  and  national 
measures  coordinated.  The  harmonisation of regulations  would 
need  to include  taxation inceptives  in order  to  promote  an 
effective approach  to  environmental  problems. 
5.  Economic  and  monetary  union 
After  a  transitional period,  in which  a  customs  union 
was  established,  a  period is now  dawning  in which  industrial 
integration will have  to  be  achieved.  By  the  creation of  a 
suitable European  industrial climate,  the  multinational 
enterprise must  be  enabled  to  make  an  optimum  contribution to 
the  increase of prosperity in the EEC.  The  objectives  of - 39-
social and  economic  policy will have  to be  clearly  formulated 
in the EEC,  so  that the multinational enterprise  can attune 
its policy to  them.  The  establishment of an  economic  and 
monetary union  makes  it urgently necessary to develop  a  clear 
vision of the  future  of Europe.  It also offers the prospect 
for  a  common  policy,  indispensable  for  a  smoothly  functioning 
common  market,  a  more  uniform industrial climate and  stable 
relationships based,inter alia,  on  a  European  monetary unit. 
Al~eady partly outstripping this development,  the 
policy of the  Commission  will have  to be directed  towards  the 
promotion of transnational  mergers  by  the  removal  of  thresholds 
and  an active  coordination of the industrial policy in the EEC 
countries.  A number  of  concrete  measures  benefit  the  operation 
of the  multinational enterprise,  as  indicated in the  foregoing. 
The  application or  the  full effect of these  measures  is in 
most  cases,  however,  dependent  on  the  creation of the  monetary 
and  economic  union.  For  the multinational enterprise,  there-
fore,  this  economic  and  monetary union has  a  significance that 
is not  to be  underestimated. 
Our  ideas about  accommodating  the European interests of 
a  multinational enterprise in a  European subsidiary are  even 
to a  marked  degree  dependent  on  the  creation of an  economic 
and  monetary union.  Solely  for this reason,  the  chance exists 
that a  society will be  developed in the  economic  and  social 
field with  a  sufficient degree  of integration to  justify a 
' 
European  view of and  a  European  approach  to  the  problems. 
The  interests of the multinational enterprise are  perhaps 
directly involved,  more  than the political and social groupings, 
in the  further  integration of Europe.  The  l~rger firms  could 
act as  promoter to a  certain extent.  Furthermore,  it is necess-
ary to realise that the  success  of an  economic  and  monetary 
union depends  on the readiness of the  government  and  the social 
partners to aim at European solutions,  in the relevant  consulta-
tive bodies,  in the  interest of our European society. -~-
IV.  THE  MULTINATIONAL  ENTERPRISES  IN  THE  WORLD  PICTURE 
1.  Interests are parallel 
In the  foregoing  parts of this report proposals  are 
made  with  a  view  to adjusting the  conduct  of  the multinational 
enterprise better to  the national circumstances,  policy and 
aspirations of  the  community  in which it is active.  In addition, 
it was  pointed out that  the adjustment  capacity of  the multi-
national enterprise has  its limits. If disproportionately 
high  demands  are  made,  the activities of the  multinational 
enterprise are  fragmented  regionally and it is precisely  the 
advantages  of the  enterprise in the  multinational context  that 
are lost. It also  means  that the multinational enterprise may 
feel  obliged  to withdrew from  certain activities or to renounce 
new  projects. 
Fortunately,  the  interests of the multinational enter-
prise and  the  national  economy  to a  large extent run parallel, 
insofar as  the multinational enterprise ia  the  backbone  of 
economic  development.  It has  already been observed  that the 
growth  of the  multinational enterprise was  greatly promoted 
after the  war  bY  abolition of  the. obstacles  to international 
trade,  as  well as  by regional integration. It was  also  a 
period in which  the  practically uninterrupted  growth  of welfare 
was  able  to reach an  extremely high level.  This  indicates  that 
the  multinational enterprise and  the national  economy  derive 
benefit  from  a  further  intensification of international 
relations. It is therefore precisely in the interest of the 
industrial countries  to  give  the  multinational enterprise,  or 
to allow it to  keep  the  necessary  elbow-room,  which is indis-
pensable  for  the  exercise of its various  fUnctions,  as descnbed 
in an earlier passage  of this report. 
Converaaly,  the multinational enterprise is sensitive 
to stable international relations  to  which it can attune  the 
longer-term policy.  But  the  same  holds  true  for  the national -41-
eoonoay.  Here  too it will be desired to avoid  the risk that 
certain countries,  in the  absence of proper agreements,  will 
attempt  to intervene in international relations in their own 
favour  and  as  they  think fit. 
The  conclusion is obvious that in particular the 
Western industrial countries  would  need  to aim  at a  world 
system in which at least a  nuaber of basic principles would 
have  to be  generally accepted.  These  principles should not be 
confined  to the  field of international trade,  concerning which 
several international agreements  have  already been  concluded. 
They  would  also need.to  extend  to foreign investments.  The 
develop•ent  of these principles in the subsequent part of the 
report is liaited to  the industrial countries,  on  the assump-
tion that  the  problems  of the developing countries will be 
dealt with by  other rapporteurs. 
2.  International trade relations 
We  aay  take as point of departure  the  fact that the 
free  trade in goods  contributes to the attainaent of as high 
a  level of welfare as possible in the world.  This applies in 
particular to  the  trade in industrial products,  which  - in 
contrast to  agricultural products  - is based in principle on 
a  free price-foraation and  free  market  relations. It is there-
fore  of great i•portance that  the principles and rules of the 
GATT,  which underlie  free  trade,  should also be  respected in 
future.  Indeed,  this is the principle for  abolishing obstacles 
to  trade by negociations  on  the basis of most-favoured nation 
treat•ent. 
The  EEC  has  reacted in a  sensible way  to  the measures 
taken by  President Nixon  in August  1971,  by  not  taking any 
countermeasures  which  would  have  aade  an escalation in the 
direction of protectionism inevitable.  The  Coamunity  has  stood 
firmly by its policy,  which it had already applied in the  past, 
of openness  to  the  outside world as regards  industry. - 42-
Th~~ liberal attitude of  the  Community  presupposes reciprocity, 
·'because it cannot  be  maintained unilaterally in the  long run. 
The  future  of international trade  dependa  to a  large extent  on 
the readiness  shown  by  the  major  industrial blocks,  the  US, 
Europe  and  Japan,  to intensify their relations. 
For  the  time  being,  a  big difference in protection is 
observable,  which  is unjustifiable internationally.  In  the 
Memorandum  on  the  Industrial Policy of the  Community  it is 
stated that  the  tariff level  for  industrial products  in the 
US  is 80 % higher  than  that of  the  Community,  while  that of 
Japan is 40 % higher.  The  competitive distortions resulting 
from such  a  tariff disparity are  sometimes  made  worse  by 
substantial quantitative restrictions,  particularly in the  case 
of Japano  On  the  other hand,  the  US,  more  especially,  when 
imports  increase,  urges  exporters  to  that  country  to  exercise 
self-restraint. The  goal  of regulating the  market  must  however 
be  carefully weighed  up  against  the  drawbacks  such as  an  exag-
gerated limitation of  the  growth  of international trade  and  a 
shift of  trade  flows  towards  more  liberal countries. 
Another  inequality occurs  in the  case  of preferential 
tariffs for  imports  from  developing countries,  which  have al-
ready been applied by  the  EEC  countrieso  All industrial count-
ries will  need  to  make  a  proportional  contribution to  the 
creation of sales possibilities  for  products originating  from 
developing countries. 
Furthermore,  a  great variety of non-tariff obstacles 
to  international  trade are  encountered,  resulting  from  national 
legislations and  administrative  provisions.  The  GATT  has  made 
an  inventory of  them,  and  thus  prepared  the  way  for  internat-
ional negotiations. 
Meanwhile,  negotiations have  started between  the  US  and 
the  EEC,  inter alia about  the  changes  demanded  by  the  US  in 
the  system of regional preferences  in  favour  of countries  on -~-
the shores of the Mediterranean and  about  concessions  in the 
agricultural field.  In view of  the  unequal  protection, it must 
be  considered of great  importance  for  the Community  to arrive at 
further  negotiations about  the adjustment  of  the unequal 
protection and  hence  the  unequal  competitive relations.  The 
Community still by  no  means  acts in accordance with its position 
as  the world's largest trading partner. There is still a  lack of 
unity in foreign  economic  policy observable among  the  member 
states,  as  also appeared in the  case of  the arduous  negotiations 
on·  the  monetary and  trade policy crisis in the  second half of 
1971.  More  initiative and  leadership might  be  expected  from  the 
Community  in the  deveiopment  of balanced relations in the  world. 
With respect to a  further liberalisation of international 
trade, it could  be  objected  that this is in opposition to  the 
concern  shown  by national governments  for  industry.  The  t~o need 
not be  mutually exclusive.  For  the  government, _protectionist 
measures at  the border are  not  an indispensable  instrument; 
they may  be replaced by internal measures  to promote  industri-
alisation.  The  latter are  even preferable.  Indeed,  the support 
character will emerge  not only in the  implementation of  the 
measures,  but also in each  case at the  time  of the budget  discus-
sions.  The  critical examination of whether  the  government  policy 
is indeed efficient remains  a  constant concern  in the  case of 
internal regulations rather  than  in the  case  of  trade policy 
measures. 
If distortions of competition occur  in international trade 
as  a  consequence  of government  policy, it is possible  to  invoke 
the  GATT  escape  clauses with respect  to  market distortion, anti-
dumping,  etc.  Whereas  in the past  these  provisions  were  applied 
more  particularly in  re~pect of- imports  from state-trading 
countries or low-wage  c~untries,  they will perhaps  in future  be 
used  more  in trade  among  the industrial countries as well. 
More  consultation among. the industrial countries,  reinforced by 
a  form  of arbitration, is desirable. 3.  Foreign investments 
The  responsibility  for  industrial and  establishment 
policy is primarily regarded as  a  national matter.  It must  also 
be left to  each  country  to  choose  the  instruments  which are best 
suited to ita own  circumstances  and requirements. 
In the EEC  it can be  seen how  difficult it is,  even in a 
limited number  of industrial countries,to  coo~dinate the 
industrial and  establishment  policy.  This  coordination may  be 
described as  a  prerequisite  for  cooperation in  the  wider inter-
national  context. 
The  time  does  not  therefore yet  seem  to be  ripe for  the 
coordination of  the  industrial and  establishment  policy,  in the 
more  general  sense.  This  does  not  exclude  the desirability that 
a  number  of principles should  be  recognised-internationally  w~ich 
are respected in the  national or European  policy. 
These  principles are 
1)  Free  access  to  industrial countries  for  direct investments, 
including own  establishments and  participations. 
2)  Non-discrimination according to nationality. 
The  interests of all parties are served by  the application 
of these  principles by  the industrial countries.  The  application 
may  possibly  be  made  to  depend  on reciprocity. 
re  1.  High  priority must  be  given  in negotiations  between  the 
EEC,  US  and  Japan  to  the abolition of  the  obstacles  to 
which are subject exclusively the  foreign direct invest-
ments  in industrial countries. 
No  common  policy has  yet  been established in the  Community. 
Except  where  questions  of national security are involved, 
an  open  policy needs  to be  applied,  which  is already  put 
into practice by  the majority of the  member  states. -45-
In the  US  there exist various regulations hindering or 
restricting ·foreign investments in certain sectors or 
states. The  anti-trust legislation may  also  form  an 
obstacle in the  case of take-overs of American  firms. 
The  criticism does  not relate to a  general application of 
the  Clayton Act  aimed at preventing domination of the 
market.  It is only  the lasting uncertainty about  the at-
titude of  the Aaerican authorities that is open  to question. 
It aay  thus  be  wondered  whether  foreign enterprises may  be 
required  to refrain froa take-overs, if they can,  by  means 
of penetration of their own  accord,  increase the  co•petition 
on  the Aaerican •arket. 
In Japan,  foreisn  establishments are allowed  on  only a 
very liaited scale, i.e., generally linked  to a  •axiaua 
participation of 25  ~ in existing firas  and  of 50  ~ in 
the  case  of new  establishments.  There is no  reason  for 
further  postponing a  more  thorough liberalisation on  the 
basis of what  we  have  proposed with respect  to  the  open 
subsidiary. If foreign enterprises,  in the  case of invest-
aents in Japan,  choose  the  form  of the  open subsidiary, 
then the required cooperation between  government  and 
industry will also continue to develop. 
re 2.  The  principle of non-discrimination based  on  nationality 
would  in fact  need  to be  developed in greater detail for 
a  nu•ber of coaponents  of the industrial and  establishment 
policy,  e.g.,  the  governaent'a  purchase policy,  research 
contracts,  aid to enterprises. 
The  problem of double  taxation and  of the right to indeani-
fication in the  case of expropriation also experiences  the 
aspect of discrimina·tion,  if the .ultinational enterprise 
were  to  be  taxed  more  heavily or were  to be  subordinated 
to national fir•s. -~-
It would  take ·us  too  far  to  go  into all these  problems 
separately here.  In general, it may  be stated that several 
bilateral and  international agreements  have  already been 
concluded  and  further  consultation is in progress  on  certain 
sub-sectors.  There  is not  yet  any  question,  however,  of 
general respect  for  the  principle of  non-discrimination. 
With  respect  to  non-discriaination as  well,  there is also 
a  task for  the  Community,  so as  to  ensure  that this 
principle penetrates  more  generally in international 
relations  in  the  industrial field. 
4.  The  multinational  enterprise as  nucleus  for  international 
cooperation 
Although  the  chances  for  statisfactory international ar-
rangements  are  not  great  for  the  time  being,  there is nevertheless 
no  cause  for  pessimism.  Despite  the  present upsurge  in nationalis-
tic tendencies,  the  factors  are still at work  which  ensured,  in 
the  1950s  and  1960s,  that  there  was  an  increase in the  economic 
and  political interaction among  the national  economies.  The  flow 
of international  communication is still increasing exponentially. 
The  multinational enterprises  must  play a  conscious  and 
active role here.  More  attention will  need  to be  paid  to  external 
relations.  This  applies  to 
a)  the national  governments,  which  must  be  encouraged  to strive 
towards  common  solutions for their conflicting interests• 
b)  other links in society;  this notion will have  to  be  contributed 
for  an  efficient operation of  the multinational  enterprise, 
which  is precisely of  importance  for  this society and  natural-
ly for  the  multinational  enterprise. 
In  the  first chapter,  the multinational  enterprise  was 
described as  a  new  form  of international  cooperation  on  a  group 
basis.  Borne aloft on  the  wings  of a  world-conquering technique, -~-
the multinational enterprise is perhaps ahead  of its time. 
At  the social and  cultural level,  new  patterns  for  an internat-
ional society will still have  to  be  created,  in which  the multi-
national enterprise must  have  an appropriate place.  The  multi-
national enterprise is a  challenge in this respect.  It brings 
together workers  and  production sources  from  different countries, 
acts as  a  clearing-house  for  kncwledge  and  experience  and 
contributes to an international dissemination of prosperity. 
The  most  important  phenomenon,  however,  is the  international 
confrontation of ideas,  the  concern  for  internationally spread 
interests and  the adoption of a  global approach  to activities as 
a  point of departure.  May  we  expect  that a  worldwide  philosophy 
and solidarity will  come  to exist ?  This  prospect is doubtless 
present,  although a  large measure  of - necessary  - diversity 
and  separate identicy will  continue  to exist. 
A pluriform policy,  finding  expression in·open subsidiaries 
and  joint ventures,  is therefore an appropriate means  of going 
halfway  to meet  national aspirations. Annex  I 
u.s.  Direct Investments  Abroad  by  Major  Area 
in billions of dollars 
1963  1970  ~ P•l• 
All areas  40.7  78.1  9.7 
Developed countries  25.6  53.1  11.0 
Europe  10.4  24.5  13.0 
U.K.  4.2  8.0  9.0 
E.E.C.  4.5  11.7  16.0 
Other  Western Europe  1.7  4.8  16.0 
Canad11  13.0  22.8  8.4 
Japan  0.5  1.5  17.0 
Australia 
New  Zealand  1.7  4.3  14.1 
South Africa 
Developing countries  21.4 
Latin America  +  Western  9.9  14.7  5.8 
Hemisphere 
Source  Survey of Current Business,  October  1971 U.S.  Direct  Investments  by  Major  Industries 
in billions of dollars 
Total  40.7  78.1 
Mining  and  Smelting  3.4  6.1 
Petroleum  13.7  21.8 
Manufacturing  14.9  32.2 
Other  Industries  8.7  17.9 
Source  Survey  of Current Business,  October  1971 
Annex  II 
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10.9 Annex  III 
Value  of Foreign Direct InvestmeEts ~  the  United States 
by  Major  Industry  and  Country  - End  of 1970 
(millions of dollars) 
Man- Finance  Petro- Total  ufac- and  Other 
turing  insurance  leum 
All areas  13,209  6,105  2,250  2 '981  .  1,873 
Canada  3'  112  1 ,831  324  189  768 
Europe  9,515  4,061  1,800  2,766  888 
United  Kingdom  4 '110  1,391  1,135  1,209  375 
Netherlands  2'  121  652  58  1,311  100 
Switzerland  1 ,550  1 '152 
, 
351  47 
Other  1 '734  866  256  246  366 
Other areas  582  213  126  26  217 
Source  Survey of Current Business,  October  1971 STUDY  AND  REFORM  SERVICE  OF  THE  U.I~L. 
THE  MULTINATIONAL  ENTERPRISE 
AND 
ECONOMIC  INTERNATIONALISATION 
28th February,  1972 1 
MULTINATIONAL  ENTERPRISES  AND  ECONOMIC  POLICY  OF  PUBLIC  AUTHORITIES 
Internationalisation of Western  economies  has  developed  in 
two  simultaneous periods:  the  expansion  of international exchanges 
of  trade,  services and  capital and  the  progress  of large multinational 
enterprises.  Expansion  in international  trade  in recent years has 
been  favoured  by  the  limitation of quantitative restrictions on 
exchanges,  by  the  lowering of protection tariffs and  by  the  development 
of monetary  relations based  on  a  larger liquidity in  the  means  of. 
international  payments. 
Multinational  enterprises,  which  consolidated after the 
Fifties,  had  already set up  branches  abroad  during  the  first  twenty 
years  of  this century:  Unilever,  Nestle,  Singer,  General  Electric. 
Technological  development  and  oligopolistic structures had  given  a 
remarkable  impulse  to  the  internationalisation of enterprises,  on 
the  other  hand,  speed  in  communication  facilitated  the  widening  of 
spheres  of action of enterprises  and  a  decentralisation of activities 
and  the  control  of management  of  independent  economic  units  through 
a  single  centre  of directives  was  made  possible. 
At  this stage,  it can  even  happen  that  cost  of  expansion  in 
the  home  market  is relevant  and  that  an  enterprise  finds it more 
advantageous  to  build  a  new  market  outside  the  national boundaries, 
particularly if the  rate of  increase in  the  demand  is higher 
elsewhere,  thus making  for  a  more  flexible  market  structure. Multinational  enterprises in particular constitute  the  most 
advanced  phase  and  a  strong  instrument  in  the  expansion  of  American 
capitalism;  the  impact  of American  enterprises in Europe  is a  case 
in point,  for  instance,  the  outlay  of  fixed  investments  made  in 
Italy in  1966  represented  6.4%  of  the  gross  make  up  of fixed  capital 
in  the  processing sector,  9%  in  France,  9.7%  in  the  German  Federal 
Republic,  13.7%  in  the  Netherlands  and  20.3%  in Belgium-Luxembourg. 
An  investigation  on  effects of  foreign  investments  in  the 
Italian economy  allows  a  comparison  to  be  made  between  the  total 
social capital of  firms  with  a  foreign  majority  participation and 
that  of  joint-stock companies  in  each sector.  On  this basis,  there 
is an  incidence  of  foreign  capital equivalent  to  14%;  ih processing 
industries,  it reaches  22.5% and  levels higher  than  70%  in  certain 
chemical  sectors,  in electronics,  pharmaceuticals  and  precision  tools. 
The  existence  of multinational  enterprises clearly requires 
a  new  outlook in programme,  i.e.  the  adaptation  of  economic  policy 
decision  centres integrated in  the  present  productive  structures of 
Europe. 3 
This,  above all,  through  a  want  of alternative solutions· to 
industrial structures development  of multinational  type. 
Firms  with  a  State participation,  conditioned  by  bonds  of 
national  economic  policy,  run  the  risk of being excluded  from  the 
multinational strategic process.  Because  of their public nature, 
it is difficult for  them  to  integrate in European  oligopolistic 
structures,  they  c~n,  however,  be  strengthened  through  a  Community 
programme. 
Not  few  are  the  preoccupations  concerning  the  phenomena  of 
economic  colonization  consequent  upon  the  union  of productive 
sectors with enterprises making  their decision abroad.  Examples 
Jf multinational  enterprises with  share  holders  and  management 
represented  by  several  countries are  supplied  by  the  banking sector, 
the  main  ones  are: 
1)  Banque  Europeenne  de  Credit  a  Moyen  Terme  - the  following 
participate in  the  capital:  Banca  Commerciale  Italiana,  Amsterdam-
Rotterdam  Bank  N.V.,  Creditanstalt-Bankverein,  Credit  Lyonnais, 
Deutsche  Bank  A.G.,  Midland  Bank  Ltd.,  Samuel  Montagu  & Co.  Ltd., 
Societe  Generale  de  Banque; 
2)  European  Banks  International Co.  - the  following 
participate in  the  capital:  Amsterdam-Rotterdam  Bank  N.V., 
:reditanstalt-Bankverein,  Deutsche  Bank  A.G.,  Midland  Bank  Ltd., 
Societe  Generale  de  Banqu~Societe Generale; 
3)  Societe Financiere  Europeenne  - the  following participate 
in  the  capital:  Banca  Nazionale  del  Lavoro,  Algemene  Bank  Nederland 
N.V.,  Bank  of America  N.T.  & S.A.,  Banque  de  Bruxelles,  Banque 
Nationale  de  Paris,  Barclays Bank  Ltd.,  Dresner  Bank  A.G.; 
4)  British and  Continental  Banking  Co.  Ltd.,  - the  following 
participate in  the  capital:  Credito  Italiano,  Hambros  Bank  Ltd., 
Union  Financiere et Miniere; 5)  International  Commercial  Bank  Ltd.,  -the following 
participate in  the  capital:  Commerzbank  A.G.,  First National  Bank 
of Chicago,  Hongkong  & Shanghai  Banking  Corp.,  Irving  Trust  Co., 
National Westminster  Bank  Ltd.; 
6)  London  Multinational  Bank  Ltd.,  - the  following participate 
in the  capital:  Baring Bros.  & Co.,  Chemical  Bank,  Credit Suisse, 
Northern  Trust  Co.  of Chicago; 
7)  Manufactures  Hanover  Ltd.,  - the  following  participate 
in  the  capital:  Riunione  Adriatica  di Sicurta,  Manufactures  Hanover 
Trust  Co.,  N.M.  Rothschild  & Sons; 
.8)  Midland  and  International  Bank  Ltd.,·- the  following 
participate  in  the  capital:  Commercial  Bank  of Australia Ltd., 
Midland  Bank  Ltd.,  Standard  Bank  Ltd.,  ~oronto Dominion  Bank; 
9)  Orion  Bank  - the  following participate in  the  capital: 
Chase  Manhattan  Bank  N.A.,  National Westminster  Bank  Ltd.,  Royal 
Bank  of  Canada,  Westdeutsche  Landesbank  Girozentrale,  Credito 
Italiano; 
10)  Orion  Termbank  with  the  same  participation as  the last one. 
11)  Western  American  Bank  (Europe)  Ltd.,  - the  following 
participate  in  the  capital:  Hambros  Bank  Ltd.,  National  Bank  of 
Detroit,  Security Pacific  National  Bank,  Wells  Fargo  Bank; 
12)  Europ~an American  Bank  & Trust  Co.  - the  following 
participate  in  th~ capital:  Amsterdam-Rotterdam  Bank  N.V., 
Creditanstalt-Bankvereinr~Deutsche Bank  A.G.,  Midland  Bank  Ltd•, 
Societe  Generale,  Societe  Generale  de  Banque. 
Other  than  the  previous  instances,  a  i'ew  examples  of dual-
national  firms  can  be  mentioned:  "Royal  Dutch-Shell"  formed  in  1907, 
the  "Unilever_'J  Group,  established in  1930  following  the  amalgamation 
between  "Lever Brothers  Ltd.,., ·and. the..  Dutch  "Margarine  Unie  N. V."; 
"Agfa  Gevaert",  established in  19'64  through  the  amalgamation  on  a joint basis between "Agfa  A.G~" of Leverkusen 
and  "Photoproduct  Gevaert  S.A."  of Mortesel. 
Multinational  companies  represent  a  kind of enterprise of 
transnational dimensions,  with  a  flexible structure linked  to 
associated  companies  and  with productive units established in 
several  countries but  which  in  terms of shareholding composition 
and  decision ·making  or in so  far  that  they  have  several decentralised 
structures miss  a  plurinational qualification.  This kind of 
enterprise is a  phenomenon  peculiar to  the  dynamism  of  the  American 
system.  At  the  beginning of  1970  the  book  value  of U.S.A.  investments 
abroad  exceeded  70  thousand million dollars,  whilst  twenty years 
earlier, it was  inferior to  12  thousand million dollars.  In  the 
European  Economic  Community  alone,  investments  supervised  from  the 
U.S.A.  have  increased since  1960 more  than  12  times.  The  share 
in investment  expenditure  of American  enterprises in the  make-up 
of fixed  capital of the  processing industry has  exceeded  20%  in 
Belgium,  around  9%  in France,  over  16%  in the  Netherlands  and it 
is equal  to  6.5% in Italy.  It is estimated that in 1975  investments 
from  the  U.S.A.  will  reach  25%  of the  gross make-up  of fixed 
capital in the'European processing industry.  Furthermore,  American 
enterprises in Europe  succeed in drawing  on  the  spot  the major 
portion of the  financial  resources necessary  for  their expansion  on 
the  continerit.  In  1967~  approximately  84%  of such resources  were 
obtained  through loans in the  European markets  or derived  from 
amortisations and  re-invested profits.  It can,  therefore,  be  said 
that  the  U.S.A.  have  transferred to  Europe  not  so  much  capital as 
management.  On  the  other hand,  the  huge  North-American  companies 
tend  to  spread their investments geographically  so  as  to  pursue  an 
expansion  which  otherwise  would  be  prevented'by anti-trust laws. 
The  high  cost of U.S.A.  labour is an  opportunity for  de-
centralisation of production to  take  advantage 6 
where  cheap  labour is available.  High  cost  of production  compels 
a  company  to  imple~ent a  more  intensive  process  of plant  and  structure 
renewal,  it can also  lead  to  the  use  of obsolete  plant  and  less 
advanced  techniques  in factories  abroad-where  the  necessity  for  a 
maximum  technological  development  is less pressing. 
The  concentration process  tends  to  become  more  pronounced 
and  to  reach  the  firm's  optimal  size.  Beyond  a  set  limi~ which  is 
different  for  each  sector,  economies  in production  are  not  possible; 
on  the  other  hand  economies  of  the  enterprise  may  increase later at 
the  level of  funds  for  research  and  development  of  advanced  manage-
ment  techniques.  It is sometimes  opportun~ due  to  different sets 
of  circumstances,to  keep  the  size  of  the  national  plant  below  the 
theoretical  optimum,  moreover,  the  opportunity  may  present itself 
to  move  abroad  whole  blocks  of production,  that is to  say,  to 
export  an  enterprise. 
As  we  have  said  the  relationship between  market  and  firm  are 
altered and  this in particular  changes  the  methods  of  joint-stock 
companies. 
The  ambit  within  which  the  joint-stock  company  operates is 
much  wider  than that  of  the  small  competing  firm  and  must  take 
into  account  various  elements.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  the 
methods  and  the  perspectives of  the  joint-stock  company  are  changed. 
Thanks  to  the  means  of  which  they  dispose,  they  aim  to  obtain the 
maximum  profit over  a  longer period  than  the  small  firm  of  the  old 
competitive market.  This  leads principally  to  two  attitudes: 
(1)  ,One  tending  to  limit  the  assumption  of risks, 
(2)  the  other of mutual  respect. I 
·1 
As  regards  the  assumption  of risks,  large  concerns  do  not 
indeed  seek rapid and  casual  advantages but  aim  at  the maximum 
possible profit realiseable  over  a  set period of  time  and  they 
dispose  of ample  resources. 
Concerning  the  second point,  few  large  joint-stock companies 
tend  to  develop  group ethics calling for  reciprocal solidarity 
and aid.  As  a  consequence,  the  behaviour  of the  joint-stoc~ company 
has  been  defined as  that of  "mutual  respect".  This  has  a  considerable 
repercussion over  price  decisions  in an  oligopoly.  Indeed, 
according  to  Sweezy  and  Baran,  the  most  important  aspect  of  the 
tacit collusion is known  as  "Price leadership". 
This exists when  the  market  equilibrium price is determined 
not  by  the market  itself but is imposed  by  one  industry  to  others 
(in general  this  impos~tion comes  from ·8 
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the  economically  strongest enterprise).  Other  enterprises accept 
it, not  only  because  it suits  them  also,  but  above  all,  because 
if they  do  not  adjust  to it, this  would  unleash  a  battle of prices 
which  would  certainly have  an  unfavourable  outcome  for all.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  case  may  occur  where  the  price is fixed  at  a 
lower  level,  other  companies  do  not  respond  and  leave  their prices 
unchanged.  In  this case,  which  generally occurs  only  when  the 
companies  are  of similar size  and  when  they  have  a  reciprocal 
fear,  the  pilot  company  which  established  the  new  price level 
returns  to  the  point  of  departure. 
In  c~nsequence,  Sweezy  and  Baran maintain  that it is easier 
for  a  company  to  raise prices,  a  simple  operation  with  no  risks 
involved,  rather  than  lowering  them,  since  this latter course  may 
cause  an  imbalance  in  the  market  with price  war  as  a  result  and 
which  would  be  harmful  to  all.  All  this  tends  towards  an  increase 
in price  and,  therefore,  in rate  of profit. 
Yet  Sweezy  and  Baran's  thesis is not  based  on  a  complete 
analysis of  the  price  make-up  under  an  oligopolistic  regime.  The 
assumption  of  "mutual  respect"  does  not  seem  sufficient  to  determine 
at  what  level  the  price is fixed nor its fluctuations. 
There  is no  doubt  that market  concentration carries with it 
a  certain degree  of collusion between different  enterprises but 
this  does  not  prevent  each of these  seeking  the  highest possible 
profit by  exploiting the  market  situation in the  most  convenient  way. 
It is necessary,  therefore,  to  examine .more  closely  what 
determines  the price in an  oligopolistic regime  and  to ascertain 
if Sweezy  and  Baran's thesis  on  the  tendency  to  increase rate of 
profit  caused  through  industrial  concentration,  has  solid bases. 
The  determination of price  in an  oligopolistic regime 
There  are  three  types of oligopolies:  differentiated, 
concentrated  and  mixed. 
The  differentiated oligopoly is characterized  by  a  sub-
division of markets,  not  a  particular single market,  but  small 
groups  of markets  inside  which  competition is imperfect  in that  the 
products offered appear  to  the  consumer  to  be  different  from 
each other. 
There  is a  concentrated oligopoly  when  there  are in the 
market  enterprises  which  produce  uniform  goods  with  such  a  heavy 
concentration that  a  limited number  of enterprises are able  to 
control all the  production or  a  major  part  of it, leaving the rest 
divided  to  many  small  firms.  This situation is typical of industries 
producing  implements.  On  the  other hand,  industries producing 
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consumer  goods  find  themselves  in  a  situation of mixed  oligopoly. 
In  this,  the  main  characteristics of  the  previous markets  are  to 
be  found:  a  differentiation of products  on  the  one  hand  and  a 
concentration of  the  productive units  on  the  other. 
In  discussing  the  make-up  of prices,  we  must  bear  in mind 
technological  discontinuities  caused  by  the  process of  concentration 
itself.  Technological  progress results in decreasing  costs of 
production provided  each  enterprise  increases  output  since  technological 
advancement  frequently  requires  ever larger,  costlier and  more 
productive  installations.  Alongside  large  industries with efficient 
plant,  can  also exist,  however,  small  or  medium  industries with 
less efficient plant.  Taking  into  account  a  particular  type  of 
enterprise,  with  a  technology  which  does  not  allow  a  production 
higher  than  a  set limit,  and  putting marginal  costs as  constant  and 
corresponding  to  direct  cost,  we  can  deduce  that the  average  unit 
cost  diminishes  up  to  that limit  since  the  fixed  cost is divided 
in an  increasing number  of units produced.  Therefore,  if~ 
represents  the unit  cost,  ~ the  variable  cost,  k  the  annual  fixed 
cost  and  x  the  quantity  produced,  we  have: 
k 
c  =  v  + 
X 
Moreover,  by  increasing production,  the  unit  cost  gets lower 
and  the  direct unit  cost  remains  constant. i 
11 
We  can  thus  conclude  that  the larger  the  enterprise,  the  more 
efficient it is since it succeeds  in producing at  a  lower  total 
unit  cost.  Depending  on  its size  there will be  different 
influences on  price decisions.  If in  the  end it is the  large 
enterprises  which  determine  price,  even  small  ones  can bring their 
influence  to  bear since  their number  and,  therefore,  their·total 
production varies according  to  the  level of prices.  It is obvious 
that if they are  very  small,  none  can  make  the  price  fluctuate  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  affect  the  large  company  but if their number 
varies,  the  price will alter despite  the  small  quantity of product 
offered  by  each  on~~ 
Moreover,  the  large  enterprise  succeeds  in controlling any 
eventual attempts  by  others  to  enter  the market,  attracted as  they 
are  by  earnings of  those  who  are  already inside  an  oligopolistic 
market.  They  succeed  in controlling such attempts  by  influencing 
prices.  Whenever it wishes  to  impede  entry by  newcomers,  the  large 
enterprise avails itself in fact  of  the  lower  cost  at which it 
succeeds  in producing  (for  a  larger production  compared  to  that of 
small  concerns),  it will  fix prices  so  low as  to  deny  the  newcomer 
the  minimum  rate of profit and it has,  therefore,  no  interest 
whatever  in  coming in.  This price  which  prevents entry of new 
companies  is called the  "exclusion price". 
It should  be  noted  that  in order  to  calculate  the  benefits 
of entering a  market,  the  newcomer  should  take  as  a  basis not  the 
prevailing price  (exclusion)  but  the  price  which  will  apply after 
entry. 
Moreover,  when  they  wish  to  do  so,  companies  already operating 
succeed  in eliminating others in the  same  market  sector by  fixing 
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lower  than  the  variable  cost  to  which  the  company  to  be  eliminated 
must  submit.  Thus,  the  weaker  companies  not  being able  to  cover 
even  out-of-pocket  expenses,  are  forced  to  abandon  the  market. 
The  de.termining  factors  of  a  price are: 
( 1)  market  expansion 
(2)  demand  flexibility 
(3)  technology 
(4)  costs of variable  factors. 
Given  a  certain market  structure  and  a  corresponding price 
equilibrium if, over  a  short period,  the  aim  is to maintain  the 
same  structure  and  to  change  the  variable  costs of  a  small  number 
of units,  the  full  cost principle is adopted: 
v  +  qv  =  p  k'  k" 
q  =-+-+ g 
X  X 
If we  consider  the  American  economy,  and if we  accept  that  wages 
increase,  the marginS remains  constant as  do  also  the  profits. 
Over  a  long period,  thanks  to  new  techniques  the  average 
unit  cost  tends  to  decrease,  faster  in large  enterprises,  more 
slowly  in  the  medium  and  small  ones. 
It  follows  that if all other elements  which  determine  price 
are  considered as  constant,  the  price  will  tend  to  find  an  equilibrium 
level  which  allows  large  enterprises increasing rates of profits, 
thanks  to  the  larger technological  discontinuity  which,  in our  case, 
is certainly matched  by  a  higher market  concentration.  If we 
consider  the  surplus as  being equal  to  the  mass  of profits,  we  have 
the  corroboration of  Sweezy  and  Baran's thesis that  the  surplus 
tends  to  increase. .1-3 ·-
THE  "AMERICAN  CHALLENGE". 
The  "American  challenge"  to Western  Europe  is enforced 
mainly  through  the installation of American  firms  in strategic 
sectors of the  economy  and  in  those  with an  advanced  ~echnology. 
At  present direct  American  investments  have  no  important  meaning in 
the  European  countries if they  are  considered in relation to  their 
whole  economy  but  will be  able .to  assume  a  key  position in  coming 
years  to  the  extent  to  which  American enterprises find.financial 
sources  outside  the  U.S.A.;  otherwise  the  deficit in the  American 
balance  of payments  will limit direct  investments in Western  Europe. 
At  the  momenti  there is a  certain paradox in the  relation between 
such  investments  and  the  American  balance  of payments;  during  the 
period  1960-66,  the  .reflux of dollars  from  the  U.S.A.  for  direct 
investments  in Western  Europe  was  8,150 million dollars,  against 
a  revenue  from  such  investments of 4,068 million,  resulting in a 
net  outgoing of 4,082 million;  during  the  same  period in the  case 
of the  under-developed  countries  there  was  a  reflux of 4,465 million 
and  an  entry of  15,051.resulting in a  net  credit balance  of  10,586 
million dollars.  In a  broad  sense it could  be  said that direct 
American  investment  in Western  Europe  is financed  by  developing 
countries! 
Electronics  and  aero-space  engineering are  the  sectors in 
which  Western  Europe  runs  the  risk of being  excluded  with rather 
serious  consequences  for  its prospects of  economic  development. 
Servan-Schreiber says  "a country acquiring abroad  the  essential 
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will  find itself in  a  condition of inferiority similar  to  that  of 
nations  which  a  century  ago  found  themselves  unable  to  guide  and 
control mechanisation.  Even  though  they  may  have  had  a  glorious 
past,  these  countries  remained  a  long  time  on  the  fringes  of 
civilisation.  If  Europe~"s failure  in  the  electronics sector should 
become  established,  it would  run  the  risk,  through  this alone  and  in 
the  space  of  a  single  generation,  of no  longer  being  an  advanced 
civilisation area".  A large  American  company  has  become  conscious 
of  the  connection  between  electronics development  and  economic 
in_dependence.  "In  the  U.S.A.  General  Notors  has  refused  IBM 
Computers,  as it considers  unsafe  to  reveal  their inside  information 
to  a  company  which,  as  in  the  case  of  IBM  is on  the  way  to  becoming 
a  monopoly." 
The  thesis  on  American  superiority by  Servan-Schreiber  which 
follows  seems  over-simplified:  "numerical  strength,  raw  materials 
or  capital are  no  longer  the  sigris  and  instruments  of  power. 
Factories are  but  an  exterior relic.  Modern  power  is the  ability 
to  invent,  i.e. research;  it is the  ability to  make  use  of inventions 
in products,  that  is to  say,  technology".  Mandel  refutes  this thesis: 
"The  undoubted  advantage  of large  American  companies is that,  given 
the  larger capital  and  profits,  they  could  bear  the  greater risks 
of  the  latest technologies ••• this enabled  them  to  buy  patents, 
inventions  and  technicians  when  their laboratories  were  lagging 
behind.  State  guarantees  of profit 15 
to  large enterprises engaged in production  for  rearmament  did. the 
rest.  Therefore, it is the  laws  of competition,  of accumulation  and 
concentration of capital which  explain  the  supremacy  of  the  large 
American  enterprises and  not  the  "mysterious spiritual strengths". 
Yet,  it is not  wrong  to  talk in  terms  of  the  "new  gap"  as  does 
Klaus-Heinrich Standke  but  only  in the  sense  that West  European 
capitalism has  the  technical and  intellectual abilities whilst 
frequently  not  having  the  financial  means  necessary  for  an accelerated 
"renewal". 
We  must  point  out,  however,  that in absolute  one  cannot 
speak of a  real  abs·ence  of capital in Western  Europe;  for  instance, 
in Italy during  the  two  year period  1966-67  when  there  was  an 
insufficiency of investment,  private capital  to  the  tune  of  1,400 
milliard lire was  exported.  The  delay is probably  due  to  an 
insufficient division of  work  in Western  Europe,  this is noticeable 
even  in the  Common  Market  and is the  reason  why  the  size of 
European  companies  in technologically advanced  sectors is still so 
far  behind  that of their American  counterpart.  Yet,  the  process 
of  division of  work  in the  EEC  has  already started and is developing 
along  the  guide-lines which large West  German  companies  have  given 
to  the  market  for  goods  which  are  technologically more  advanced; 
not  of little account  is a  large  enterprise of  the  RFT  g'E6up  SIEMENS 
which  opposes  the  predominance  of  IBM  at least in the  German 
Federal Republic;  in three years  only,  from  1964  till 1967,  the 
share  of Siemens in the  computer  sector has  increased  from  5  to  30%. 
Servan-Schreiber,  true  to  his  theory  of  "inventive"  U.S.A. 
superiority proposes  to  overcome  the  disparity between  them  and 
Western  Europe  by  altering the  American methods  "once  defined as 
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·the large  operations are  chosen,  and  the  connections are  established 
between  industrial effort and State aid;  it will still be  necessary 
to establish new  relations adapted  to  technological  progress,  in 
the  complex  Industry-University-State •••  ,  in  the first place  and 
a  systematic  development  of client-supplier relationship;  it must 
be  accepted  that ministries and  universities  work  for  laboratories 
under  contract  with  industrialists and  in the  sense  which  they 
have  indicated''·  This last  p~oposal is really surprising on  the 
part  of  a  man  such  as  Servan-Schreiber  who  describes  himself as 
being of  the  Left  and  who,  in order  to  bring the  matter  to  a  close 
concludes  by  suggesting  a  revenue  policy  chargeable  to  wages: 
"Will  wage-earners  accept  the  industrial  changes?  Will  they  make 
savings proportionate  to  the  investment  needs  of  our  era?  Will 
they  agree  that  their increased  earnings  come  within  the  bounds 
of  a  planning of values?  Which  rights and authorities will  have 
to  be  granted  to  them,  which  objectives will  have  to  be  given  to 
expansion  so  that  they participate in  the  game  and  in  the  interests 
of production?  These  are  the  terms  of  a  debate  which  would  advance 
economic  efficiency and,  simultaneously,  social  justice.  These 
are  the  elements  of an  extensive  negotiation which  a  Left,  true  to 
its programmes,  must  endeavour  to  bring to  a  successful  close". 
In  truth,  it is possible  to  demonstrate  the  hollowness  of 
the  parallel between  economic  expansion  and  social  justice in  the 
capitalistic system  by  using  the  instance  of the  U.S.A.: .17 
PERCENTAGE  VARIATIONS 
Breakdown of GNP 








Annual  Rate 
Gross  National  Product  34,6  13,5  2,1 
Wages  11  , 8  1 , 9  . _8., 3  1 , 3 
Companies'  Profits  46,0,  6,5  16,2  2,5 
Already  during  the  period  1956-61,  the  rate of wage  increases  was 
not  keeping pace  with  the  expansion of national  revenue;  during  the 
boom  period  1962-67  when  national  revenue  increased by  5%  per annum, 
the  rate in wage  increases  was  very  restrained whilst  companies' 
profits almost  trebled.  .Another statistical comparison will help 
to refute Servan-Schreiber's thesis:  between  1957  and  1967  wages 
in the  processing industry registered in real  terms  an  increase  of 
only  16.3%  in the  U.S.A.  against  59~4% in  the  United  Kingdom,  a 
country  considered barely efficient in its economy. 
The  strategy proposed  to  the  Left  by  the  French  journalist 
of limiting West  European  industrial concentration and  to  channel 
workers  claims  by  means  of revenue  policy  so  as  to  confront  from 
more  favourable  positions  competition  with large  American  companies 
was  refuted;. but  the  strategy of  the  fight  against  concentration 
was  also  refuted ami  as  Mandel  rightly underlines:  "from  the 
considerations previously  developed,  the  conclusion  should not 
be  drawn  that  the  workers movement  of 18 
~estern Europe  has  interest in  slowing  down  the  process  of international 
capital penetration,  because it gradually reduces  prospects  of 
conquest  through political  power  at national level,  modifying  the 
relations of  strengt~ at least  temporarily,  to  the  disadvantage  of 
workers.  It would,  in  any  case,  be  utopian  to  try  to  prevent 
economic  changes  in line with  the  development  of productive  forces 
even  considering that  workers  movement  has  never  aimed  at  keeping 
alive artificially the  small  capitalistic  firm  nor  to  obstruct 
capital concentration".  Against  the  temptations  by  the  Left  to 
embark  in an  unprecedented  fight  against  monopolies  Joseph  Schumpeter 
in  "Capitalism,  Socialism  and  Democracy"  (Harper  and  Brothers,  1947, 
New  York)  wrote:  "According  to  the  profile of  economic  development, 
perfect  competition is not  only  impossible  but  is theoretically 
inferior and  has  no  claim  whatever  to  be  mentioned  as  an  example 
of ideal efficiency.  It is,  therefore,  a  mistake·to  base  the  theory 
of State  control of  industry  on  the  principle  that  the  large  company 
must  be  put  to  work  in  the  same  way  as  the  one  in  which  the  corresponding 
industry would  operate  under  a  system  of perfect  competition.  In 
their criticisms,  Socialists should lean  on  the  virtues of  a 
socialist  economy  rather  than  on  those  of  the  competition  system". 
AMALGAMATION  TREND 
We  shall  examine  now  activities in amalgamation  by  sector: 
real-estate  companies  represent  the  most  important  sector with  a 
somewhat  weak  capital  structure  given  the  instrumental  and  speculative 
character  taken  by  such  companies  in Italy.  Numerous  amalgamations 
have  occurred in  the  mechanical  industry group;  as  regards  the  total 
number  of  companies  selected for  amalgamation we  find  in first place  the metallurgical enterprises followed  by 
electrical industries and  chemical  companies  which  represent·a 
relative majority in  terms  of value.  Mechanical  industries assume 
a  lesser importance  relative  to  the  total nominal  capital  involved. 
A first group  of sectors  - mechanical,  chemical,  electric 
power  - has  exercised a  definite  influence  on  the  general  progress 
of amalgamations,  both  through  the  number  of operations and  the 
importance  of  the  share  capital involved.  For  the  m~chanical and 
chemical  sectors concentration was  particularly heavy  from  1962 
onwards  with  a  more  intensive  amalgamation  movement  during  the 
recession period, ·later stimulated by  law .170. 
A second group- agricultural  firms,  cement  plant,extraction, 
paper,  building construction - show  evolution  tendencies linked with 
the  economic  movement,  where  concentration and  rationalisation 
remained  about  constant  during  the  whole  period but ·with more 
activity in recent years. 
In a  third group,  the  amalgamation movement  occurred after 
some  delay.  The  number  of operations is somewhat  reduced  and 
dispersed over  the  whole  period of time  considered without  any 
particular concentration.  In  these  sectors it is only in more 
recent years  that a  movement  of concentration and  rationalisation 
can  be  seen:  from  1961  for metallurgy,  from  1964  for  paper  and its 
technique,  from  1965  for  f9od  firms,  cotton  firms,  graphic arts, 
from  1966  for  wood  and  furniture. .20 
THE  MECHANICAL  SECTOR 
In  a  first overall appraisal it is opportune  to  note  that  the 
mechanical  sector is characterized  by  a  low  rate  of activity by 
the  enterprises;  those  which  have  amalgamated  in general  are  of 
medium  and  small  size  in  comparison  to  the  importance  of  the  sector 
(even if they  are  included  amongst  the largest  companies  of  the 
two  hundred).  Moreover,  in practically all cases  they  have 
absorbed  only  one  company  during  the  period. 
In  the  electromechanical  sector  on  the  other hand,  rather 
high activity in amalgamation is to  be  seen,  those  involved  were 
medium  to  large  firms.  It seems  moreover  that  two  operations  were 
purely  of rationalisation:  those  of Marelli  and  Ignis. 
In  the  sector  of  construction of means  of  transport  are 
seen  operations,  probably  of  "internal" rationalisation,by FIAT 
during  1967  and  only relatively large  enterprises have  incorporated 
other  companies. 
In  the  metallurgical  sector  one  is struck by  operations of 
the  largest  enterprise  in  the  sector,  i.e. Italsider which  extends 
over  the  whole  period  under  examination. 
Medium  size  companies  were  more  active  and  operations  were 
carried out  essentially during more  recent years,  this influence 
was  due  partly to  the  decision  to nationalise  the  electrical sector, 
given  the  connections  existing between  energy  producers  and  the 
electro-mechanical  companies. - 21-
In  the  shipyard  se.ctor  amalgamations  were  few  in technical 
and  economical  terms  and  were  carried out  by  relatively small 
enterprises. 
METALLURGY  - In  the  sector of  the metallurgic  industry are 
19 of  the  200 largest  companies  selected on  the  basis of  their sale 1 
value  during  1963.  This  sector  seems  characterized by  a  high number 
of operations during  the  period·1957-1968 in that  23  were  recorded 
in all. 
Amongst  the  enterprises mainly  involved in increasing their 
own  size  through  external  expansion,  i.e.  by  absorbing other  companies, 
are  in first places: 
Italsider  (2nd,  1st in  the  sector),  concluded  12  operations 
incorporating in  1961  Cornigliano,  nominal  capital  70  thousand million; 
in  1964  Generale  Pugliese  di Elettricita,  nominal  capital 9.3 thousand 
million;  Elettricita della Campania,  nominal  capital  1.7 thousand 
million;  Unione  Esercizi Elettrici,  nominal  capital 33.8  thousand 
million;  in  1966,  Acquedotti  della Versilia,  nominal  capital 
20  million;  Immobiliare  Borge,  nominal  capital  1  million;  Ferrovie 
Marchigiane,  nominal  capital  1  million;  Siderurgica dell'Ossola, 
nominal  capital  842  million;  Sigim  Italiana Gestioni  Immobiliari, 
nominal  capital 50 million;  in  1967,  Meridionale  Azote,  nominal 
capital 7.7 million. 
Sava Soc.  Alluminio  Veneto  (138th,  18th in  the  Sector) 
concluded  4  amalgamations,  incorporating in  1965, - 22-
Idroelettrica Cismon,  nominal  capital  1  thousand million;  in  1965 
Ftalital,  nominal  capital  1.5 million;  Laminal,  nominal  capital 
1  million;  in  1965,  Smirrel Serbatoi Montani  Irrigazioni Elettricita, 
nominal  capital 500 million. 
Acciaierie  e  Ferriere  Lombarde  Falck  (  15th,  4th in  the  sector) 
concluded  2  operations  incorporating in  1963  Nazionale  Elettrometal-
lurgica Sondel  di  Roma,  nominal  capital  600  million;  in  1966, 
Nazionale  Elettrometallurgica,  nominal  capital  400  million. 
Metallurgica Italiana  (60th,  7th  in  the  sector)  concluded 
2  operations  incorporating in  1958 Metallurgica Bresciana,  formerly 
Tempini,  nominal  capital  1.5  thousand million;  in  1964  Forze 
Idrauliche  Appennino  Centrale,  nominal  capital  3  thousand million. 
Redaelli  Giuseppe  & Fratello  (108th,  12th in  the  sector) 
concluded  2  operations  in  1967 Trafilerie Corderie  Italiana,  nominal 
capital  700 million,  Materferri,  nominal  capital  100 million. 
Fabbrica  Italiana Tubi  (124th,  16th in the  sector)  concluded 
1  operation incorporating in  1967 Ferrotubi,  nominal  capital 
1.1  million. 
In  this sector,  a  total of  23  amalgamations  took  place; 
23  companies  were  absorbed. -~-
MECHANICAL  INDUSTRY  - In  this sector are  19 of  the  200 
largest  companies  selected on  the  basis of their sale  'value  during 
1963.  This  sector  seems  characterized for  the  period  1957-1968 by 
11  amalgamations.  Amongst  the  enterprises more  actively engaged· 
in increasing their size  through external expansion,  i.e. by 
absorbing other concerns,  are  in first places: 
RIV-SKF  Officine  di  Villar Perosa  (25th,  2nd  in the  sector) 
which  concluded 3  operations,  incorporating in  1966  Macchi  Cuscinetti, 
nominal  capital  250 million;  Costruzioni  Druento,  nominal  capital 
400 million;  in  1967,  Immobiliare  Sitar,  nominal  capital 1.5 million. 
ASPERA  FRIG0··(88th,  10th in the  sector)  which  concluded 
2  operations,  in  1959 Aspera Frigo  of Turin,  nominal  capital 
140  million;  in  1968 Fonderia Aspera,  nominal  capital  1  million. 
Singer  Compagnia  Macchine  per Cucire  (  49th,  5th in the 
sector)  which  concluded  1  operation incorporating in  1967  FIAR'; 
nominal  capital 0.5 million. 
Nebiolo  (132nd,  12th in this sector)  which  concluded  1  operation 
incorporating in  1962  Colture  Razionali,  nominal  capital  25  million. 
Tosi  Franco  (82nd,  9th  in  the  sector)  which  concluded  1 
operation incorporating in  1966  Immobiliare  Boccaccio,  nominal 
capital  100 million 
Ideal Standard  (79th,  8th in the  sector)  which  concluded 
1  operation incorporating in  1966  Ideal Standard  Industrial, 
nominal  capital 50 million. 
F.lli Borletti  (109th,  11th in the  sector)  which  concluded 
1  operation incorporating in  1966  Filatura S.  Giorgio; nominal 
capital 30.4 million. Morteo  (19th,  18th in the  sector)  which  concluded  1  operation 
incorporating in  1967  Prefabbricati  Finsider~  nominal  capital 
300 million. 
In  this sector  a  total of  11  amalgamations  were  concluded; 
in total,  11  companies  were  absorbed. 
ELECTRO  MECHANICAL  INDUSTRY  - In  this  sector are  16  of  the 
200  largest  companies  selected  on  the  basis of their sale  value 
during  1963.  This  sector is characterized  by  a  number  of amalgamations 
during  the  period  1957-1968  with  a  total of  24  amalgamations  recorded 
and  with  the  take-over  of 31  companies.  Amongst  the  firms  more 
active  in increasing their  own  size  through  external  expansion, 
i.e.  by  absorbing others,  are  in first places: 
IGNIS  (64th,  8th  in  the  sector)  which  concluded  7  operations 
incorporating in  1966  EL.VA,  nominal  capital  450  million; 
Metallurgica Terni,  nominal  capital  450  million;  FIL,  nominal 
capital 50  million;  ISOVER,  nominal  capital  100 million,  CONIS, 
. 
nominal  capital  150  million;  in  1967,  in  one  single  operation, 
IMBALL,  nominal  capital  60 million and  ORLEANDRO,  nominal  capital 
9  million;  in  1968,  FONTER,  nominal  capital  150  million. 
CGE  (45th,  4th  in  the  sector)  which  concluded  7  operations, 
incorporating in  1957  Antonio  Biffi of Milan,  nominal  capital 
29.9 million;  in  1962,  Compagnia  Generale  Componenti,  nominal 
capital  1  million;  in  1966,  Unda  Radio,  nominal  capital  6  million; 
Zancangeloni,  nominal  capital  3  million;  Compagnia  Italiana Apparecchi 
Elettrici CONE,  nominal  capital  228 million;  SIRE,  nominal  capital 
150  million; - 25-
Scotti Brioschi  & Co.,  nominal  capital 240 million. 
Officine  GALILEO  (134th,  13th of the  sector)  concluded 
3  operations,  in  1962,  Applicazioni  Industriali di  Firenze,  nominal 
capital  1  million;  in  1963,  Officine  Gal~leo di Milano,  nominal 
capital  20 million;  in  1967,  Costruzioni bttiche  e  Meccaniche, 
with  a  capital of 50 million. 
SIEMENS  (51st,  6th of  the  sector)  concluded  2  operations 
incorporating in  1963,  Immobiliare  Agricola Castelletto,  nominal 
capital  10 million;  in  1964,  Aziende  Tecniche  Elettroniche Sud, 
nominal  capital  1.5  thousand million. 
Ansaldo  S.  Giorgio  (54th,  7th of the  sector)  concluded 
1  operation incorporating in  1966  Officine Elettromeccaniche 
Triestine,  nominal  capital  1  thousand million. 
Fabbrica Italiana Magneti Marelli  (40th,  3rd of  the  sector) 
concluded  1  operation incorporating in  1968 in a  single operation, 
Francesco Rabotti,  nominal  capital  700 million;  Rabbotti  Sud, 
nominal  capital  200  million;  IMCARARIO,  nominal  capital  150 million; 
Fabbrica Italiana Valvole  Radio  Elettriche  (FIVRE),  nominal  capital 
2  thousand million;  MABO,  nominal  capital  7  million;  Radio  Marelli, 
nominal  capital  1.2 million;  INIEX,  nominal  capital  20 million; 
Magneti  Marelli  took  over  a  total of 7  companies. 
MAGRINI  (148th,  14th of  the  sector)  concluded  1  operation 
incorporating in  1965  Officine Elettriche Scarpa  & Magnano,  nominal 
capital  1  thousand million. 
GELOSO  (196th,  18th of  the  sector)  concluded  1  operation 
incorporating in  1962  Immobiliare  Calzaturificio Brenta,  nominal 
capital  1  million. -~-
PHILIPS  (23rd,  1st of  the  sector)  concluded  1  operation 
incorporating in  1966  Isonzo,  nominal  capital  100 million. 
CONSTRUCTION  OF  MEANS  OF  TRANSPORT  - In  this sector are 
11  of  the  largest  companies  selected on  the  basis of their sale 
value  during  1963.  During  the  period  1957-1968,  four  amalgamations 
took  place  in this sector.  Amongst  the  firms  more  active  in 
increasing their  own  size  through  external expansion,  i.e. by 
absorbing others,  is,  in first  place: 
FIAT  (1st,  1st  of  the  sector)  which  concluded  2  operations 
incorporating in  1967  in  a  single  operation,  Gamma  Ebanite  Similari, 
nominal  capital  150  million;  NAC  Italiana,  nominal  capital  100 million; 
Officine  Costruzioni  Industriali,  nominal  capital  3  million; 
Costruzioni  Aeronautiche  Novaresi,  nominal  capital  100 million;  OM, 
nominal  capital  20  million;  and  Auto  Bianchi,  nominal  capital 6.5 
million,  in  a  single  operation  FIAT  has  absorbed  a  total of  6 
companies. 
POLICY  OF  FIAT 
Due  to  a  narrower  internal market,  Fiat  seeks  constant 
outlets abroad;  the  largest share  in motor  vehicles  exported 
compared  to  total production  was  reached  during  the  period  between 
the  two  World  Wars  and  has  never  been  exceeded  since;  in  1927, 
to  be  exact,  when  the  30,000 motor  vehicles  exported  represented 
2/3 of production.  It is during  the  inter war  years -~-
that  EIAT  developed its commercial  network  and  created its branches 
abroad  (sales,  servicing,  assembly).  After  the War- thanks  to 
, 
the  introduction of new  models,  to  the  governmentspolicy  which 
facilitated expansion,  to  the  need  of  covering an  increasing 
internal market  - exports,  whilst  continuously  on  the  increase, 
represented  up  to  a  few  years  ago  a  not negligible but neither 
high  share  of production.  Yet  in  1970  FIAT,  OM  and  AU~OBIANCHI 
vehicles reached  an  export  of 617,720 units,  equal  to about  39% 
of Italian production.  In total,  exports by  FIAT  represent  about 
10%  of  the  world  export  of motor  vehicles. 
Some  markets ·are  ot particular importance  for  the  FIAT 
group.  53%  of  exports  go  to  countries of the  EEC  and  18%  to  those 
of  the  EFTA.  As  for Socialist countries  whose  importance  is limited 
but  increasing,  about  80%  of exports  go  to  European  markets.  About 
9%  is taken  by  the  U.S.A.  and  Canada,  whilst  the  rest  .. is distributed 
in other  countries.  The  importance  of  the  European market  is such 
(and it is obviously greater when  considering also  the  Italian one) 
that  in  the  recent  publicity  campaign  in the  U.S.A.,  FIAT  shows 
itself as  the  company  with  the  larg~st share  of  the  European market. -28-
1962  1968 
Vehicles  Market  Vehicles  Market 
(thousands)  Share  (thousands)  Share  Company 
595  I 9, 4  %  I • I 00  24,7  %  Fiat  +  Autobianchi 
499  I 6, 4  %  538  I 2 , I  %  Volkswagen  + 
Auto  ·union 
337  l  I ,. 1  OJ  491  I I , - %  Renault  ,0 
267  .  8-. 8.. ·-·% - 437  9,8  %  General  Motors 
281  9' 2  %  324  7 '3  %  Ford 
276  9,- %  3 I 7  7 ' 1  %  Citroen 
58  I , 8  h  82  I , 7  %  Alfa  Romeo 
During  the  sixties,  in effect,  FIAT  group  is the  one  which 
has  increased  the  most  its sales in Europe  (~s  shown  ty  Table  1 
prepared  by  Saris  on  data of  companies'  balance  sheets)  and its 
share is even  higher  when  considering also  Citroen. 
THE  INTERNATIONAL  MARKET  OF  FIAT  - Exports  of  finished  vehicles,  f~e-·-
.. - ..... -.. --. 
completely  assembled,  is but  a  part  of  the  role  which  the  international 
market  offers to Fiat.  Like  the  other large makers  of cars,  FIAT 
on its own  and  in conjunction with other  companies  has  for  some  time 
I 
created enterprises either for  the  assembly  or  for  complete  production 
of motor  vehicles  and  tractors.  According  to  the  latest report  to 
shareholders,  production 'by  establishments operating abroad  • 
has ••• totalled about  450,000  cars  and  industrial vehicles 
also  about  30,000  tractorsj  these  totals  do  not  include  production 
by  Citro;n nor  by  Volga,  nor units assembled  abroad  with  parts 
supplied  by  us". -29-
"Official" investments abroad represent  about  33%·of  FIAT's 
shares portfolio,  with  a  slight decrease  in absolute  value  compared 
with  1969  ~nd with  a  percentage  reduction more  pronounced.  Over 
98%  of  such  investments are  held  by  Holding FIAT  with an  office in 
Lugano.  It should  be  added  that  IFI has  an  international holding 
in  Luxembourg  and  numerous  participations are.almost  certainly lead 
by  IFI or  companies  under its control.  According  to  certain sources, 
establishments  abroad  which  produce  or assemble  Fiat mqtor  vehicles, 
tractors,  rolling stock,  large  engines,  etc.  exceed  thirty.  An 
exact list of  the  countries  where  FIAT  is present is extremely 
difficult;  the  sources,  even  agencies,  give  different  and  uncertain 
information,  above  all where  assembly  plant is  ~oncerned.  In  any 
case,  that  the  international  development  of FIAT  has  been  intensified 
during  the  post-War  era and  above  all in more  recent years is clear. 
Should  we  suggest  a  period  when  a  turning point  was  reached,  we 
would  choose  1965,  not  only  because  the  agreement  with  the  Soviet 
Union  (which  will  have  considerable  importance  for  the multinational 
future  of  FIAT)  was  settled that year,  but  also  because activities 
abroad  manage~ controlled and  financed  directly by  FIAT  acquired  a 
greater  importance  in  the  group's policy. 
THE  LOGIC  OF  INTERNATIONAL  DEVELOPMENT  followed  by  FIAT  is 
due  to  customs'  barriers which  preclude  the  export  of  complete 
vehicles or  because  a  prominent  share  of  the market  has  been  secured 
and it becomes  convenient  to  produce  or assemble  locally. - 30-
As  a  rule  assembly  preced~s complete  production  even after many 
years  - even  when  the  establishment  is capable  of producing  complete 
vehicles  - numerous  establishments help  in production itself with 
alongside  an- assembly  chain  which  receives parts  from  Turin  or 
from  other establishments.  On  the  other hand,  to start with  assembly 
invariably  shows  itself more  convenient  for  several  reasons.  It 
is not  possible  to  be  present  in markets  which  are  barely  developed, 
to  benefit  from  low  labour  costs whilst  transport  costs  (thanks  to 
the  development  of  containers)  are  in constant  regression. 
Alongside  the  production  or  assembly  plants  which  are  dependant 
on  FIAT's  finance  programme  there  is a  spread  o~ production under 
licence.  Examples  of  these  are  the  plant  of Togliattigrad,  FSO  in 
Poland,  NASR  in Egypt,  etc. 
In  view  of  the  importance  which  the  European  market  offers 
to  Fiat, it is obvious  that  the  company  should  be  directly present 
in almost  all  these  countries.  In France,  the  activities of Fiat 
depend  on  FIAT  FRANCE  with  a  share  capital in  excess  of  140  million 
French Francs  controlled as  to  48.5%  by  Fiat  and  9.5%  by  the 
Luxembourg  holding of  IFI  and  in  whom  CHRYSLER  has  a  participation 
of  24%.  FIAT  FRANCE  which  employs  about  8,500  workers  relies on 
sales,  servicing of motor  vehicles and  the  production  of  UNIC 
coaches  and  SOMECA  tractors. 
In  1969,  6,827 lorries and  14,000  tractors were  produced; 
in  1970,  there  was  an  increase  in production of industrial motor 
vehicles  (over  8,000)  whilst  production of tractors  showed  a 
small  reduction. - 31-
In West  Germany,  DEUTSCHE  FIAT  has  been  established since 
1922  (35  million marks),  it has  a  100%  control  over  seven  companies. 
The  most  important  are  NECKAR  which  assembles  a  number  of FIAT  cars, 
FIAT  TRAKTOREN  which  produces  and  assembles  tractors and  earth-
moving  equipment  and  FIAT  LEASING.  Commercial  and  servicing 
activities are  of  course  also  entrusted to  DEUTSCHE  FIAT. 
The  country  in which  FIAT's  presence is most  important is 
Spain  where  SEAT  is controlled as  to  51%  by  the  Spanish fascist 
State  through  the  National  Institute for  Industry  and  where  FIAT's 
participation is 36%.  But  to  this share must  be  added  another  12% 
recently acquired by  IFI.  SEAT  which  in  1970  ~produced about  285,000 
motor  vehicles  (28%  higher  than  the  previous year)  is the largest 
Spanish motor  car  company  and  its production represents about  60% 
of national production.  It employs  25,000  workers  and  has  represented 
for  FIAT  a  useful  instrument  to  obviate  the  production strangulation 
in·  Italian plants.  For  a  considerable  time,  in fact,  SEAT  presses 
have  worked  for  Turin.  On  the  other hand,  SEAT  does  not  limit 
itself to  the  production of  complete  cars,  it also  assembles  FIAT 
cars with parts produced"in  Turin.  In  1969,  apart  from  the  normal 
SEAT  production,  120,000 motor  vehicles  were  assembled  using parts 
from  the  Italian FIAT  ~orks. 
In Yugoslavia  FIAT  is present  through  CRVENA  ZASTAVA  where 
it holds  a  49%  participation.  19,000 workers  are  employed  by 
ZASTAVA  and  production in  1969 was  71,000 motor  vehicles.  Forecasts 
indicate  an  important  increase -32-
in production  (183,000  by  1973);  this plant also  assembles  parts 
of FIAT  cars  from  Turin  alongside  its own  production;  it can  even 
be  said  that  up  to the  presen~ assembly  has  been  prevalent. 
Production  of  ZASTAVA,  including assembly,  is 50%  of  the  Yugoslav 
total.  Joint  FIAT  and  ZASTAVA  activities are  foreseen  in  Colombia 
and  in  India  (the latter should  produce  utility vehicles  to  the 
tune  of 50,000 units per  annum).  Technically  and  from  every  point 
of  view,  control  by  FIAT  is practically complete. 
Other  assembly  plantsexist in Portugal  (7,000  vehicles  in 
1969),  in Austria,  in  Ireland,  in  Belgium  and  in  the  Netherlands. 
Bulgaria and  Rumania  assemble  tractor parts under  licence  and  with 
FIAT  parts.  The  plant  of  Togliattigrad,  on  the  other  hand  is self-
supporting. 
The  presence  of  FIAT  in South  America  is huge.  In  Argentina, 
there is FIAT  CONCORD,  MATERFER  and  GRANDI  MOTORI.  FIAT  CONCORD 
which  is the  largest  Argentinian private  company  employs  13,000 
workers  and  has  produced  in  1970,  50,000 motor  vehicles,  5,600 
tractors  and  about  3,000 lorries.  Its sales  value  has  been  of 
143  thousand million lire.  Other  assembly  plants are  located  in 
Chile,  Mexico,  Peru,  Venezuela,  Paraguay  and  Costa  Rica.  In 
Uruguay,  the  AUTOMOTORA  BASSO  plant  assembles  FIAT  components. 
It is estimated  that  no  less  than  70,000 motor  vehicles  were 
assembled  in  1969  in  the  Latin  American  plants  (apart  from  the 
independent  production  by  FIAT  CONCORD).  A project  is nearing 
completion  for  the  manufacture  of tractors in Brazil. ...  33-
In Africa,  there  are  works  which  assemble  FIAT  m9tor 
vehicles in Egypt,  in Morocco  (SOMACA  where  FIAT  FRANCE  has  a 
participation of  25%  and  the  public  concern BEPI  of 50%),  in Kenya  and 
in Tunisia.  As  can  be  seen,  apart  from  companies  where  FIAT's  capital 
is present,  there  are  others which  are  financially  independent  of 
FIAT .. but  assembled  under  FIAT  licence  and  with parts  from  Italy 
(ex.  Egypt,  Tunisia). 
Apart  from  the  companies  already  spoken  of,  mention must 
be  made  of  MAROCAINE  DE  CONSTRUCTION  AUTOMOBILES  (100%  FIAT), 
FIAT  ZAMBIA  (car  assembly,  100%  FIAT),  FIAT  SOUTH  AFRICA  (assembly 
of about  10,000  in  1969),  all controlled by  INTERNATIONAL  HOLDING 
FIAT  of  Lugano.  Other  assembly  plan~are foreseen  in Ethiopia, 
The  Congo:and  the  Sudan. 
In  Asia,  countries  where  there are plants which  produce  and 
assemble  FIAT  motor  vehicles are  many.  In  Turkey,  the  presence  of 
FIAT  is very  strong:  TOFAS  (2,000  employed)  in which  FIAT's 
participation is of  41.5% and  TURK  TRAKTOR  controlled by  FIAT. 
There  are  other plants in Iran,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Pakistan,  Thailand 
and  in India  where  "PREMIER  AUTOMOBILES  with  a  capital of 74.8 
million Rupees  operates  and  employs  10,000 workers".  There  are 
other  assembly plants in Australia and  New  Zealand.  In Japan, 
KUBOTA  produces  tractors under  FIAT  licence. 
As  can  be  seen,  the  establishments  which  produce  or assemble 
FIAT  vehicles are  extremely numerous.  FIAT  is strengthening 
further its foreign  set-up.  For  example,  SEAT  should  reach  a 
production of  480,000  motor  vehicles  in  1972,  TOFAS  should  produce 
20,000  also  in  1972,  PREMIER  25,000,  etc.  Within  a  few  years, 
therefore,  production of 700,000 motor  vehicles  (excluding  those 
assembled)  should be  reached.  It can also  be  presumed  that  the 
volume  of -M-
motor  vehicles assembled.will  increase  sharply  and  our  estimate 
(over  300,000)  should  be  exceeded  quite  soon. 
Lastly,  foreign activities by  FIAT  do  not  appear  in their 
true  importance if the  field of  construction is left out:  ahead 
of  the  FIAT  group  is  IMPRESIT,  the  largest Italian civil engineering 
company.  It is to  IMPRESIT  that  was  entrusted  the  construction of 
the  Kariba  Dam  and,  more  recently,  in association with  companies 
from  other  countries,  the  work  on  the  Tarbela  Dam.  In  collaboration 
with  others or alone,  IMPRESIT  (created in  1929  by  a  group  of financial 
institutions and  taken  over later by  FIAT)  has  worked  in Africa,  in 
Latin  America,  in Asia,  etc.  The  value  of contracts  for  1970 
was  about  450  thousand million lire and  apart  from  the  2,500  Italian 
technicians  and  workers  there  are  tens of  thousands  of local  workers 
on  the  sites.  IMPRESIT  and  other  companies  or  groups  with  which 
it operates is an  example  of  the  kind  of  expansion  seen  in  Italy 
during  the  early post-War  years;  a  functional  expansion  which 
requires more  promising  investmen~than those  of  FIAT  in its assembly 
or  construction plants. 
FIAT'S  POSITION  IN  THE  INTERNATIONAL  MARKET 
FIAT  participates in  the  international  division of  work 
not  only  passively  by  accepting  a  set  scheme  but  also  actively 
by  promoting  and  participating in agreements  which  on  the  one  hand 
exclude  our  country  from  a  given activity and,  on  the  other, 
strengthen FIAT's  position in  the  international market  for  the 
motor  vehicle  sector. -ls-
The  recent agreement  with J.  DEERE  confirms  that  FIAT  tends 
to  specialise in the  motor  vehicle ·and utility  vehicle  sector whilst 
keeping  a  controlling position in its other activities. 
The  FIAT-CITROEN  agreement  shows  that this Italian company 
with  increasing interests and  participation abroad  has  become  a 
real and  true  multinatio~al company  but  may  reveal  characteristics 
which are  different  from  those  of multinational  companies  existing 
h~therto. 
In  December  1970,  after lengthy negotiations and  after FIAT 
had  already secured  a  participation in  CIT~OEN,  PARED!  (Societe  de 
participation et  de  developpement)  was  established; it owns  53% 
of the  share  capital of  CITROEN.  In its turn,  the  capital of 
PARED!  is divided between FIAT  and MICHELIN,  in the  proportion of 
49  and  51%  respectively.  CITROEN,  on  the  other hand,  controls 
BERLIET  (the  French manufacturers  who  cover  45.6%  of French 
production of industrial vehicles of over  six tons).  In  1969, 
CITROEN-BERLIET's  production  was  worth  868. thousand million lire. 
505,997  motor  vehicles  were  produced  and  20,085  coaches.  In  1970, 
production  increased  sharply  (by  over  25%).  Even  without  precise 
information,  all agree· that  FIAT-CITROEN  have  overtaken  CHRYSLER, 
taking third place after  GENERAL  MOTORS  and  FORD.  FIAT  is able  to 
be  present  in  the  European market  even  in those  engine  capacities 
from  which it had  been  excluded  since  the  French  firm  occupies  an 
important  position in capacities exceeding  1,700  cc. -~-
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The  agreement  will not  consist  of  a  simple  overlapping of various 
establishments and  products.  The  mutual  integration will also  cover 
the  commercial  network,  moreover,  projects are  being  considered 
for  standardising parts of  FIAT,  CITROEN  and  LANCIA  vehicles  to  obtain 
a  greater  importance  and  economies  and  at  the  same  ~ime to  dispose 
of different plants  which at  the  opportune  moment  can  produce 
irrespectively for  one  make  or  the  other. 
The  FIAT-CITROEN  group  has  thus  become  the  most  important 
European motor  vehicle manufacturer  and  has  better prospects  than 
the  German  VOLKSWAGEN-NSU-AUTOUNION  group  for  developing  and 
introducing new  models  in  the  market;  this  commercial  policy of 
diversification of products  also  opens  the  prospects  of reaching 
different  income  groups. 
A possible  agreement  between  FIAT-CITROEN  and  VOLKSWAGEN  has 
been mentioned;  this  would  confirm  the  forecast  that  the  COMMON 
MARKET,  after  a  period of  sharp  competition,  may  have  led  to  a 
higher  degree  of monopoly, •to  a  larger  concentration  and  to  more 
agreements. 
The  agreements  FIAT-CITROEN,  AGFA-GEVAERT,  PIRELLI-DUNLOP 
are  the  signs  of  the  beginning of  a  new  phase:  the  truly multinational 
companies,  European  companies  will  be  able  to  build,  in conjunction 
with other  factors  such as monetary  and  economic  policies,  not  only 
a  common  market  but  also  a  common  economic  system. 
At  the  summit  of  FIAT's  international policy  there  is a 
twofold  requirement:  build  a  multinational  company  able  to  contain 
competition  which  will  become  increasingly  sharper  through  a 
slackening in  the  rate  of increase  in sales of  cars  in Europe  and 
dispose  of plants  so  sited geographically as  to  benefit  from  the 
differences -37--
in  synd~cal revendication and  their lack of cohesion.  Th~ Chairman 
of FIAT,  Gianni  Agnelli  has  said that  the multinational  company  is 
"the most  effective  instrument  to  operate  in tomorrow's  world",  his 
strategy cannot  be  understood if this reality is omitted. 
The  ability  o~ self-financing,  the possibiity of drawing 
capital and  to make  it flow  from  one  country  to another according 
to  the  need  of new  activities, .etc.  show  how  FIAT  can  succeed,  at 
least  on  a  medium  term.  The  risk is that this will be,a FIAT. 
success  and  not  a  success of the  Italian economic  system  which  runs 
the  danger  of being  temporarily more  integrated in the  traditional 
"' 
system  (with  the  rules of division of  work)  and  placed more  on 
the  fringe  because its own  major  company  will  become  always less 
Italian and  more  international. 
RIV-SKF 
This multinational  group  faces  the  challenge  of world  wide 
pressure  with 65  establishments,  28  plants,  52  sales organizations 
in all continents.  In over  60  years of operation,  the  group  has 
produced  up  to  now  about  6  thousand million bearings.  SKF  was 
founded  in  Gbteborg  by  Dr.  Sven  Wingquist  in 1907,  already  in 1909 
and  1910,  it opened  branches  the  other side of the  Atlantic  and 
in Great Britain;  in  1914,  the  first  German  factory  was  built and 
in  1917,  the  first French one.  Meantime,  it bought  two  important 
Swedish  steel-works.  In  1947,  there  were  45  SKF  plants in operation. 
The  amalgamation  with RIV  came  in 1965.  Today,  the  SKF  group 
employs  64,000  and  its annual  sales are  around  450  thousand million 
lire. -38-
RIV  was  founded  only  one  year before  SKF;  it was  established 
in Turin in  1906  by  Sen.  Giovanni  Agnelli  with  a  first pilot plant 
of 23  operatives.  A  few  months  later,  the  Villar Perosa plant  was 
built,  with  180  operatives,  300  machines  and its own  hydro-electric 
plant,  its production  capacity  was  20,000  bearings per  annum.  In 
1911,  it reached  a  target of  220,000  bearings per  annum.  At  the 
end  of  the  First World  War,  RIV  employed  1,000  and it covered  an 
2  area of 28,000  m  •  A new  plant  was  built in Turin  in  1924.  In 
2  1932,  there  were  4,400  workers  and  the  area  had  reached  70,000  m  , 
new  works  were  opened  at Massa  in  1939;  workers  had  increased  to 
2  8,600  whilst  the  area  extended  over  155,000 m  and  annual  production 
exceeded  20  million bearings. 
The  expansion  process  of  RIV  went  on:  in  1956,  the  Cassino 
plant  was  built,  the  first activity of its kind  in  the  Italian 
Mezzogiorno,  three  years later a  new  plant  was  built at Pinerolo. 
The  nucleus  of  the  AIRASCA  establishment  was  inaugurated in  1963. 
In  1965,  the  company  joined  the  SKF  multinational  group  under  the 
name  RIV-SKF  Officine  di  Villar Perosa S.p.A.,  it employs  at present 
about  10,000;  over  100  million bearings  per  annum  are  produced  in 
8  plants and it has  16  branches  in Italy apart  from  about  one 
thousand  distributors.  The  production  programme  of  RIV-SKF 
includes  every  type  of bearing  which  means  several  thousand  different 
types  of shapes  and  sizes. 
Apart  from  having  a  leading position amongst  the  world 
specialists for  supplies  to  the  motor  industry,  RIV-SKF  make 
bearings  for  advanced  technologies -39-
as  for  instance  aero  engines  and  mach~ne-toola which  require 
parts with  a  very high precision.  RIV-SKF  as  a  company  in the  SKF 
international group is in a  position to satisfy any  demand  fo-r 
bearings,  from  those  with  a  1  mm.  diameter  and  weighing less than 
one-tenth.of a  gram,  to  those  with an  outside  diameter of several 
meters;  from  bearings  wh~ch can  turn at 400,000  r.p.m.  to  others 
which  can  carry loads heavier  than  2,000 tons.  The  heaviest 
bearing produced till now  by  the  SKF  group  weighs  6,100 kilo,  the 
lightest o;o36  gram. 
Special steel for  bearings,  one  of  ~he bases of success of 
the  SKF  group  arrives at  the  RIV-SKF  works  as  a  tube  or  a  bar  for 
small  and  medium  sized rings,  billets for large rings and  drawn 
wire  for  the  revolving pieces.  Every year,  some  80,000  tons of 
steel are  processed.  With its own  production,  integrated in that 
of  the  group,  RIV-SKF  guarantees  ori~inal bearings wherever  there 
are  machines  and  equipment  built in Italy;  stocks  of spare bearings 
are  also  assured  for  any  machine  built in any  other  country  of  the 
world.  Usually  a  bearing goes  through  several basic  stages of 
manufacture:  twining or  stamping of  the  rings,  heat  treatment, 
grinding to  give  rings·the size  and  finish required,  mounting of 
the  revolving parts and  cages  in the  rings.  Balls and rollers go 
through  similar stages.  Cages -~-
are  mostly  stamped  or  turned.  The  raw material mainly  used is the 
tube  from  which  the  rings are  made  on  automatic  six spindle lathes. 
From  the  lathes,  th~ rings are  tested.  In  some  cases,  during  the 
first operation of rough-shaping  on  an  automatic  lathe,  there 
follows  a  finishing process  on  special  single-spindled lathes. 
For  rings  of larger sizes,  the  first  operation consists of  forging 
with  a  hammer  or  of  stamping  or rolling;  having  passed  the·test after 
turning,  rings  go  through  a  heat  treatment.  This  involves  several 
stages  and  its purpose  is to  impart  to  the  various pieces  which  make 
up  the  bearing  the  prescribed hardness;  special  appliances  measure 
this at  the  end  of  the  process.  Laboratory  checks  examine  the 
steel's internal structure.  Hardened  rings  are  then  ground  and 
the  surplus metal left during  turning is removed  from  their surface. 
They  thus  reach  their final  shape  and  size.  The  race  in particular, 
i.e.  the  groove  in  which  the  balls or rollers are  made  to  run  are 
specially finished;  from  this delicate operation  depends  largely 
,·· 
~ 
the  silence of  the  bearing in action. 
Two  million balls and  three million rollers are  produced 
daily at  the  RIV-SKF  plant  of Pinerolo.  The  ball is made  by  stamping 
a  steel  drawn  wire.  The  rougher  uneveriess  is removed  by  a  filing 
machine  after  which  the  ball is hardened  through  a  complicated 
heat  treatment.  It finally  passes  through  several  stages  of 
grinding  and  "shining".  After  each  operation,  strict tests are 
carried out  on  every  single ball  to  ensure  the  highest  level  of 
quality. -41--
The  task of  the  cage  is to  keep  moving parts at  th~·ir proper 
distance;  they  can  be  turned,  pressed or  stamped, ·in one  or  sometimes 
in  two  pieces called  "semi-cage".  They  are  produced in a  speci~l 
shop  of  the  Airasca plant  for all the  other RIV-SKF  plants at the 
daily rate of about  one  million pieces. 
Bearings are  assembled automatically;  the  machine,  working 
on  ring size,  selects suitable balls and  places  the  cage  in the 
required position.  A medium  sized revolving bearing goes  through 
a  total of at least 40  different processing  and  checking operations. 
RIV-SKF  use  electronic  computers  for  solving problems  of 
actual projects.  To  users  of its products it offers programmes  of 
calculations of physical  dimensions  for  their planning,  making, 
with  the  extreme  rapidity  typical  of electronic  systems,  calculations 
which  through  their complexity  would  have  represented  an  obstacle 
not  easily surmountable  through  traditional methods  of ·industrial 
practice. 
RIV-SKF  doesnot  manufacture  only bearings.  Quite  apart  from 
present  studies about  the  numerous  items  which  can  represent  a 
promising diversification,  RIV-SKF  have  for  some  time  been  specialising 
in the  production of  shock-absorbers  of different  types~  also 
tappets  for  car engines.  Research is very  intensive,  not  only  in 
order  to maintain  the  pre-eminence  which  the  SKF  group  holds in the 
world  and  which  RIV-SKF  has  in Italy,  but also  in the  study, 
development  and  implementation  of the  most  advanced  technology. 
This  takes  a  practical  form  in  the  research laboratory  which is 
the  pride of  the  company  and  works  in  co-ordination -42-
with  the  laboratories of other  firms  in the  group,  at  the  SKF 
European Research  Centre. 
HONEYWELL  INCORPORATED  AND  HONEYWELL  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS 
One  of  the  first  steps  taken  by  GENERAL  ELECTRIC,  the 
world's largest electric  and  electronic  group,  when  it held  66% 
of  the  French  MACHINE  BULL's  shares,  was  the  dismissal  of 500 
workers.  At  a  later stage,  dismissals  reached  3,000  with  a  further 
2,000  being asked  to  accept  "voluntary  dismissal". 
This  resulted in  the  closing  down  of  five  factories  whilst 
various  research  and  development  groups  were  abolished. 
In  May  1970,  G.E.  announced  that it was  ceding  to  HONEYWELL 
its control  of  BULL.  Workers  of  the  two  companies  learnt  this 
through  the  Press.  This lateral  change  of  control,  i.e.  from  one 
foreign  company  to  another  foreign  one,  was  decided  thousands  of 
kilometers apart.  The  French  Government  "consulted"  in  the matter, 
gave  its consent  in July.  HONEYWELL  undertook  to  maintain  the  same 
employment  levels at  BULL's. 
In  August  1970,  the  world  President  of  HONEYWELL,  James  H. 
Binger,  declared  that  the  agreements  with  the  Computers  Division 
of  G.E.  would  have  meant  an~expansion in production  and  employment. 
A  telegramme  and  a  Press  communique  from  the  U.S.A.  announced  the 
dismissal  of  260  out  of  360  workers  of  the  Amsterdam  branch.  Once 
again,  the  decision  had  been  taken  thousands  of kilometers  away. -43-
'· 
The  Dutch  syndicate  for metal  workers  had  obtained  during 
the  negotiations of January-February  1971  a  project  of active 
assistance  for  the  workers  concerned. 
Meantime,  transfers of other  workers  of this plant  to  others 
in the  Netherlands,  France  and  Germany  were  spoken  of.  Simultaneously, 
it was  siad that several  hundred other workers  were  to lose their 
jobs:  500  in Great Britain  (400  in Lanarkshire  and  100  in the  new 
plant of Hemel  Hempstead),  also 3,000 in the  U.S.A.  (not all from 
the  computers  division).  The  factory  councils in  Germany  protested 
so  loudly  that  the  firm  was  compelled  to  reduce  the  100  dismissals 
anticipated but it did  not  renew  the  contracts of 50  foreign  workers 
(frequently subjected  to  this kind of treatment)  and  losses  through 
death  or retirement  were  not  made  up. 
GENERAL  DESCRIPTION  - HONEYWELL  was  founded  in  1927  through 
the  amalgamation  of  "HONEYWElL  HEATING  SPECIALtSTS"  and  "MINNEAPOLIS 
HEAT  REGULATOR".  It adopted its present  style in  1964  after having 
been  known  as  "MINNEAPOLIS  HONEYWELL  REGULATOR". 
HONEYWELL  is the largest  group  producing industrial instruments 
.1d  electric,  electronic  and'pneumatic  control  systems  specialised 
in  the  thermal  sector;  f~ns and air conditioning plant,  and,  in the 
industry of  space  exploration. 
It. is equally active  in production of  war  material  with 
fragmentation  bombs.  This has  caused  demonstrations in large 
sectors of public  opinion where  it is known  as  "HONEYWELL  PROJECT". 
~n  1970,  a  demonstration  compelled  the  Chairman  to  bring to  a  close 
a  meeting of shareholders in Minneapolis after a  session  which 
lasted  10 minutes  - a  record!  There  were  other protests -«-
in  the  American  plants,  in  those  of  Great  Britain and  in Germany. 
The  company  also  specialises in  the  manufacture  of electronic 
equipment  and  the  various  instruments  connected  with it, in  1969 it 
took  over  COMPUTER  CONTROL  COMPANY.  HONEYWELL  is made  up  of six 
divisions of  which  the  COMPUTER  AND  COMMUNICATIONS  division  was 
established in conjunction with  that  of G.E.  to  make  the  present 
HONEYWELL  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS  (receipts in  1969  represented·24% for 
the  whole  group).  The  other divisions are:  Controls  (23%  of receipts), 
Space  research  (34%),  Industrial  products  (17%),  Research  Centre 
and  production of optical  instruments  (2%). 
G.E.  - HONEYWELL  - The  outstanding  feature  of  1970  in the 
computer  sector  was  the  amalgamation  of G.E.  and  HONEYWELL.  The 
new  company  took  the  style of  HONEYWELL  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS  (HIS). 
HONEYWELL  INC.  holds  81.5% of  the  shares,  G.E.  18.5%. 
G.E.  transferred  to  the  new  company  two  plants in  the  U.S.A. 
for  the  production  of  computers,  the  control  of  BULL-G.E.  in France 
and  of  G.E.  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS  (previously Olivetti G.E.  in Italy). 
G.E.  contributed almost  10%  in total  to  HONEYWELL,  over  and  above 
a  total value  of  $110  million in bonds.  HONEYWELL  transferred  to 
the  new  HIS  group  six plants in the  U.S.A.  and  others  in Scotland, 
England,  Canada,  Germany  and  Japan. 
It is superfluous  to  mention  that. in  the  competition race 
in  the  computers  sector,  it has  to  face  up  to  IBM  which  holds 
about  two-thirds  of  the  world market.  HONEYWELL  and  G.E.  are  now 
in  second  place,  having  overtaken  SPERRY  RAND -·-
(UNIVAC)  which  holds 5.6%.  But  much  remains  to  be  done. 
HONEYWELL  EMPLOYEES  - Early in  1970,  G.E.  e~ployed about 
400,000  and  Honeywell  Inc.  81,500 of which  23,900  were  working 
outside  the  U.S.A.  In  September,  1970,  the  new  company,  HONEYWELL 
INFORMATION  SYSTEMS,  absorbed  about  23,000 of G.E.  employees  and 
about  28,000  from  HONEYWELL  INC.,  making  a  total of about  51,000 
(including  16,400  from  HONEYWELL- BULL).  The  dismissals early in 
1971  reduced  these  figures  to  about  48,000  employees. 
The  activities and  employees  of  HONEYWELL  !~FORMATION SYSTEMS 
(based  on  figures  for  the  end  of  1970)  were: 
u.s.A.  11,000  (plants  only) 
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10,000  (about  5,000  in Paris,  2,400  in 
Angers  and  2,350  in Belfort) 
3,900  (including  commercial  outlets in 
Australia and  South Africa) 
900 
400  (plant  of Heppenheim  only) 
600  (360  in  the  Amsterdam  plant) 
3,300  (1,230  in the  Caluso  plant). 
The  other 20,000  work  in administration and  commercial 
centres and  in  the  departments  of  HONEYWELL  INFORMATION  SYSTEMS 
in the  U.S.A.  and  in: 
EUROPE  (Austria,  Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  Greece,  Norway, 
Portugal,  Spain,  Sweden  and  Switzerland) 
LATIN  AMERICA  (Argentina,  Brazil,  Mexico  - including a 
small  plant  in Mexico  City  - Uruguay  and  Venezuela). -46-
ASIA  (Japan  and  The  Lebanon), 
AFRICA  (Algeria,  Ivory  Coast,  Madagascar,  Morocco,  Reunion). 
In  many  countries  the  activities of  HONEYWELL  INC.  ar~ of 
cours~ considerably more  important  than  the  figures  of  HIS;  for 
instance,  in Great  Britain,  the  plants making  industrial instruments, 
heat  control  equipment  and  other  items  for  comuters  has  a  total of 
around  9,000  employees.  Similarly,  in  Germany,  the  total of  the 
personnel  employed  by  HONEYWELL  INC.  and  HONEYWELL  INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS  (HIS)  was  brought  into  focus  when  the  Chairman  of  HIS, 
Clarence  W.  Spangle,  was  also  elected Executive  Vice-President  of 
HONEYWELL  INC.  early in  1971. 
THE  FUTURE  FOR  HONEYWELL  EMPLOYEES  - HONEYWELL ,.s  future  -
and  particularly that  of HIS  and  of its European  key  company, 
HONEYWELL  - BULL  - causes  a  great  deal  of  concern  to  its employees 
and  their syndicate.  Rumours  of participations,  amalgamations 
or  take-overs  (on  the  part  of  the  British  ICL,  the  French  CII 
and  even,  incredibly,  of  GENERAL  ELECTRIC)  show  the  need  of  employment 
guarantees at all levels of  the  multinational activities.  HONEYWELL's 
continuation  in its present  shape  in no  way·reduces  the  necessity 
for  securing  such  guarantees. - ·47 -
FINANCIAL  OUTLOOK 
Spangle,  the  spokesman  of HIS,  stated in February  1971 
that  income  for  1970  amounted  to  861  thousand million dollars, 
an  increase of  13%  compared  with  1969  for  the  Computers  Division 
of  HONEYWELL  and  G.E.  HON-EYWELL  INC.  succeeded  only in maintaining 
the  same  level of  income  as  the.previous year,  keeping  to  the 
figures  published  (this,  despite  the  fact  that  income  during  the 
first six months  of  1970,  29 million dollars,  exceede~ by  1.1%  the 





1.921  million,dollars 
62  million  dollars 
1969 
·1.838  million  dollar! 
·62  mi·llion  dollar! 
(1)  Figures  for  1969  were  amended  (as  concerns  income  of 
1,426 million dollars)  to  include results of G.E.  computers 
and  to bring  them  into line with  the  data for  1970. 
(2)  These  consolidated  figures  include  for  the  first  time  in 
1969 and  1970,  those  of  YAMATAKE  HONEYWELL  with  a  share 
participation of 50%  in Japan,  which  in both years  had  an 
income  of  1.2 million dollars. 
The  Chairman  of  HONEYWELL  INC.,  James  H.  Binger,  whilst  releasing 
this  information declared  on  19th February,  as reported in the 
Press,  that  the  outlook  for  1971  was  "rather complex". -~-
It is interesting to  note  that after  a  long period of 
sickness  BULL-GENERAL  ELECTRIC,  shortly before  announcing  the 
transfer  to  HONEYWELL,  published  the  first  financial  report  which 
showed it as  being  for  years  a  solid and  prosperous  industry. 
After  accumulating  total liabilities of about  500 million French 
Francs  (equal  to  about  55  thousand million lire)  in  connection  with 
previous years,  BULL-G.E.  wrote  for  1969,  139 million Francs  to 
financial  reserve  and  depreciation,  3.56 million  Francs  to  net 
profits and  an  increase  of  40%  in  the  order  book. 
Announcing  the  development  of  HIS  (which  is faster  than 
that  of  HONEYWELL  INC.),  Clarence  Spangle  sees better prospects  for 
the  future,  a  development  rate  of  14-15% in  the  U.S.A.  and  20%  in 
the  other  countries  during  the  next  five  years  as  regards  the 
computer  industry. 
Which  changes  in  the  meantime  are  mapped  out  for  the 
structure  of  the  company?  Above  all,  what  will  be  the  fate  of 
the  employees?  And  what  will  they  have  to  say  about  the  present 
and  future  situations? 
PIRELLI  GROUP 
The  tyre  industry  employs  about  54  thousand  workers  in Italy. 
Of  these  about  77%  come  under  the  direct  control  of  Pirell~;  about 
24,000  depend  on  Pirelli S.p.A.  and  the  other  groups  of associated 
companies.  Production is centred mainly  in  the  provinces  of Milan 
and  Turin. -4~-
Sales by  PIRELLI  S.p.A.  in 1969  exceeded  215  thousand 
million lire;  they  rose  to 353  thousand million if sales by  the 
associated  companies  are  taken  into  account  and  reach 690  thousand 
million lire if the  whole  group  is considered.  In  the  selection of 
Italian groups  by  importance,  PIRELLI  takes sixth place  for its 
sales. 
The  tyre  industry in Italy is rather concentrated.  Only 
16%  of  the  firms  have  more  than  250  workers  and  they  account  for 
almost  80%  of  the  labour  force.  In  this sector,  the  absence  of 
labour is noticeable,  with  a  few  exceptions  - such as  special 
caves  for  fluid oil - a  very  advanced  stage  in  technology  and 
automation has  been  reached. 
In  1902,  PIRELLI  were  in Spain,  i~ 1914  in Great Britain, 
in  1917  in Argentina,  in  1929  in Brazil,  in 1936  in Belgium.  In 
Basle,  Societe  Internationale  PIRELLI  became  the  holding  company  of 
the  group  and  controls directly the  companies  of  the  group  outside 
the  EEC.  In  the  Community  countries,  companies  of the  group are 
controlled directly by  PIRELLI  S.p.A.:  the  Belgian  PIRELLI  SACIC, 
the  German  VEITH  PIRELLI  and  PIRELLI  FRANCE.  Other  foreign 
companies  are  controlled by  PIRELLI  SVENSKA  A.B.  in Sweden  and  by 
the  Swiss  PIRELLI  PRODUKTE.  The  multinational  character of  PIRELLI 
has  considerably increased  following  the  integration between 
DUNLOP  and  PIRELLI. 
Let  us now  examine  the  progress of sales of the  company 
from  1962  to. 1969.  In  1962,  PIRELLI  International had  sales 
amounting  to  146  thousand million lire equal  to  41.2%  of the 
group  whilst  by  1969,  it had  risen to 335  thousand million and 
48.7%. -so-
PIRELLI  S.p.A.  in  1962  represented,  always  in  terms  of sales, 
39%,  in  1969  it had  dropped  to  31.2%.  Percentages  for  associated 
companies  in  the  group  remain  constant,  even if in absolute  figures 
they  increased  from  70  to  138  thousand million lire. 
COMPARISON  BETWEEN  THE  DUNLOP  AND  PIRELLI  GROUPS  (from  "FORTUNE") 
1964  - 19 65-- 1 96_6_  1967  1968  lj69 
POSITION  D  3 1  3 I  36  35  42 
p  49  52  53  54  54 
SALES  D  885  952  974  1070  1 080  1 I 8 4 
(Million  $)  p  680  739  848  &_94  950  1070 
ASSETS  D  667  723  763  755  871 
(Million  $)  p  769  863  91 1  .961  9.93 
NET  PROFITS  D  23083  25766  25010  26672  27907 
(Million  $)  p  8130  1 1 64 6  23571  24.970  25020 
EMPLOYED  D  103700  I 06100  104100  99000  102500  108000 
p  64690  65900  67009  67739  69289  76000 -51-
OVERALL  OBSERVATIONS 
The  trend  to  concentration in industrialized economies  goes 
now  beyond  every national border  and  takes  the  aspect  of  a  centralisa-
tion of  capital  which  goes  much  further  than  the  traditional 
agreements  or alliances or divisions of markets.  All  these  aspects 
follow  the  same  reasoning  even  though  they  appear  in varieties which 
go  from  simple  associations  to  amalgamations,  to  take-overs,  to 
structures of ultranational  types. 
In  Europe,  the  large  size  and  dynamic  prospects of  the 
Common  Market,  even  prior  to  stimulating the  internal drive  for 
accumulation  on  the  part of  companies,  had  promoted  a  gradual  but 
massive  expansion  of  American  presence. 
Like  a  magnet,  the  Common  Market  attracts American  capital 
in  the  shape  of direct  investment.  This  penetration of European 
industry  by  large  American  business interests is without  precedent. 
Something similar occurred in  1920  when,  in the  wake  of the  Dawes 
and  Young  Plans,  American  private  capital was  channelled  into  the 
electrical concerns  and  the motor  industry in Germany.  At  the  time, 
the  Germans  created an  uproar  about  this kind of offer to  conduct 
their business which  they  called "ueberfremdung""l  However,  all 
this is irrelevant in  the  face  of  the  present  capital offensive 
from  the  U.S.A.  in Western  Europe.  "Patronat  Franc;ais"  the  French 
industrial magazine  in·its issue  of August-September  1964,  estimated  . 
the  size of  the  American  offensive  and  stated that if it was 
measured  in  terms  of sales volume,  the largest  German  company  would 
occupy  the  27th place  in the  grading of American  companies;  the 
.largest -52-
Italian  company  23rd  place  and  the  French,  57th. 
GENERAL  MOTORS  which  heads  the list of  the  largest  American 
companies  with  a  volume  of sales of  16.5  thousand million dollars 
in  1963  is amongst  the  seventeen largest  companies  in Western 
Germany;  DUPONT,  the  11th American  company  has  a  volume  of sales of 
2.6  thousand million dollars,  six times larger  than  that  of 
MONTECATINI;  GENERAL  ELECTRIC,  4th  in  the list with  a  volume  of 
sales of 4.9  thousand million dollars is now  six times  larger  than 
the  German  AEG. 
Today's  overall  competitive  and  expansionist  strength of 
American  capital is opposed  by  a  considerable limit which  ex-
President  Eisenhower  once  described as  "military-industrial  complex". 
The  New  York  Times  expert  on  foreign  policy,  James  Reston,  wrote 
from  London~  "American  pressure  on  Great  Britain and  on  Europe, 
emanates  to  a  large  extent  from  American  industry  which  in turn 
draws  advantages  from  the  vast  demands  made  by  the  Pentagon  •  •  • 
i.e.  that  the  Governments  and  industries in this part of  the  world 
consider but  find  that  they  cannot  effectively  compete  •  unless 
they  combine  into  much  larger units,  capable ·of  undertaking  very 
advanced  and  costly  development  and  research projects"  (New  York 
Times,  15th April,  1965). 
The  amount  spent  on  research and  development  programmes  in 
1963  was  18  thousand million dollars,  compared  with  2  thousand 
million in  1950.  In  1963,  it represented  3%  of  the  Gross  National 
Product  of  the  U.S.A.  But  this  amount  (of  which  7  thousand million 
dollars  were  entirely for military purposes)  represented  23%  of 
Great  Britain's total production,  27%  of France's,  29%  of  the 
German  Federal Republic's,  14%  of  the  total production of  the 
Netherlands  and  Belgium;  49%  of  that  of Italy. -53.-
This picture shows  the considerable superiority of the 
large  American  business  firms  supported by  the  enormous  demand  and 
the  policy of over-bill by Washington. 
This  leads  to  an  att~tude which is above  all defensive,  as 
shown  in alarming  terms  by·the  Chairman  of FIAT,  Gianni  Agnelli,  who 
at  a  Press Conference  in Paris in March  1965,  asked  European  industry 
for  a  greater unity  to  face  the  American  companies'  onslaught.  He 
said:  "the prodigious  development  of American  economy.imposes 
imperatively  the  joining of forces  of our  old  world"  ("Le  Monde", 
4th March,  1965). 
The  change  in these  developments  can better be  seen if 
considered against  the  background  of capital internationalisation 
in modern  times. 
International  centralisation of capital is unlike  national 
centralisation in several  important  respects.  Firstly;  centralisation 
occurs  almost  exclusively in  the  oligopolistic  system. 
The  motive  power  and  expansion potential of international 
monopolistic  strength appear  to  be  driven  by  nuclear energy if 
compared  with  the  competitiveness  of mechanical  industry in  the 
sudden  fall in world  competition in  the  19th  century.  The 
international giant  of our  days  tends  not  only  to  sell in the market 
but  to  dominate it and  the  main  instrument  for  this domination is 
direct  foreign  investment  which will also  secure  th_e  supremacy 
in foreign markets  - a  phenomenon  unknown  at  one  time  but  well-
known  during  the  period  between  the  two  World Wars  and  typical of 
economic  relations between  countries industrially advanced  on  the 
~ne hand,  and  colonies  or  semi-colonies,  on  the  other.  Yet,  the 
attempt  to  conquer  the national market  from  rivals equipped  with 
highly  developed  means  is a  ne~ post-War  occurrence. -54-
Decisions  to  invest  and  the  credit  transactions of  these 
giants have  often  such  importance  that  they  have  a  direct  influence 
on  the  balance  of  payments  of all countries  and  can  cause  the  economic 
policy  decided  upon  by  the  govenments  of  these  countries.  Concerning 
the  agreement  reached  between  Shell  and Montecatini  and  the  acquisitions 
by  Ford  outside  the  minority  of British interests and  their  eff~ct 
on  the  Italian,  British and  American  balance  of  payments,  uThe 
Economist"  of  London  wrote:  "they  have  such massive  funds  available, 
moveable  at will  and  independent,  that  they  can alter  the  shade  of 
every  wish  national  governments  may  have  to  control movements  of 
capital"  (The  Economist,  October  1964). 
The  integration of Western  Europe  and  the  creation of  the 
Common  Market  in particular,  have,  therefore,  attracted large 
American  investments,  assured of strong support,  from  which  followed 
an  important  internal  force  of  concentration  even  of  a  multinational 
character.  From  an  automatic  and  unchecked  process  of  concentration 
can  also arise,  however,  against  every  appearance,  a  situation of 
such  instability and  imbalance  as  to  slow  down  West  European 
economic  life.  Locked  in  a  fight  for  compefition  which  is always 
severe  and  the  outcome  of  which  for  the  large  productive  complex 
and  large  capital is a  success,  the  concentration of  European 
capital increases in rapid leaps  and  within  the  various  forms  of 
amalgamation  and  take-over.  It seems  that  joint-stock companies 
;  gaining ground  in  the  centralisation process.  A  study  on  the 
~bject shows  that  amongst  the  100  largest industrial  companies  in 
~urope,  there  is also  clear  sh~re capital;  this is the  case  for  all 
:he  oil  companies  and  also  of other  companies  such as  NESTLE, 
NILEVER,  RHEINISCHE STAHLWERKE  etc.  "In short, it seems  that moat  of the large 
industrial  companies  gradually become  joint-stock companies if 
they  have  not  already  acquired this  form"  (Research  by  LOUVAIN, 
September  1963). 
From  this picture  emerges  straight  away  another  important 
aspect;  the  upsurge  of  European  giants  through  integration reacts 
on  the  economic  policy,  its main  instruments  and  institutions. 
The  power  incorporated in  these  enormous  concentratiops of  E~ropean 
capital is a  law  within  a  law  and  this power  has its own  laws 
determining  and  directing the  integrated trends.  Decisions  on 
investment  of  inte~ational capital are  quite  independent  of governments 
economic  policies.  An  EEC  study  group  has  come  to  the  enlightening 
conclusion  that:  "large international  companies  escape  to  a  great 
extent  the restrictions and  financial  incentives introduced by 
Western  governments,  the  example  of oil companies  has  shown  in the 
\ 
past  that it is illusory  to  submit  such  companies  to national  p~ans 
••• Amalgamations  and  agreements,  the  importance  of which  we  have 
already  seen,  gradually  deprive  governments  of their means  of action 
in an  increasing number  of  economic  sectors"  (Conference  Europeenne, 
Progres  Technique  et Marche  Commun,  Bruxelles  1960,  Vol.  1,  p.  245). 
If such  considerations are  valid  for  individual nations,  they are 
even  more  valid  today  for  the  supra-national institutions of West 
European  integration.  All  the  more  reason  why  investment  decisions 
and  credit  transactions of international giants have  disturbing and 
imbalancing effects-which cannot  be  checked  through  the  normal 
stabilising mechanisms.  Monopoly  is a  national  as  well  as  an 
international factor of instability and  justifies. more  than  ever 
Keynes'  verdict that ''it is dangerous  to  leave  in private hands -56-
decisions  concerning  investments"~ 
A·mininrum-~f international co-operation is sufficient 
to  ensure  a  smooth  working  of  the  world market  only  under  conditions 
of  a  large  volume  of business negotiated  by  numerous  competing 
firms  unable  to  determine  or  to  influence price  through  the  weight 
of  supply  and  which  react  automatically  to  every  price  change  in 
the  world  market  with  a  change  in the  volume  of production  and 
supply.  In  other words,  a  minimum  of international  co-operation 
through institutions is sufficient only  the  moment  automatic 
stabilisation mechanisms  can  work  at national  and  international 
levels.  It is clear,  however,  that  an  increased minimum  value  of 
private  capital necessary  to  compete  with  a  possibility of  success 
requires  a  higher  degree  of minimum  co-operation;  at  the  same  time, 
however,  the  main  difficulty is to maintain that  minimum  of  co-operation. 
The  appearance  of  international  companies  with  a  dominant  position 
creates an  entirely new  situation in  this respect. 
It is impossible  to  have  a  valid  theory  of  economic  integration 
in  the  capitalistic world  without  taking into  account  the  new 
developments  in monopolies  and  the  correlation between  monopoly  and 
integration.  Some  neo-classical  theories  on  integration are nothing 
but  a  brought  up  to  date  version of  the  classical  concept  of 
economic  harmony.  This is an  unrealistic picture, if not  the 
classical  dogma  on  harmony  of interests. 
*  *  *  *  * -51--
The  advent  of multinational  companies  coincides  wi~h the 
largest phenomena  of industrial concentration and  responds  to  the 
same  way  of  thinking.  This represents,  therefore,  an  increasing 
reality born  from  real needs,  which  cannot  be  ignored or  opposed 
by  fanciful restrictions.  But  nor  can  one  accept  the  utopian vision 
of a  network  of  companies  of a  "geocentric" kind,  of international 
mould  and  having an  international pursuit which,  according to  some 
futurists  could be  the  foundation  of peace  and prosperity.  Neither 
the realities of the  American  challenge nor  the  Japanese  one  can 
justify certain community  tendencies of granting incentives or 
privileged systems;  in any  case,  these  companies  do  not  require 
these  nor  the  childish illusion - if not  the  outright deliberate 
evasion  - that  the  core  of a  concentrated process of industrial 
restructurisation is the  key  to  the  solution of structural problems 
of  the  economy  and  of society. 
These  companies  are  born  from  the  high spheres of  the 
international  economic  system,  from  each national  system  and,  more 
specifically,  from  situations and  relations of oligopolistic 
character;  for  this very  reason,  questions  and  problems arise  on 
general  structural  development  and  stability of  the  economy  and 
of society. 
Against  every  appearance,  they  do  not  in  themselves necessarily 
lead  to  the  best  solutions in  terms· of prices,  nor  in certain cases, 
of technological  development.  On  the  other  hand~- we  have  only  to 
look at  the  experience  of General  Electric  - they  have  caused  serious 
setbacks in  employment. -58-
Above  all,  the  presence  and  policies of multinational  companies  have 
forceful  and  relatively autonomous  effects in  the  mother-country  as 
well  as  in places of production  and  marketing,  on  processes  of 
accumulation,  the  distribution of resources,  type  of investments 
and  of consumption,  on  employment,  conditions  of  work  and-on 
international  trade  and  balance  of payments,  therefore,  on  development 
policy  and  finally  on  the  political outline under  a  multi-party 
regime  and  in conditioning its attitude  to  evolve  towards  a  more 
advanced,  enlightened  and  articulated democratic  reality.  They  may 
even  degenerate  into  instruments  of  economic  neo-colonialism  to 
the  advantage  of  the  country  of origin,  or  conversely,  to  look 
entirely to  business  reasons  and  a  kind  of international division 
of  work  completely  divorced  from  national interest. 
It is clear that  the  search  for  an  overall alternative  to 
these  risks  and  the  roots  which  produce  them  would  arise  from  an 
ideological  angle~which would  go  beyond  the  bounds  of  this  talk and 
of  the  role  of  the  syndicate.  It is also  clear that  an  alteration 
involving absolute  power  is unthinkable  and  would  be  irrational 
from  an  economical-social  aspect,  not  realisable  in practice  and 
incompatible  with  the  engagements  and realities of international 
relations. 
In  the  ambit  of  the  present  system,  I  think,  therefore,  that 
we  can  consider  two  parallel  courses  which  coincide  with  reality even 
if they  involve  considerable  difficulty and  some  unknown  element 
and  require  a  strong sense  of purpose  and  a  good  deal  of application, 
a  programmed  economic  guide-line  and  control  of  the  public authorities 
at national  and  supra-national level  - hence  the  necessity of setting 
up  authentic  powers  and  instruments  in this  sense  - and  syndical action 
at levels  corresponding  to  the  removal  and  nature  of multinational 
companies. -·59-
These  are particularly difficult-tasks.  Yet,  the  true 
alternative  to  these  aims  is an  increasing reality in which  the  new 
giants not  only  follow  independent  thinking and  policies of national 
and  supra-national  choices of development  and  of economic  policy, 
but  cause  instability and  imbalance  which  cannot  be  checked  through 
the  normal  methods  of harmonization  and  stabilisation and  are  even 
less able  to  be  reabsorbed  through  an  adventurous  automatism. 
The  difficulty both  for  public authorities and, syndic~tes 
is increased by  the  fact  that  the  zones  of influence of  these 
companies  are  ma~y, moveable  and  not  identifiable with old or new 
institutional  complexes;  whilst  in these  better-defined dimensions, 
the  will,  capacity  and  means  of intervention are  inadequate  to  the 
extent  that  the  EEC  itself resembles  increasingly a  customs  union  -
and,  therefore,  a  development  of internal contradictions - more  than 
of  a  real  community. 
The  task,  therefore,  is anything but  easy but it· does  not 
permit  alternatives  today  which  are  fanciful  or  subordinate. THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  MULTINATIONAL  COMPANIES 
L.  DUQUESNE  de  la VINELLE The  Development  of Multinational Companies 
L.  DUQUESNE  de  la VINELLE 
The  existence of  multi:u~tional companies,  that is ·to  say 
companies  with production units in a  number  of  countries,  is not  a 
totally new  phenomenon;  there  were  already  a  few  in existence in the 
petroleum industrl.! before  the  second world war. 
What  ie new, ·on the other hand,  is the  extraordinary expansion 
of  such  companies in the  last two  decades.  In the  geographical  zone 
formed  by  the  six EEC  countries,  the  growth rate of direct  American· 
investment  has  regularly been double  the already high one  of  the  GNP. 
The  performance  has  been ao  less remarkable in Great  ~ritain, where 
the  value  of direct American  investments  almost  quadrupled  between 
1950  and  1960  and  doubled  again between 1960  and  1968.  In Japan a 
twelve-fold increase was  recorded  between 1950  and  1960  (rising 
from  a  very  low  level, it is true)  and  a  four-fold increase  between 
1960  and  1968. 
Another  remarkable  fact is that only  a  very  small proportion 
of  these  investments are in the  mining industry;  they are  chiefly 
in the  petroleum industry,  the  technologically most  advanced 
branches  of  the  manufacturing industry  and  the services sector. The  explanation accordingly does  not lie in the  need  to  seek  ~~w 
materials outside  the  United States. 
The  trend in direct European investment  in the  United States 
has  been less regular  and  spectacular.  Between 1965  and_l968  their 
book  value  nevertheless multiplied  by  2.9 as _compared  with the 
United States GNP  at market  prices,  which  multiplied  by  2.~~only. 
How  can the  outstanding success  of multinational  companies 
be  explained  ? 
It is easy to  answer  that they  have  concentrated their 
efforts  on rapidly  expanding sectors,  either bepause  the  demand 
was  highly elastic or  because it was  possible  in such sectors  to 
take  advantage  of  major  technical advances. 
However,  such  an  answer  only  moves  the  problem  on  to 
different  ground.  It remains  to  be  seen_why  rapidly  expanding 
branches  of production have  been  taken over  to  such an extent  by 
multinational  companies.  To  say that  they want  to  derive profit 
from  their innovations  on  as  large  a  market  as  possible is cer-
tainly correct in many  cases.  But  there  again the  problem is moved 
to different  ground rather than solved.  There  are  indeed other 
means  of deriving profit from  an innovation  :  exporting  from  the 
parent  company  is one  of  them. --al-
i 
Why  then has it beea relatively little used  when  customs 
· duties and  other trade barriers have  been subs·tan.tially reduced 
over  the past  twenty years? Where  the  cost of transport and/or 
customs  duty  seemed  to  constitute aa obstacle to export,  why  was 
recourse  not  had  to selliag licences aad  know-how  rather than to 
·direct investment whicht  at first sight, presents  m~ny more  risks 
{some  of which  seem  impossible  to assess)  and in aay  case  enormous 
complications  by  __ \ the  very fact of the  pare_nt  compally  having to 
transform.itself into a  multinational group? 
At  the  hea~t of the  problem is the  following  question  :  Why 
has  company  strategy so  often led to  the  choice  of direct invest-
ment  rather than other means  of  expansion and  why  has  this  choice 
so  often been  crowned  with success? 
Several suggestions may  be  advanced  to  explain this phenomenon. 
We  shall look at some  of them  in the  following pages  •. 
•  One  might  ask in the first place  whether  transport  costs 
have  not  played a  predominant part,  at least in some  cases.  The 
most  probable  example  of 'this would  be  the  petroleum industry. 
It is known  that if; since the last world  war,  most  of  the 
refineries have· been set up  in the  consumer  countries rather than 
in the  crude-oil producing  countri&s it is because it is much 
cheaper to transport  the  crude oil .than the refined products. - !4  -
This  certainly explaias  the siting of  the refineries  but it 
does  not  explaia the  vertical integration of  the  major oil companies 
from  the  extraction of the oil, its shipping and·  refining to  the 
sale of petrol.  Why,  after all,  are  the  big oil  companies  not  content 
to sell crude oil at profitable prices  and  leave  the  trouble  and 
risks of refining and distributioa to  others?  The  question is the 
more  pertinent since it is well  known  that  the  extraction of  crude 
oil is more  profitable  (except in the  United States)  than transport, 
processing and  distribution. 
The  most  likely explication is doubtless  that vertical 
integration,  although  not  specially profitable in itself, at least 
ensures direct access  to~)he final  consumers.  It is easy to  imagine 
the perilous situation of  a  company  producing  crude oil only  as 
compared  with  companies  integrated  vertically~ ~n  a  period of 
relatively abundant  supply.  The  iategrated  companies  would  obviously 
give  preference  to their own  crude oil.  Conversely,  companies 
~ 
restricted to refining and  distribution would  find  themselves 
dangerously  exposed in a  period of relative scarcity of  crude oil -
unless  they  can take  advantage  of long-term purchase  contracts. 
If this assumption is valid,  that is to say if vertical 
~ 
integration is- an elementary precaution in the strategy of  com-
petition,  one  can  understand  why  the  big oil  companies  have  been 
forced  as it were  to  become  multinational. --· :1-i-• 
,I· 
•  A second possible explaaatioa caa be  f.ouad  ia the  chaaged 
nature  of  the political risks.  The  Jears 1900 to 1945  saw  two 
outb~eaks of war  between the  powers  of Westera Europe  aad ia 
peace-time their diplomatic relatioas were  a~t  always  bad.  !his 
situation was  certainly of  a  aature  to discourage  foreign invest-
menta,  whether  betweea couatries in Europe·or  betweea America  aad 
Europe.  To  the risk of destruction by  war  were  added  those  of 
c.onfiscation as  enemy  property or because  of  finaac:tal  deal'iags 
with eaemy  companies.  The  daager of  war  has  certainly aot dis-
appeared ia Europe  but it ao  loager takes  the  form  of a  risk of 
armed  coaflict ~etweea Westera powers.  The  only remainiag risk is 
that of war  with the  USSR,  which  would  be  highly likely to 
degenerate iato a  geaeralized auclear  coaflict,  but ia that  case 
the sitiag of inveetmeate would  make  little differemce  to the 
risk they rua. 
It is not  easy to  weigh  up  the probability of this suggested 
explanation.  The  volume  of  loans  to Germaay  from  Anglo-saxon  banks 
between 1920  and  1930 suggests that it may  be  less valid than 
•  --1 
would  at first appear.  It is true that these  were  short-term·  __  · 
operations,  both techaically aad legally.  The  moaetary  crises of 
1931  had  aot  been foresee•  by  a.ybody,  so that  the leaders  imagined 
perhaps  that if need  be  they  could  call their credits in at very 
short notice  (which  was  aot ia fact  the  case).  However  that may  be,· - 6'  -
this hypothesis  can at best  explain why  multinational  companies 
did  not  spring  up  earlier.  It does  not  at all explain why  they 
have  sprung  ~p in the last twg  decades • 
•  A third  ~uggested explanation is that multinational 
companies  have  been successful  thanks  to  the  considerable aid 
they  have  received  from  European States,  either with  the  aim  of 
encouraging  the  creation of  employment  in underprivileged or 
depressed  areas  or out  of rivalry  among  themselves,  that is to 
say in the  hopeof  "hooking"  a  valuable  investment  that might 
otherwise  go  to  a  neighbouring  country.  It is indeed  well  known 
that  the  member  States of  the  EEC  ha.ving,  in a  large  measure  at 
least,  evaded  the  obligation to  co-ordinate aid,  which is never-
theless laid down  in the  Treaty of  Rome,  many  multinational  com-
panies  have  in fact  been able  to  set  up  the  "sovereign"  public 
authorities in competition with  one  another.  The  authorities 
have  so  to  speak  "tendered"  the  amount  of  aid  and  the  aid 
arrangements  they were  prepared  to offer.  Thereis  no  doubt  that 
this situation has  been of  very  great  benefit to multinational 
companies  and  companies  about  to  becom~~ultinational and  had 
speeded  up  their development.  But  while it has  certainly 
accentuated  the  movement it is very  unlikely  to  have  caused it. 
~ 
Indeed,  if so  many  States have  taken to  giving such substantial 
aid  to  investment it is because  national  enterprise is relatively 
lacking. - .7  -
Where  it existed it has  enjoyed  the  same  aid as multinational 
companies.  Furthermore,  multinational  companies  have  developed in a 
spectacular fashion in Japan,  where  they have  certainly not received 
any  such aid  • 
•  A fourth suggestion is that  the direct investments  from 
abroad  which  characterize multinational  companies  are  the  consequence 
of  customs  tariffs and  a  proof  of their protectionist nature.  However, 
this  explanation does  not fit in with the  fact  that direct American 
investments in the  EEC  have  grown  at  an exponential rate which  the 
successive  lowering of  the  common  external tariff has  not  at all 
slowed  down.  Nor  does it fit in with the  fact that the sales of 
American subsidiaries in Europe  far  exceed,  in most  branches.of 
industry,  the  value  of  the  corresponding American exports; 
ap?arently direct investment is not  a  "substitute" for exports. 
Lastly this hypothesis  by  no  means  explains  why  direct investment 
has  been preferred to  the  sale of licences  and  know-how • 
•  It can  be  advanced,  as  a  fifth hypothesis,  that  because  of 
wage  differences  produc~ion costs are higher in the  United States 
than in Europe.  Consequently  capital has  been transferred  from  a 
high-cost  area to  l~wer-cost areas according to  a  well-known 
classical pattern. In fact  the  rare  comparisons  available  seem  to  indicate 
that  this is often the  case. (l)  However,  it may  be  wondered 
whether  so  many  decisions  to invest,  mortgaging· the  future  for 
so  long and  even  changing  the structure  of  firms,  could  have  been 
taken on  the strength of  an advantage  in respect  of  cost  which 
might  disappear rapidly with  a  differential trend in wages  and/or 
changes  in rates  of  exchange.  This  hypothesis  does  not  ~xplain 
either why  American  investments fell off in Great  Britain and 
investors  gave  relative preference  to  the  Community  countries  as 
soon as  the  Community  was  set  up.2)  Lastly,  can it explain why 
direct  investment  has  been preferred to  the  sale  of licences? 
Could  not  the  amounts  charged  have  covered  a  large part of  the 
advantage  in respect  of  costs in many  cases?  There  are  accordingly 
many  reasons  to  doubt  that  the  relative levels  of  production  costs 
offer a  significant explanation of  the  success  of  multinational 
companies.  Surveys  carried out  show  that  the  heads  of  the  firms 
concerned  mention it ver~ rarely among  the  major  reasons  for 
their decision.  But  they  usually  mention it nevertheless,  among 
their secondary  reasons.  All  told,  it seems  reasonable  to  agree 
that  the  advantage  of  lower  costs  has  encouraged direct  investment 
(1)  The  advantage  of  lower  wages  is partly  cancelled out,  however, 
by  the  higher  cost  of  other factors  (energy,  for  example), 
intermediate products  or auxiliary services. 
(2)  For  although  the Treaty of  Rome  gave  prospects  of  a  larger 
market,  it changed  nothing in the  short  term in regard  to 
the  relative levels  of  costs. - g:  -
outside  the  United States by  numerous  American  companies  and  has 
thereby  promoted  the  development  of  most  of  the  firms  that  can  be 
regarded  today  as  multinational.  Nothing,  however,  justifies 
regarding this factor  as  the decisive  one • 
•  The~ is a  sixth hypothesis,  to  the  effect that efficient 
marketing is essential to  the  success  of  most  of the  innovations 
in industry.  Marketing  must  be  understood here in a  broad  senae 
covering all the  producer-consumer interactions  :  market  surveying, 
keeping watch  on  competitors,  advertizing,  price adjusting,  a~apting 
the  product,  its presentation,  its packaging,  etc.  It is well  known 
that  the  management  of  American  firms  attach great  importance  to 
the  marketing side when it has  been decided  to penetrate  a  new 
market  and  put it on  a  level with production management  and 
financial  management  (whether rightly or wrongly  matters little 
at this stage of  the  argument).  From  this ~standpoint, it is logical 
not  to  leave  the  marketing side to others  when  one  has  decided  to 
launch a  product  on  a  new  market.  To  forgo  control of  marketing, 
one  would  need  to  have  the  twofold  conviction that  the  proposed 
partner would  be  more  efficient and  that there  would  never  be 
any  problems  with him  of opposing interests.  Common  sense tellsus 
that such a  conviction would  be  very rare,  particularly in the 
minds  of  American managers  with a  long  experience  of  marketing. - 10  -
But  if one  decides to  keep  control of marketing,  many  good 
reasons  incite to  keeping  control  of  production also.  It is 
difficult to.see what  advantage  there  would  be  in a  structure 
where  ~ parent  firm,  which  had  developed  the  product  and  remained 
in charge  of  any  improvements  to it and  had  handed  over  to  one 
of its subsidiaries  the  task of  promoting it on  the-external 
market,  left its production for  that  external  market  to  another 
firm  manufacturing it under  licence.  Such  a  situation would  not 
be  satisfactory for  the  hypothetical outside  firm  unless it 
enjoyed  guaranteed prices  for  quite  a  long  time,  which  would  be 
a  very  costly  concession  on  the  part of  the  parent  firm.  The 
parent  firm,  moreover,  would  be  forgoing all the  advantages  of 
integrated  management.  In particular,  any  question of  modifying 
the  product  or perfecting the  production processes  could  give 
rise  to litigation between  the  parent  company  or its sales 
subsidiary  and  the  company  manufacturing  the  product  under 
licence,  which latter company  would  be  embarrassing rather  than 
helpful  as  an intermediary. 
Although  concisely stated,  the  foregoing  probably suffices 
to  show  that if the  best  company  strategy  consists in keeping 
control  of  marketing  on  an  external market,  it implies at  the 
same  time  keeping  control  of production for  that  market.  It 
remains  to  be  seen in that  case  whether it is preferable  to 
export  the  product  from  firms  situated in the  country  of  the 
parent  firm  or whether it is better to set  up  production units 
abroad. - .11  -
It is at this point  that the  factors  of relative cost  of 
transport  of  raw  materials  and  the  finished product,  relative 
costs  of production in different places,  customs  duties,  State 
aid,  etc.  come  into play. 
It is known  that as  a  general rule,  for  an equal  distance, 
the  transport  of finished products  costs  more  than the  tr.ansport 
of  the  raw  materials required for  th~ir manufacture.  There  are 
indeed  ~orne  exceptions  to this rule  but  they are  becoming less 
and  less  numerous  as  technical progress  (size of ships,  mass 
goods-handling machinery,  for  example)  lowers  the relative  cost 
of  transporting raw  materials.  This  fact is worth stressing 
because,  being technological in character, it has  a  permanence 
that the  relative levels of  wages,  customs  duties  and State aid 
do  not  have  to  the  same  degree.  It should  be  noted,  however, 
that in the last decades  these latter factors  have  all acted in 
the  same  direction as  the  relative  cost  of transport,  except in 
the United States where  wage  levels must  usually have  acted in 
the  opposite direction. 
The  argument  in regard  to  the last hypothesis  may  be 
summed  up  as  follows  : 
- Efficient marketing  can  be  a  strategic factor in the 
decision to derive profit  from  an industrial innovation 
on  a  new  market. 
- If that is the  case,  the  firm  possessing the  innovation 
will generally have  advantage  in keeping  control of - 12  -
that decisive  factor  and its management  will  be 
strongly inclined not  to  give it up. 
- But  the  decision to  keep  control  of  marketing  usually 
entails the  need  to keep  control  of  production also, 
because  of  the  manifold  advantages  of integrated 
management. 
- Moreover,  the relative  costs  of  transport  and  the 
effects  of  customs  duties  and  of State aid will  almost 
always  incite firms  to  bring production  close  to  the 
consumer. 
- The  relative  costs  of  production seem  to  have  been 
influential in the  same  direction in the ·majority of 
cases,  except  as  regards  firms  set  up  in the  United 
States. 
- There  exists,  therefore,  a  whole  battery of  reasons 
for  thinking that direct  investment  is usually  the 
best  means  of deriving profit  from  an  innovation on 
an  external market  (provided  that it be  large  enough 
and  far  enough  away  from  the  parent  company). 
- But  recourse  to  the  strategy of direct  investment  calls 
for  the  "multinationalisation"  of  the  parent  company. 
Can  one  be  absolutely sure,  however,  that  the  basic  as-
sumption is  correct  ?  It is difficult to  be  absolutely certain 
in such  cases.  But  nobody  can  doubt  that  efficient marketing is 
essential  to  success.  The  only  arguable  point is whether it is essential enough to provide  the  key  to the  expansion strategy 
that has  led so  many  firms,  especially American firms,  to  become 
multinational.  Thereis  one  indication that  seems  very significant; 
heads  of  American  firms  questioned  about  the  reasons  for their 
direct investments in Europe  have  almost  invariably mentioned 
first the  size of  the  market  and its prospects  of expansion.  If 
this is the  answer  that regularly  comes  to their mind,  it is 
natural that  they  should have  attached primary  importance  to 
marketing  and  have  made  it the  pivot  of their  company  strategy. 
This is a  hypothetical explanation but  a  very plausible 
one,  considering that  the strategy of direct investment  has  so 
often been adopted.  It cannot  be  said,  however,  to  explain at 
one  stroke  the  frequency  and  the  success  of  the  phenomenon. 
Indeed,  to set  up  numerous  integrated firms  in many  countries 
and  manage  them  efficiently in all respects is a  very attractive 
scheme ••••  on paper.  It still remains  to master  the  enormous 
complexity  which  inevitably stems  from  such ageqgraphical dis-
persion of activities and  the additional  complications arising 
from  different  languages  and  customs. 
Here  we  need  not hesitate.  The  chief  explanation lies in 
the  quality of  the  management  which  has  been able  to  perform 
this feat.  The  fact  that  the  gigantic machines  that multinational 
companies  come  to  be  succeed in functioning,  making  a  profit and, 
so  far at least,  expanding  much  faster  than the  GNP  of  the - 14  -
countries  where  they  have  their works,  is a  truly praiseworthy 
achievement.  An  exploit is an exploit,  even  though  one  may 
sometimes  f~nd some  of  the  methods  used  open  to  criticism. 
However,  the  men  who  achieved this  feat  had  at their 
disposal  means  that their predecessors  did  not  have.  The  first 
of  them  is the  aeroplane.  From  New  York  to  Paris  by  sea takes 
at least six days.  By  air it scarcely  takes  more  than six hours. 
The  cost  of  manager  travel,  that is to  say  the  "entrepreneur" 
factor in classical economic  terminology,  is thus  reduced  by  at 
least  90  %.  Without  air travel,  which  enables  the  manager  jet-set 
to  be  ubiquitous  in a  way  that  would  have  been  undreamed-of  in 
1930,  it is not  at all sure that the  strategy of direct invest-
ment  would  have  been adopted  so  often nor  that its success  rate 
would  have  been  so  high. 
The  second  tool is the  computer.  It is well  known  that 
the  difficulty of absorbing and  processing information is  one 
of  the  principle  factors  that restricts the  size  and  complexity 
of organizations if they are  to  be  efficient.  The  computer is 
an  extraordinarily powerful  instrument  for  the  storing and 
processing of  information.  Logically its use  should  have  the 
effect of  greatly extending the  optimum  dimension of  organizations 
in general  and  of  firms  in particular.  It is accordingly  a 
plausible hypothesis  that it should partially explain the 
emergence  and  success  of multinational  firms. 
X 
X  X - .15  -
The  foregoing ia an attempt  to  explain the rise of 
multinational  companies.  As  that rise is a  fact  of history and 
there is  no  means  of  going  back in history to  check  the  accuracy 
of  the  explanations put  forward,  they will remain for  ever  sup-
positions.  The  only  other  thing that  one  can  do  to prepare better 
for  the  discussion of  the  problems  raised  by  the  existence  and 
expansion of multinational  companies  is to situate  them  in the 
contemporary socio-cultural context.  For this purpose  we·  must  be 
bold  enough  to interpret the  moment  of history in which  we  live 
and  of  which  we  are  the  eye-witnesses •.  Again,  if it is a  mat'ier  of 
history it is  riot  possible to  do  more  than advance  plausible 
hypotheses.  Such  an  exercise  cannot  be  vain,  however,  since it 
is always  easier to  understand  a  phenomenon if we  situate it in 
the  overall  context  of  which it forms  a  part  :  we  see  the  trees 
better if we  look also at  the  forest. 
To  speak of  the  speeding  up  of history,  of  change,  of 
revolutions,  has  become  a  common-place.  The  newspapers  are full 
of  such  expressions  applied  haphazard  to  the  news  of  the  day. 
But  behind  these  common-places  can  be  discerned  a  question of 
the  greatest interest for  any  mind  which  seeks  to  understand  the 
world in which it lives.  Is  there  a  link between the  changes  we 
believe  we  see in the  most  diverse  fields? 
Lastly,  if such  a  link exists,  does it allow  us  to discover 
the  epicentre of this world-wide  upheaval,  this historical earth-
quake  of  which  we  seem  to  be  the privileged witnesses? - 16  -
To  endeavour  to  answer  these  questions, it might  first  be 
useful  to  ask ourselves whether  the  phenomenon  we  are  witnessing 
has  any  precedent  which  we  could  grasp  better thanks  to  the 
perspective afforded  by  time.  The  example  of  the  Renaissance 
leaps  to  the  mind.  The  history textbooks  we  read in our  childood 
or youth define it as  a  time  of particularly radical  and  rapid 
change  in all the  spheres  of social life  :  science,  te~hnology, 
culture,  economic affairs,  political structures  •••• 
If we  seek to  work  out  more  precise parallels  we  can easily 
produce  the  following  table 
RENAISSANCE 
Science 
The  earth ·is  not  flat  but 
spherical. 
It is not  the  centre  of  the 
universe  but  only  one  of  the 
sun's planets. 
This  planet  revolves  in 
empty  space. 
- Although  empty,  this space is 
capable  of  transmitting the 
force  of  gravity. 
- Rediscovery  of  the  civiliza-
tion and  scientific knowledge 
of  antiquity. 
Religion 
- Reformation  and  Counter-
Reformation. 
XXTH  CENTURY 
Science 
There  is an  equivalence 
between matter  and  light. 
There  is  no  absolute  measa-
zement  of  time. 
No  distinct  break  between  the 
human  and  the  infra-human. 
Human  nature is not  rigorously 
constant. 
- Man  dates  back at least 
500,000 years. 
- Man's  conscious  mind  is 
accompanied  by  a  subconscious 
mind. 
Religion 
- Oecumenism,  Vatican II and 
its consequences. - 17.  -
RENAISSANCE 
Technology 
- Compass,  sextant,  stern-post 
rudder  :  make  voyages  of  cir-
cumnavigation possible. 
- Gunpowder  :  revolutionizes  the 
art of  war. 
- Printing  :  dissemination of 
knowledge  and  primacy  of 
written expression of  thoughts 
and  emotions. 
Painting 
- Replacement  of mystic  and 
symbolic painting by  scien-
tific,  humanistic  and  gen~rally 
real  is  tic art  .• 
Architecture 
- End  of Gothic art and  flower-
ing of  the  Renaissance  style. 
Education 
Vnrest  in the  Universities, 
foundation  of  the  College  de 
France  and  the Jesuit  colleges. 
Economic  affairs 
- Intercontinental sea trade, 
the first large  banks,  the 
first manufactures,  inten-
sification of trade,  growth 
of  towns,  slow  disruption of 
the  closed mediaeval  ·econo-
mies,. first  indic~ti~ns of 
national  economic  policy 
(Bodin- de  Malestroit 
controversy). 
Politics 
- Formation and  hegemony  of 
the first national States. 
XXTH  CENTURY 
Technology 
- Computer,  radio radar;  make 
interplanetary travel possible. 
- A and  H bombs,  revolutionize 
the art of  war. 
- Cinema  and  television  :  dis-
semination of knowledge  and 
primacy  of  audiovisual expres-
sion of thoughts  and  emotions. 
Painting 
- Birth of  a  new  kind of painting, 
for  the  most  part anti-realist 
impressionist,  abstract,  non-
figurative,  surrealist. 
Architecture 
- Radically  new  designs  seeking 
to  use  new  materials and  new 
techniques. 
Education 
Unrest  in the Universities, 
crisis in education. 
Economic  affairs 
- Intensification of internatio-
nal  trade  (except  during the 
wars  and  the  crisis of  the 
thirties),  growth of  towns, 
first indications of  an inter-
national  economic  policy 
(IMF,  aid to  under-developed 
countries),  the first multi-
national  companies. 
Politics 
- Rise  and  hegemony  of  continen-
tal States. - 18  -
This  table  makes  no  claim  to  be  exhaustive  nor  to  take 
account  of subtle distinctions.  Its sole  purpose  is to  bring out 
the  main  li~es of similarity  (not  of identity)  between  two 
historical contexts,  we  might  almost  say  two  historical  junctures. 
Needless  to  say  we  do  not  seek to  deny  or  underestimate  the 
changes  that  took place in other periods  but  simply  to recognize, 
as  common  sense  and all historians direct  us,  that  there  are 
times  when  changes  are  more  rapid,  more  radical  and  more  wide-
spread  than at others. 
It remains  to  be  shown  how  these  changes  interlock to 
form  a  historical  context  or,  better,  a  historical  juncture. 
In  certain cases  the  connections  are  obvious.  For  example, 
the  painting of  Leonardo  da  Vinci  is inconceivable  without  the 
rediscovery of  Euclidean geometry  and  Greek  humanism;  impres-
sionist painting depends  on  the  discovery  of  the  decomposition 
of  light;  surrealist painting is explained  by  the  discovery  of 
the  subconscious;  the  inventio~ of  gun-powder  helps  to explain 
the rise  of  the  national States,  since  a  mediaeval principality 
could  not  keep  up  an  efficient artillery;  similarly,  nuclear 
weapons  help  to  explain the  hegemony  of  continental States;  the 
difficulties of  the  Church at  the  Renaissance  period were  bound 
up,  as  everyone  knows,  with  the  rediscovery of  the  civilization 
of  antiquity  but  also  with astronomical discoveries,  as  the - .19  -
trial of Galileo  amply  demonstrates;  nowadays  the  religious 
crisis is certainly not  unconnected with the  discoveries regarding 
the  subconscious  and  the  origins  of  mankind;  as  for  mul\inational 
companies,  it is suggested above  that their success is due 
probably in part  to  the  development  of aviation and  the  invention 
of  the  computer. 
These  examples  show  that there are special  connections 
between  a  certain number  of  the  components  of  each of  the 
historical situations  compared.  It is thus  right to speak of  a 
historic "juncture".  Can  we  go  further  and  identify the  chief 
component,  the-epicentre  to which all the  changes  noted are 
attached directly or indirectly? 
The  most  attractive hypothesis  here is that  which situates 
the  epicentre in the  sphere  of scientific knowledge,  whether it 
concern nature,  man  or his past.  Indeed,  discoveries like  those 
referred to  above  are  of  fundamental  importance  for  man  because 
they  change  the  way  he  sees himself  and  his relations with  the 
world.  The  oldest-established truths in this field suddenly 
se~m outmoded;  they  must  be  replaced  by  others or at least 
interpreted differently.  A cultural traumatism is the  normal 
corollary of  such a  situation.  It leads people  to  challenge 
everything in all the  spheres  of  culture  and  morals  and  even in 
social  and  political affairs.  This  would  explain that  excitement 
f  th  h  .  (l)  th  t  h  t  k  "th "  o  e  uman  gen1us  a  we  ave  come  o  now  as  e 
Renaissance  because  so far it was  the  only  one  we  knew. 
(1)  Of  the  noosphere,  Teilhard de  Chardin would  have  said. • 
- .20  -
Naturally,  in such  a  context  the  passion to  innovate is 
just as  strong as  that  to  challenge  everything  :  that is why 
"renaissance" periods present  such flagrant  contrasts  between 
phenomena  of  creativity and  phenomena  of  disorder. 
The  excitement  lasts until  civilization has  found  a  way  of 
adjusting to  the  new  fundamental  truths  and  a  social  and  political 
order has  come  into  being that is more  or less in harmony  with 
the  cultural  changes  that  have  occurred. 
The  interest of such  considerations  from  the  point  of  view 
of  this report is that  they  show  how  wrong it would  be  to  think 
that  t~e problems  facing multinational  companies  and  those  facing 
the  social  and  political order  can  be  detached  from  their  context 
when  they  are  an integral part  of  a  world-wide  challenge  that  the 
historical  juncture is throwing  down  at  the  feet  of  our  civili-
zation. 
X 
X  X 
In spite of their success,  multinational  companies  have 
many  internal problems,  stemming  on  the  one  hand  from  the  co-
existence within them  of staff,  and  especially higher-grade 
staff,  of  different  nationalities  and  languages  and  on  the  other 
hand  from  the  fact  that,  being of  national origin,  their general 
'management  is,  with  few  exceptions,  exclusively national. 
To  keep  staff severely segregated  by  language  or nationality 
in order to  avoid  misunderstandings  and  conflicts or  the  formation 
of  cliques is certainly not  the  ideal solution.  It affects  the - fl  -
mobility of staff and  consequently  leads  to poor  use  being  made 
of individual talents.  To  impose  an insignificant  common  denominator 
in the  shape  of  a  knowledge  of the  language  of  the  parent  company 
is not  a  satisfactory solution either.  The  right solution necessa-
rily involves,  so it would  seem,  the possibility of  cultural ex-
changes  resulting in mutual  enrichment  and  esteem.  Given this, 
multinational  companies  would  take  on quite  a  different appearance 
they  would  be  revealed  not  only as  remarkably  succ~ssful technical 
and  economic  enterpris.es  but  also as  major  instruments  for  the 
progress of  civilization.  By  achieving this they would  help to 
direct  the  human  energy manifested in the  socio-cultural upheaval 
of  our  times  into  constructive  channels.  To  work  out  concrete 
means  of pursuing such  a  policy would  be  a  splendid  task for 
industrtal sociologists. 
The  other aspect  of  the  problem  facing multinational 
companies  is that of  the  uninational  character of their general 
management.  It will readily  be  understood  that  no  solution has 
yet  been found.  How  can  groups  which obtain their new  blood 
chiefly by  co-opting  be  persuaded  to  take  of their own  accord 
the  step of  becoming  international?  How  can  we  answer  the 
objection that this would  .~mperil the  homogeneity of  the  manage-
ment  team,  which is manifestly essential? It has  sometimes  been 
suggested that multinational  companies  might  adopt  a  polycentric 
structure.  But  how  then  could  a  coherent  company  strategy  be 
preserved?  In reality, it would  seem  that  the  solution of  this - 22  -
second  aspect  of the  problem  depends  on  the  solution of  the 
first  :  the  education of  a  man~erial elite whose  members  would 
be  app~~ciative of  each other's  cultures.  From  this standpoint 
we  can guess  at  the  great  advantage  of  a  n~w humanism,  founded 
less  on  a  knowledge  of  the  Greek  and  Latin languages  and 
civilizations than on  a  knowledge  of  several  contemporary 
languages  and  cultures  - Western  ones  to  begin with.  Perhaps 
our  schools  and  universities are  already  making  their first 
steps in the  direction of  a  new  humanism.  Would  it not  be 
natural,  after all, that  a  new humanism  should  come  out  of  a 
.  ?(1)  new  rena~ssance. 
If that  could  come  about,  nothing  more  would  stand in 
the  way  of  the  internationalization of  the  general  management 
of  multinational  firms.  The  problem  would  be  solved definitively 
and  at  the root.  In the  meantime it should  be  possible  to  find 
at least partial solutions.  The  author's  personal  experience  in 
the  European  Communities  encourages  him  to  think that Europeans, 
those  of  the  Continent  at least,  are  astonishingly ready-
provided  that  certain favourable  conditions  are  present  - to 
recognize  a  common  interest and  take it to  heart  as  a  cause  to 
serve.  The  minimum  conditions  are  that  the  lead  should  come 
from  ~bove,  that it should  be  recognized  by  the  people  concerned 
and  that  these latter should  be  treated with impartiality what-
ever  the  intrigues  fomented  from  the  outside. 
1)  Cultural internationalization is not  equivalent  to  a  denat-
ionalization of individuals.  Greeko-latin learning has  never 
denationalized  persons.  Anglo-franco-germanic  culture,  for 
example,  would  not  do  it either. - 23  -
Even  when  these  conditions  are  present,  we  are still 
some  distance  from  the  ideal  because  the  reciprocity of  language 
knowledge  is very  imperfect  and  because  the  cultural exchanges 
are insignificant and  do  not  extend outside  the professional 
sphere.  Nevertheless  a  certain degree  of mutual  understanding 
and  esteem  may  be  achieved,  its value  may  be  appreciated  and 
it may  promote  efficiency. 
What  can  be  done  in a  civil service has  even more  chance 
of  being achieved in the  business  world,  subject  to  the  same 
minimum  conditions.  Let  me  here  say  a  word  in favour  of  the 
"European  company"  scheme.  In addition to all the  economic, 
legal and  fiscal  arguments  that  can  be  put  forward,  there is 
one  important  psychological argument  :  a  "European  company" 
would  not  fly  the  flag of  any  one  country.  This  fact  alone 
would  help greatly to  ease  tensions in the multinational 
companies  which  adopted  this status.  Symbols  are often more 
important  than might  appear at first sight. 
But  the  possibility of setting up  "European  companies" 
would  not  solve all the  internal problems  that multinational 
companies  have  to  face  precisely by  reason of  their multi-
national  character. 
In addition to the  problems  mentioned  above,  which it 
can  be  agr~ed are  unlikely  to  be  fully solved in the  near 
', -~-
future,  there  are  many  others that it is urgent  to  solve  some-
how  or other,  for  better or  for  worse. 
One  of  these  problems is the fair treatment  of  the 
different  subsidiaries.  The  control  exercized  by  the  parent 
company  enables it to  share  the  group'·s  profits as it wishes 
among  the subsidiaries  and  between  them  and itself.  Various 
techniques  may  be  used  for  this purpose  and  in particular the 
fixing of  arbitrary prices  for  the  goods  and  services supplied 
by  one  company  of  the  group  to  others.  Such practices,  although 
they  may  benefit  the  group  as  a  whole,  may  adversely affect 
minority shareholders if any,  as  well  as  the staff of  a  given 
subsidiary  where  there is a  profit-sharing scheme.  As  things 
are,  the  management  of  a  multinational  company  has  sole 
authority to settle this delicate  matter  of professional  ethics 
and  is accountable  for its actions  to itself alone. 
The  situaiion is similar when it comes  to  the siting of 
extensions  of the  company.  The  parent  company  is perfectly 
entitled to  transfer the  group's available  funds  from  one 
reeion or  country  to  another.  It  can  ~e assumed  that in such 
a  case,  as  in the  preceding one,  the  management  will act  in 
the  interests of  the  group  as  a  whole.  The  hard realities of 
competition doubtless  make  it difficult to depart  very greatly 
from  this line of  conduct.  There  are  nonetheless  problems  of 
equity  which arise in specific  cases.  For  example,  the  chances 
of promotion for  tlie  staff - particularly the  higher-grade 
staff - of  extension subsidiaries are  greater. -~-
Ia it a  matter of indifference whether  the  reserve 
profits with which  the  extension was  financed  were  made  by  the 
subsidiary in question or  by  another?  True,  people  are paid 
for  the  work  they  do  but  they also attach importance  (and 
rightly)  to their  career prospects.  Now,  here  again,  the 
management  of  the  parent  company  is accountable  for its 
decision to itself alone.  The  reason for this is that they 
have  no  valid  challengers.  True,  they  can  be  challenged  by 
governments  or trade  unions,  but  as  both of these  are purely 
national,  their respective attitudes are  very  likely to  be 
contradictory.  In the  face  of divided  and  even rival  chal-
lengers,  multinational firms  are  the  sole arbiters of the 
interests at stake.  This  situation will  continue  as  long as 
they are  not  faced  with a  partner as  multinational as  them-
selves. 
Common  sense  suggests that to give subsidiaries a 
certain measure  of  independence  vis-a-vis the  parent  company 
would  be  an acceptable  middle  course  between the  complete 
decentralization of multinational  companies  and  the  central-
ization of  their decision-making at the level of  the parent 
company.  Certain multinational  companies  have  this arrange-
ment  and  are well satisfied with it, since  a  measure  of 
decentralization has  many  advantages. - 26 -
Others,  however,  have  a  different  policy.  It  can  happen, 
for  example,  that  the  European  manager  of  an  American subsidiary 
receives  a  telegram  from  the  United States stating individually 
by  their  number  - the  members  of his staff to  be  dismissed. 
It is clear that  such practices are  quite  inadmissible,  both 
for  the staff and  for  the  manager,  who  is reduced  to  being  a 
simple  post office.  But  when  one  looks  around  for  effective 
means  of putting a  stop  to  such dictatorial practices  one  comes 
back  once  again to  the  absence  of  any  valid  challenger. 
A problem  bound  up  with  that  of  the  independance  of 
subsidiaries is the  question of  the  nationality of  the  members 
of  the  Administrative  Board  and  the  management,  not  of  the 
parent  company  but  of  the  subsidiary itself.  Some  multinational 
companies  evict  systematically from  the  management  any  person 
who  is not  of  the  nationality of  the  parent  company.  It  can  be 
allowed  that  this is  not  done  chauvinistically but  for  reasons 
of  convenience,  at least in the  short  term.  The  situation is 
nevertheless  an  unfortunate  one,  both  harmful  and  humiliating 
for  the  country  where  the subsidiary  ~s set up.  Once  again 
effective  counteraction would  require  the  existence  of  a  valid 
sparring partner.  Perhaps  the  States  of  the  European  Community 
will manage  one  day  to  present  a  united  front  in the  face  of 
such  a  problem  as  that,  but  how  long will it be  before  they 
do  so? 
X 
X  X -~-
The  internal problems  of multinational societies are 
chiefly of  a  social order;  they  concern many  Europeans  and 
hence  also their governments.  But  the  existence of  these  com-
panies raises in addition,  or accentuates,  certain problems  of 
economic  policy or of  general policy some  of  the  most  important 
of which it is worthwhile  describing. 
An  initial problem is one  which  concerns  the  capital 
market,  or rather the  capital markets.  The  clauses of the  Rome 
Treaty relating to  the  free  movement  of  capital have  been more 
or less respected  but  no  single European capital market  has 
emerged.  Indeed,  not  only have  national  currencies  remained 
distinct but  they are  also  capable  of  changing  their value  in 
relation to  one  another.  Furthermore  the regulations regarding 
share  and  loan issues  have  not  been standardized.  The  Treaty 
of,Rome  made  no  provision for  this in any  case.  That is quite 
irrational,  since  one  of  the  aims  of  the  Treaty was  to promote 
a  change  in the  size of firms  called  upon henceforth to  supply 
a  continental market  instead of  a  national  one.  Logically the 
financial  needs  of  such firms  would  increase proportionately, 
so  that it could  be  foreseen that national  capital markets 
would  one  day  be  found  too  small  to  meet  firms'  requirements. 
That  day  has  come  sooner  than anticipated because the subsi-
diaries of multinational firms,  particularly American firms, 
assumed  continental proportions, /economically speaking,  right 
from  the start. 
The  absence  of  a  European  capital market  has  since  been 
palliated to  some  extent  by  the  constitution of  a  Euro-currency -28-
market,  principally in Euro-dollars.  It is well  known  that  the 
development  of  this  market  was  facilitated  by  the  existence  of 
the  gold  standard  and  the  recurrent  deficits in the  American 
balance  of  payments. 
The  manifest  disadvantage  of  the  system is that interest 
rates  on  the  Euro-dollar market  are directly influenced  by  the 
decisions  of  the  Federal Reserve  Board,  which  acts with  an  eye 
to  the  situation in America  and  not  in Europe.  True,  central 
banks  in Europe  can influence it by  buying  or  selling Euro-
dollars  but  they  cannot  do  so  effectively unless  they  concert 
their action,  especially if the  Federal Reserve  Board is taking 
the  opposite  course.  The  paradox is accordingly that  the· central 
banks  of  Europe  are  faced  with  an  American  capital market  which, 
moreover,  they  can  only  influence  by  countering if necessary 
the  action of  the  Federal Reserve  Board.  Who  would  regard  as 
normal  a  situation in which  several  central  banks  are  interested 
in regularizing the  s~me capital market? 
Doubtless  we  should  not  dramatize  the  situation.  In a 
world  in which  transactions  enjoy  a  certain measure  of  freedom, 
the  financial  marke~do not  operate  in a  closed  circuit and 
national  monetary policies influence  one  another.  This  inter-
dependence  is nothing  new  and it was  not  brought  about  by -29-
multinational  companies.  They  have  simply  contributed a  new 
aspect  to it, namely  the passage  through a  third  currency to 
finance  investments  that are  European  (by  their location)  with 
capital that  very often belongs  to Europeans.  In addition they 
·• 
are  not  at all at fault;  in seeking the least costly means  of 
financing  a  firm is simply acting strictly within its rights. 
Nor  can one  blame  them  either for  moving  their liquid assets 
in such  a  way  as  to preserve  them  from  fluctuations in 
exchange  rates.  "National"  firms  do  the  same  when  they  can. 
At  most it might  be  claimed· (and it still remains  to 
be  proved)  that multinational firma'  financial  and  cash trans-
actions are likely to  reach such proportions that national 
monetary authorities might  no  longer  be  capable of  performing 
their function of regulating the  money  markets.  Supposing 
that this is true, it would  only prove  that national monetary 
authorities have  no  adequate  arrangements  among  themselves  or 
else that monetary  union is the  corollary of  the pooling of 
goods  and  services.  If monetary  union is thought  to  be  pre-
mature,  and  there are  perhaps  good  arguments  in support  of 
this view,  then  we  must  be  resigned  to  rely for  the  time 
being  on  expedients. - 30-
Another  problem  frequently  mentioned  in connection 
with multinational  companies  is that of  tax  evasion.  It is 
true  that it is  a  fairly  easy matter  for  such  companies  to 
arrange  for  profits to  appear in the  accounts  of  one  sub-
sidiary rather  than another  and  thus  to  exploit the  tax 
disparities  between  the  various  countries.  This  problem 
has  already  been  touched  on earlier in its social aspect. 
As  regards  the  taxation aspect,  two  remarks  are  called for. 
In the  first place,  multinational  companies  are  not  the 
only  ones  to  indulge  in this kind  of  game.  Tangiers  was  a 
tax-payer's paradise  long  before  there  was  any  mention  of 
multinational  companies  in this  connection.  Such  companies 
merely  have  easier access  to  paradises  of  this kind  because 
of  their widely scattered subsidiaries.  The  second  remark 
is that it is  not  very  logical to  complain of  tax  evasion 
in the  case  of  companies  to  which States  do  not  hesitate 
to  grant  enormous  tax  concessions,  which  are  only  a 
legalized  form  of  tax  evasion,  when it is a  question of 
attracting their investments. 
This  being said, it remains  true  that  tax  evasion, 
legalized or  not,  is an  unhealthy  thing that  should  be 
remedied.  What  can  be  done  in this direction,  however, 
except  to  confront  multinational  companies  with  a  power 
able  to  make  itself respected.  Here  we  have  again the 
problem  of  the  valid partner.  The  setting up  of  European 
companies  would  probably help  towards  a  solution,  since 
they  would  be  subject  to  a  Community  fiscal authority - 31-
whose  geographical ubiquity would give it a  bargaining power 
and  an  efficiency which  cannot  be  achieved  by  national taxation 
authorities  today.  But  the  problem  would  remain unsolved in the 
case  of  firms  that did  not  adopt  European  company  status.  How 
could  they  be  confronted with a  valid bargaining partner?  Can 
we  envisage  the possibility of greater vigilance  on  the part of 
national taxation authorities?  Perhaps.  But  there  would  need  to 
be  an international  judicial authority to settle casesin which 
natio?al  taxation authorities made  conflicting decisions.  Let 
us  imagine,  for  example,  a  transaction between  two  subsidiaries 
of  the  same  group,  subsidiary  A in country X supplying  goods  to 
subsidiary B in country  Y.  It may  well  be  that  the  taxation 
authorities in country X consider that the price p  of the  goods 
supplied has  been under-valued  while  the  taxation authorities 
in country  Y consider that it has  been over-valued.  Naturally 
both  cannot  be  right.  It can  be  seen  from  this example  that  a 
single  judicial authority is needed  to settle, at least in the 
last instance,  all disputes relating to  the  '~artificial" transfer 
of profits  from  one  Community  country  to  another.  Logically,  the 
same  authority should have  jurisdiction in the  matter of  trans-
fers  to third  countries,  otherwise  triangular arrangements 
would  allow  this kind  of  tax  evasion to  go  on  undisturbed. 
Yet  other problems  arise,  not  by  reason of  the  existence 
of  multina~ional companies  as  such but  because  most  of  them, 
being of  American origin,  have  a  large,  if not  the largest part 
of their interests in the  United States and  because  their 
management  is  composed  of United States citizens.  For this - 32-
twofold  reason they  may  have  to  bow  down  to decisions  of  the 
United States Government  even if the  consequences  of  doing  so 
are  deplored in Europe.  It was  thus  that  Washington  was  able, 
by  a  unilateral decision,  not  only  to  prohibit  parent  companies 
from  transferring capital  to their subsidiaries  but  also  to 
compel  them  to  repatriate  the profits of the  subsidiaries  to 
the  United States.  This  is also  why  the  European subsidiaries 
of  American multinational  companies  are  in fact  bound  by 
American policy in the  matter  of  exports  to  the  countries  of 
Eastern Europe. 
That  Europeans  should  be  concerned at  such  a  state of 
affairs is only  natural.  It represents  an  encroachment  on  their 
territory by  American  sovereignty.  But  supposing they  wished  to 
change  the situation,  how  could  they  do  so? 
At  the  extreme  limit  one  might  imagine  a  European policy 
of  blocking  or rejecting all American  investments.  But  the  price 
to  be  paid in terms  of  the  slowing down  of  the  growth rate, 
deterioration in the  balance  of  payment  and  unemployment  would 
be  considerable  - probably  out  of  proportion to  the  result 
hoped  for.  Most  sensible  people  would  no  doubt  think that it 
is better to  "have"  firms  exposed  to political pressure  from 
the  American  Government  than not  to  "have"  them  at all.  In 
addition,  for  the  blo  eking or rejection of  American  capital to  ·· 
work,  all the States of  the  Community  would  have  to  act in 
concert  or  the  policy would  collapse  before  very  long. ·.- 33-
But  if a  permanently  concerted policy were  possible,  a 
solution less radical and  less disastrous  from  the  economic 
standpoint  might  be  envisaged.  United in a  common  decision-
making  centre,  the  European States might  have  a  chance  of 
bringing the  American Government  to accept  the  principle of  the 
independence  of  the  European subsidiaries of  Amerlcan· companies. 
They  might  back  up  this  demand  with threats of reprisals in the 
form  of  fines,  which  would  have  to  be  taken seriously. 
The  same  principle  could  be  applied  to all the possible 
cases  of  interference  by  the  American authorities in the  oper-
ation of  European subsidiaries of  American  companies,  such as 
priority to  supplying  firms  in the  United States as  against 
firms  in Europe  in the  event  of  a  political crisis entailing 
a  partial  c  ..... ssation of  deliveries of  crude oil,  or priority of 
employment  in the  event  of recession,  or  again decisions  by  the 
America~Department of Justice in the matter of anti-trust 
legislation having  consequences  in Europe.  In such  cases,  as  in 
others that  can be  imagined,  what  is important is that Europeans 
should recognize  that the  American  establishments in Europe  are 
not  mere  branches  but subsidiaries enjoying real, if limited, 
independence  and  subject,  in European territory,  to European 
sovereignty. 
There is no  need  to  bring about  the  total decentraliz-
ation of multinational  companies  to  achieve  this.  Generally 
speaking, it is enough  to  secure  that the subsidiaries should - 34-
be  responsible  for  their  own  day-to-day  management  decisions 
in regard  to  employment,  production  and  prices,  leaving 
decisions  concerning  company  strategy,  such as  the  orientation 
of  research,  major  investments  and  the  launching of  new  products, 
to  the  parent  company.  Many  large  companies  are  already organi-
zed  roughly  on  this pattern;  the  various  establishments  that 
depend  on  them  are  treated like  so  many  autonomous. "profit 
centres". 
Vis-a-vis  the  American  Government,  it is important  to 
have it recognized  that  American sovereignty  cannot  be  exercized 
in European territory even indirectly by  means  of  pressures 
exerted  on  firms  which  have  subsidiaries in Europe. 
Lastly,  multinational  companies  must  be  rendered  incapable 
of  playing off European sovereignties against  one  another  and, 
for  a  start,  they  must  not  be  encouraged  by  the  escalation of 
offers of aid  which  must  sometimes  place  them  in an embarrassing 
position,  while it is  unworthy  of  Europeans  and  humiliating for 
them. 
These  demands  are  legitimate  but  there is no  other means 
of  securing  them  except  to  confront  multinational  companies  and 
the  American  Government  with  an  efficacious  countervailing power 
able  to  obtain a  hearing  by  putting forward  convincing  arguments. 
And  to  achieve  this  there is  no  other  way  but  union in some 
form  or  other. -35-
Perhaps  too,  since all is ·of  a  piece,  Europeans  should 
decide  to  do  something serious  about  their  common  expenditure. 
It is difficult to  argue  on  a  really equal  footing  with some-
body  who  is an indispensable protector.  But  that is another 
story. 
CONCLUSIONS 
At  the  conclusion of this  effor~ of reflection, it would 
seem ·possible  to  draw  some  relatively reliable  conclusions. 
In the  first place,  multinational  companies  are  incompar-
able efficient instruments  from  the point of  view  of innovation 
and  economic  expansion.  Without  any  possible  doubt,  they are  one 
of  the  great  "inventions"  of the  century.  Their extraordinary 
development  in the  past  twenty  years is partly explained,  more-
over,  by  the  fact  that their management  has  known  how  t¢  use  to 
advantage  the  new  means  of transport,  telecommunications  and 
information processing that technical progress  has  made  avail-
able.  From  this angle,  the  development  of multinational  companies 
fits into  the  contemporary  technico-cultural scene,  from  which 
it appears  inseparable.  On  the  basis  of  these  new  techniques, 
the  managers  of  multinational  companies  have  succeeded,  wherever 
they  have  been allowed  to  do  so,  in overcoming  the  obstacle  of 
the  complexity  inherent in the  efficient management  of production, 
marketing  and  even scientific research units scattered throughout 
the  world  and  in bringing together  men  of all races,  languages 
and  cultures.  This  is a  remarkable  feat  even if the realisation 
is imperfect in many  respects. - 36-
The  multinational  company  is also,  in all probability, 
one  of  the  constituents  of  the  economic,  social,  cultural  and 
political  change  we  are  witnessing in our  time.  It is doubtful 
whether it would  be  possible  to reject  the  multinational  company 
without  rejecting all  change  whatsoever.  This  is possible,  it is 
true,  since  there is  no  historical determinism,  but  to  miss  a 
rendez-vous  with history is a  decision whose  consequences  may  be 
grave.  The  example  of  the  Renaissance  is worth  thinking  about 
seriously in this respect.  ~t that  time  Germany  and  Italy were 
unable  to  achieve  national  unity.  Both  countries  suffered  from 
it greatly  fro~  the  point  of  view  of their political influence, 
thei.r  economic  prosperity  and  their cultural  conquests. 
If Europe  wishes  to  avoid  a  very  similar fate  in the 
coming  decades it must  have  the  courage  to  face  the  problems 
which arise in regard  to  multinational  companies  as  in other 
fields.  Let  Europe  beware  of falling  victim  to  the  illusion 
that is still passed.0n by  most  history  textbooks,  namely  that 
history  ended  with  the rise of  the  national States.  History 
will  not  end  until  man  has  ceased  to  search  and  to  discover. 
As  contemporary  man  is searching  and  discovering  more .than 
ever,  there is  no  reason  to  think that  the  national States 
mark  the  end  of his political evolution.  They  only  mark  a 
phase  of it, like the  Greek  miracle,  the  Roman  peace  or  the 
"Christian Republic"  in the  Middle  Ages. -37-
Another  lesson of history,  aad particularly of the 
Renaissance,  is that scientific,  technical,  social,  religious, 
economic,  cultural and political  changes  are  not  independent 
of  each other but  influence  one  another mutually.  There  are 
doubtless  various  ways  of approaching  them,  but it is dangerous 
and,  at  the  extreme  limit,  impossible,  to accept  some  and 
refuse  others. 
The  analysis  of  these  concrete  problems  ~aised by  the 
existence  of multinational  companies  brings  us  back  to  the 
question of  the  valid bargaining partner,  whether it be  in the 
social or the political sphere.  With  the  birth of  multinational 
companies,  economic  structures have  moved  on  to  a  new  "wave-
length"  to  which Europe's social  and  political structures  no 
longer  correspond.  In the light of histo'ry, it is always  the 
structures that refuse  to  evolve  which  go  to  the  wall in the 
long run. 
It remains  to  be  seen how  Europe's social  and political 
structures  can  be  made  to  evolve  so  that they  remain equal  to 
their responsibilities.  That  question is outside  the  scope  of 
this report  and  the  author's  competence.  It is indeed far  from 
depending solely on  the  multinational  company  phenomenon.  To 
put it prop~·l'ly one  would  need  to  ask  :  How  can Europe still 
keep its rank  and  remain faithful  to  the  best  that its tra-
ditions hold  for itself and  for  mankind  at the  hour  of  the 
hegemony  of  continental States? - 38~ 
It is clear that  such  an adjustment  requires  time  ~nd 
\ 
patience.  As  the  proverb says,  we  must  "hasten slowly"  and, 
as  another  adage  has it, patience  and  time  do  more  than force 
and  rage.  But  just  the  same,  let us  take  care  not  to  arrive 
too  late. 
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